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Evert Schoorl (1940–2018) 
Bert Tieben* 
 
 
 
On 24 June 2018 the historian of economic thought Evert Schoorl died 
in his home town, Amsterdam.  
To his colleagues, Evert is best known for his lifelong work on 
Jean-Baptiste Say (1767-1832), the great classical French economist. 
Say formed the topic of his PhD-dissertation in 1980, which was the 
reflection of research he had started 10 years earlier (Schoorl, 1980). 
The dissertation was a blueprint for the research Evert would carry 
out in the decades to come: it combined careful historical analysis 
with an investigation of Say’s economics. We all know Say for his in-
famous ‘law of markets’, but Evert tried to show that the ‘added val-
ue’ of Say’s work was so much more. His thesis presented education 
and population as topics were Say was able to make progress. More-
over he was one of the first to use the Say archive to study the eco-
nomic thought of Say and to sharpen our understanding of the histor-
ical context of his life and work. In 1980 we lacked a proper biog-
raphy of Say. Evert’s thesis was one of the first attempts to fill this 
void. The subject would occupy him for the rest of his professional 
life. After his retirement he found the time to finish the biography: 
Jean-Batiste Say: Revolutionary, Entrepreneur, Economist (Routledge, 
2013).  
How different the situation is today. Thanks to the efforts of An-
dré Tiran and others the study of Jean-Baptiste Say and his work has 
greatly advanced, which resulted in, amongst other things, the publi-
cation of his collected works. In word and print, Evert contributed to 
this development (e.g. Schoorl, 1992; 2002; and 2010). 
Evert’s biography was well received. Inevitably it rekindled the 
debate about the law of markets, exactly the type of discussion Evert 
tried to prevent. But he was very pleased with the assessment of Eve-
lyn Forget in her review for the Journal of the History of Economic 
Thought (Forget, 2015). Forget correctly underlined that Evert aimed 
to combine history and economics. The search of the REAL law of 
markets is fruitless endeavor. Those who want to understand Say’s 
contribution to economics need to appreciate that Say lived in a     
tumultuous period of history. For Evert, Say actively took part in 
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three revolutions: the French revolution, the Industrial revolution and 
the establishment of economics as an academic discipline. The image 
of Say as a revolutionary in several ways forms the backbone of his 
biography. As Forget stressed, a work like this cannot just rely on a 
study of the published works of Say like the Traité d’économie politique 
(1803) and the Cours complet d’économie politique (1828). One of the 
strengths of the work is that Evert relied on the notes, letters and dia-
ries from the Say archive but also on magazine articles and pamphlets 
to bolster his story. Forget acknowledged the “hard work of an histo-
rian of economic thought who tries to understand the historical con-
text within which ideas are developed” and that is exactly what Evert 
tried to achieve.  
Though he may not have belonged to the scientific avant-garde, 
Evert greatly enjoyed his contribution to several international projects 
led by esteemed colleagues, such as Istvàn Hont, Bob Coats, Marco 
Guidi, Michalis Psalidopoulos, José Luis Cardoso and others. Coats, 
the godfather of the sociology of economics approach, became a per-
sonal friend. Through these projects Evert found his second niche: the 
history of Dutch economic thought. Hont’s institutionalization project 
inspired Evert to explore the role of societies in the development of 
Dutch economic thought (Schoorl, 2001). He also teamed up with 
Henk Plasmeijer, an economist whom we remember for his studies on 
the history of marxism in the Netherlands. Evert and Henk formed a 
duo for many years. For Coats’ internationalization project they re-
viewed the development of postwar Dutch economic thought 
(Plasmeijer and Schoorl, 2001). Additionally they explored the role of 
textbooks in the development of 19th and 20th century Dutch economic 
thought (Schoorl and Plasmeijer, 2012). One of their key publications, 
written jointly with E. Buys and I. Maes, is the article “Comparing the 
Development of Economics during the Twentieth Century in Belgium 
and the Netherlands”, which was published in HOPE (2005). His last 
contribution to these international cooperative projects was published 
in José Luís Cardoso’s & Michalis Psalidoupolos’ book on the impact 
of the German Historical School in European Economic Thought. For 
this last work Evert and I wrote the chapter on the Netherlands    
(Tieben and Schoorl, 2016). 
That Evert aimed to combine history and economics is not surpris-
ing: he was trained as both an historian and an economist. In spite of 
his PhD he never considered himself a researcher pur sang. Jokingly 
he would say that he belonged to the academic ‘foot soldiers’. He was 
a devoted teacher of economics and taught the subject on all levels: 
from high school to the post-graduate level. It was perhaps inevitable 
that his career would peak with his appointment as director of the 
graduate school of economics of the University of Groningen, a kind 
of uber teacher as he would say. His activities were not confined to ac-
ademic research and teaching. He acted as ghostwriter and editor of 
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the biographies of several Dutch economists, such as Emile van 
Lennep and Wim Drees. An art-lover, he cherished his first art histor-
ical publication—on the painter Hendrik Valk and his brother, sculp-
tor Willem Valk—just as much as his PhD-dissertation (Van der Laan, 
IJsselstein Mulder and Schoorl, 1999).  
Evert excelled in the social aspect of our science: networking. He 
was a veteran of the diverse history of economic thought conferences 
around the globe. He attended the British history of economics socie-
ty meetings from the early 1970s and hosted one of them at Groning-
en. In the 1990s Evert actively supported the foundation of the Euro-
pean Society of the History of Thought (ESHET). He was present at 
the ESHET founding sessions at Sophia-Antipolis 1994 and certainly 
did not forego the opportunity to enjoy the Mediterranean beach at 
that occasion. That also marked Evert: Enjoy life, while you can. He 
certainly practiced this motto himself. We jointly worked on a paper 
for the conference on Economics and Public Reason at Lausanne, last 
year. Evert planned the present our work there, but unfortunately his 
illness suddenly worsened and prevented him from going. 
In the Netherlands he likewise operated as a bridge-builder be-
tween his two main interests, history and economics. In 2015 he took 
the initiative to organize an informal network for historians and 
economists studying the history of Dutch economic thought. The 
network hosts a successful yearly conference. We will certainly con-
tinue his initiative and shall miss his presence there. A good friend 
and inspiring colleague has passed away.  
Evert left behind his wife Mieke, their three children and grand-
children. 
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Introduction to Economics as a Public  
Science. Part II: Institutional Settings 
Harro Maas*, Steven G. Medema**, and Marco Guidi*** 
 
 
This issue of Œconomia contains the second set of essays that emerged 
from the conference “Economics and Public Reason” hosted in May 2018 
at the Centre Walras-Pareto for the History of Economic and Political 
Thought at the University of Lausanne. 
Keywords: methodology, public reason, expertise, institutions 
Introduction à l’économie comme science publique. 
Partie II : le contexte institutionnel 
Ce numéro d’Œconomia contient la seconde série d’essais issue de la con-
férence « Economics and Public Reason » qui a été organisée en mai 2018 
par le Centre Walras Pareto d’études interdisciplinaires de la pensée éco-
nomique et politique à l’Université de Lausanne. 
Mots-clés : méthodologie, raison publique, expertise, institutions 
JEL: A11, B20, B40, Z18  
 
 
 
In the introduction to the first special issue, we referred to Hirschman 
and Berman’s much cited article of 2014, “Do Economists Make Poli-
cies?” which highlights the importance of what Science and Technol-
ogy Studies refers to as the socio-technical infrastructures of economic 
knowledge production and transmission (Hirschman and Berman, 
2014). We could also have referred to Eyal and Levy’s contribution in 
Mata and Medema’s HOPE conference volume on economists as pub-
lic intellectuals (2013), “Economic Indicators as Public Interventions,” 
in which the authors use the Foucauldian distinction between general 
and specific intellectuals to argue that economists do not gain their 
public traction so much as individuals, but rather through the institu-
tions in which they work or with which they are otherwise associated 
and through the tools they develop. Eyal and Levy then cleverly ap-
ply this argument to the rise to prominence of the GDP as an indica-
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tor of growth. In doing so, they show the close-knit relations between 
economic agents and the modes in which and arenas where they in-
tervened. In this issue we see similar relations between and within, 
for example, the Social Science Research Council, or OECD, and the 
tools and techniques developed and promoted to intervene in the 
public sphere. While John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, in different 
ways, concentrate their analysis of “public reason” on how a political 
society sets its priorities and agrees on its procedures of decision 
making, both Hirschman–Berman and Eyal–Levy remind us that the 
interventions of economists as a rule do not take place in the public 
arena, but gain their effectiveness from the way their tools shape the 
arenas of economic and political decision making, with National In-
come Accounting or Merton–Black–Scholes option pricing as stellar 
examples. This of course opens the door to the larger literature on 
how economists “perform” the economy. It is in this spirit that the 
initial conference behind these two special issues concentrated not on 
economists, but on economics and public reason. 
While the first issue, published as volume 9(2) of Œconomia, fo-
cused on the ethos of economists vis-à-vis their publics and on their 
means of expression (such as models and memos), this issue zooms in 
on the institutional settings in which and through which economists 
become socially and politically relevant. As we noted in the first is-
sue, and emphasize here again, the distinction may seem neat, but in 
the contributions to both issues we see many crossovers between the-
se themes. The institutional settings in which economists operate or in 
which economic tools and thinking are proposed or applied range 
from learned societies which created middle grounds between exper-
iments in households and emerging states, to ad hoc committees of 
economists that mediated between academic economic knowledge 
and hands-on economic policies, to international organizations that 
came to serve as vehicles for specific visions of economic policy. The-
se visions may be concerned with how to translate theories into ac-
tion, or with the promotion of specific tools that serve the same pur-
pose. The essays gathered in this issue also feature a concern with the 
travel of such theories and tools from centers of economic and politi-
cal power to the periphery or the reverse, including the resistance 
with which they are met and/or the need to adjust them to local cir-
cumstances.  
The first two essays find us at opposite ends of the British Empire. 
Aida Ramos uses her contribution to examine how the Dublin Society 
through the eighteenth century functioned as a collective that pro-
moted agricultural and other experimentation to improve the Irish 
condition, in the absence of a central government with other than ex-
ploitative interests. Lacking political clout, the Dublin Society pro-
moted economic innovations and experimentation via prize-schemes 
and, eventually, low-cost publications that spread new, experimental 
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knowledge to a wider audience. As with much of the knowledge 
produced at the time, this was not “pure economic” knowledge in the 
sense of high theory, but it consisted of a mixture of (especially) agri-
cultural and economic experimentation that facilitated the improve-
ment of local constituencies. While focusing on economic knowledge, 
Ramos’s contribution fits in the recent rise of interest in low-key sci-
entific initiatives that transgressed from the homely sphere of the 
family-economy into wider orbits of public conversation.  
With Sharmin Khodaji’s contribution we move from the colonial 
relation between England and Ireland to that between India and 
Great Britain in the early twentieth century. By then, there was a cor-
pus of classical political economic knowledge in Britain that was con-
sidered authoritative, especially when presented to its colonies. It was 
against this authority that a growing group of Indian-trained econo-
mists took a stance. Taking up Mahadev Givind Ranade’s appeal of 
1892 to develop an ‘Indian Political Economy’, these Indian econo-
mists aimed at a political economy that would no longer take its ex-
amples from Britain and Europe, but from Indian local conditions, to 
thus further the growing Indian nationalist creed. Khodaji examines 
how the British colonial administration responded by tightening its 
grip on Indian university teaching through the dissemination of text-
books that reaffirmed the truths of British political economy, yet 
modified their message by allowing the Millian caveat that the uni-
versal laws of political economy do not always manifest themselves 
identically because of disturbing causes coming in their way. Khodaji 
shows how Indian political economists in response increasingly drew 
on the ideas of Friedrich List and the German Historical School, at-
tracted by their focus on protectionism and the need for attention to 
the distinct conditions of different nations as against the classical free-
trade universalism. Some of these texts were intended as academic 
textbooks, while others were targeted at wider audiences but came to 
be used as textbooks as well. Thus, in the early decades of the twenti-
eth century, economic textbooks became the battleground to chal-
lenge the colonial vision of the Indian economy and to carve out an 
Indian road to economic development. 
With the second pair of papers we move to a more recent period in 
history, one in which institutional settings were becoming increasing-
ly formalized. Yet, more or less informal gatherings of economists 
created a space in which new methods of analysis and forecasting 
were ventured or policy advice was whispered that would cater to 
different audiences. Daniel Schiffman and Eli Goldstein tell the story 
of the organization of economic advice in Israel in the short window 
of time between 1952 and 1954 during which a group of American 
Jewish economists was contracted to help the Israeli government with 
the means and goals of economic policy. The young and embattled 
new state was clearly still under construction and highly dependent 
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on external financing for its survival. Using the public choice distinc-
tion between ‘learning’ and ‘signaling’, Schiffman and Goldstein ex-
amine how the Israeli government organized a committee of econom-
ic advisors, somewhat along the lines of the Council of Economic Ad-
visors to the US President. The cast of economic characters hired by 
the Israeli government consisted of high profile American Jewish 
economists, amongst whom was Abba Lerner. The government thus 
aimed to signal to an American audience a willingness to learn, yet it 
did so mainly to the largely liberal and democratic American Jewish 
community—not unimportant for its financial support, but far less so 
to the Eisenhower administration. The increased focus of the US gov-
ernment on the Israeli-Arab conflict also entailed a diminishing inter-
est from the Americans in this economic advisory board. Schiffman 
and Goldstein explain in fascinating detail how the economic adviso-
ry board lost its efficacy and was discontinued when it became en-
meshed in internal Israeli disputes over the meaning of economic 
planning, the weighing of long and short-term economic goals, and 
the importance of nation building over economic efficiency. It is a 
healthy reminder that the road to the performativity of economics is 
paved with failures.  
Reversing the relation between center and periphery, Juan Acosta 
and Erich Pinzón-Fuchs tell the story of the Committee on Economic 
Stability of the Social Research Council, which promoted the use of 
large-scale macro-economic models with even more detail than their 
original Klein and Klein-Goldberger examples, specifying these de-
tails to the level of parameters that could be plugged in for policy 
purposes. Given the fledgling status of empirical macro-economic 
modeling within high-profile economic research centers like Cowles 
in the United States, it is an unlikely story. Yet luminaries such as 
James Duesenberry, Franco Modigliani and, less surprising, Lawrence 
Klein were sitting in the Committee on Economic Stability, working 
towards a conference that would take lessons in the possible benefits 
of macro-econometric modeling for economic policy from smaller 
countries such as Japan, France, Norway, and the Netherlands. If we 
remember that Dutch economist Jan Tinbergen received, with Ragnar 
Frisch, the first Nobel memorial prize in 1969, this may be less sur-
prising, but with a waning of enthusiasm for notions of “planning” in 
the sixties (a notion of importance in Schiffman and Goldstein’s story 
as well), an exploration of the possibilities of macro-econometric 
modeling for policy purposes is remarkable. Though Acosta and Pin-
zón-Fuchs show how the status of participants at the conference on 
quantitative policy analysis organized at the Brookings Institute, with 
financial support of the Ford Foundation, was less than initially ex-
pected, these participants had exactly the right profile to promote 
quantitative macro-econometric modeling within important policy 
institutes such as the Fed. Acosta and Pinzón-Fuchs thus provide an 
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important building block leading to the famous Fed-MIT-Penn mac-
ro-econometric model. A more or less institutionalized group of 
economists interested in macro-econometric modeling and policy 
planning became an enabling device for the acceptance of quantita-
tive policy analysis within highly institutionalized settings such as 
the Fed.   
The last paper deals with economists within international econom-
ic institutes. Pedro Teixeira examines the extent to which ideas within 
the OECD about education changed over time. While Matthias 
Schmelzer recently claimed the early adoption of human capital theo-
ry within the OECD’s growth paradigm, Teixeira nuances 
Schmelzer’s account by distinguishing between such an adoption at 
the macro and micro levels. According to Teixeira, it amounts some-
what to a ‘truism’ that education contributes to economic growth, an 
argument regularly supported with reference to the factor labor in the 
Cobb-Douglas function and Solow’s growth theory. But causal claims 
about links between education, labor productivity growth, and the 
growth of GDP say little about how these links are brought about at 
the micro level. Teixeira then contrasts sympathies within the OECD 
for governmental support for education as a form of long-term plan-
ning for growth with what he takes as an essential element of human 
capital theory in the Mincer-Becker-Schultz program—that is, that 
individuals themselves invest in their own education according to 
market pay-offs. These two views entail very different conceptions of 
the functioning of labor markets. In the first case, labor markets are 
imperfect and in need of governmental steering; in the second case, 
they are institutions that can be left to themselves. Teixeira’s essay 
thus signposts the important point made in Eyal and Levy (2013), that 
economic expertise becomes political exactly when it is searching for 
neutral and technical modes of expression.  
The contributions found in this volume, covering three centuries 
of economic thinking about economic improvement and policy mak-
ing, bring to the fore developments in the types of institutional set-
tings in which such thinking finds its voice. Ranging across friendly 
societies such as the Dublin Society, evolving university curricula, 
more or less informal committees of economic experts, and staff 
economists working in the service of established international institu-
tions, the essays implicitly demonstrate the stabilization of economic 
knowledge and instrument making as a regular and continuing input 
in institutions which themselves came to serve as enabling devices for 
the functioning of the modern capitalist world and the governance 
enterprises that have at times attempted to (re)shape it. 
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* * * 
 
We would be remiss if we did not point out that this symposium 
issue would have contained a sixth contribution were it not for the 
untimely passing away of Evert Schoorl, after an illness that seemed 
to have waned. In March 2018 Evert was in a good mood and expect-
ing to come to Lausanne in May, but in mid-April it became clear his 
illness had returned and he would be unable to attend the workshop. 
Evert Schoorl was a well-known scholar of the work of Jean-Baptise 
Say, and within and outside of the Netherlands highly appreciated 
for his wit and support, especially for young, new students in our 
field. He was also an early participant in and promoter of research on 
the economist’s roles in the public realm and the broader transmis-
sion of economic ideas—projects in which the entrepreneurial work 
of one of us, Marco Guidi, and the late Bob Coats loomed so large. As 
a tribute to Evert’s person and scholarship, we are glad to have Bert 
Tieben’s obituary in this issue and dedicate this two-volume sympo-
sium to his memory. 
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“An Invitation to All Persons:”  
The Dublin Society and Public Reason  
in Eighteenth-Century Ireland 
Aida Ramos* 
 
The paper explores the activities of the Dublin Society as a form of public 
reason. Founded in 1731 when the Irish legislature and all trade policy 
was under the oversight of the British parliament, the Dublin Society un-
dertook two roles usually under the purview of the government: econom-
ic improvement and public reason. Rawls’ definitions of public reason, 
with some qualifications are used. Given the nature of Irish governance, 
the Society transmutes the idea of public reason into the economic realm. 
Through its various projects, experiments, contests, schools, and publica-
tions, which all had public input, the Society develops a process whereby 
factual conclusions and social consensus can be made on the Irish econo-
my. Although it did not fully escape the prejudices of its time, the Society 
provides a larger space than Irish political institutions for members of the 
public to engage in public reason as economic citizens rather than political 
or religious ones. 
Keywords: Dublin Society, public reason, eighteenth-century Ireland, eco-
nomic development, economic growth, Prior (Thomas) 
« Une invitation pour tout le monde » : la Dublin Society et la raison 
publique dans l’Irlande du 18ème siècle 
Cet article explore les activités de la Dublin Society en tant que forme de 
raison publique. Fondée en 1731, alors que la législature irlandaise et 
l’ensemble de la politique commerciale relevaient du parlement britan-
nique, la Dublin Society assumait deux rôles qui relevaient généralement 
du gouvernement : l’amélioration de la situation économique et la raison 
publique. Nous utilisons ici les définitions de la raison publique de Rawls, 
en y apportant toutefois quelques nuances. Compte tenu de la nature de la 
gouvernance irlandaise, la Society transforme l’idée de la raison publique 
dans le domaine économique. À travers ses divers projets, expériences, 
concours, écoles et publications auxquels le public a contribué, la Society 
développe un processus permettant de tirer des conclusions factuelles et 
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de parvenir à un consensus social sur l’économie irlandaise. Bien qu’elle 
n’ait pas complètement échappé aux préjugés de son époque, la Society 
offre aux membres du public un espace plus vaste que les institutions po-
litiques irlandaises pour s’engager dans la raison publique en tant que ci-
toyen économique plutôt que politique ou religieux. 
Mots-clés : Dublin Society, raison publique, 18ème siècle irlandais, 
développement économique, croissance économique, Prior (Thomas) 
JEL: B1, B3, O1 
 
 
 
John Rawls (1997) claims that a political society “has a way of formu-
lating its plans, of putting its ends in an order of priority, and of mak-
ing its decisions accordingly” (93). Public reason is the means by 
which this process is accomplished. Additionally, he says that, a soci-
ety’s “ability to do these things is also its reason, though in a different 
sense: it is an intellectual and moral power, rooted in the capacities of 
its human members” (ibid.). But what happens when the political 
process in a democracy is superseded in some way, such that the di-
rect form of public reason through the political action of its citizens 
and representatives is disrupted? How does public reason assert itself 
when the standard channels for doing so are temporarily disconnect-
ed or disjointed? Can Rawls’ concepts still apply in such a case, or 
does it apply only to politically liberal communities? What I wish to 
explore in this paper is the emergence of public reason in non-
political form in eighteenth-century Ireland in the activities of the 
Dublin Society. 
Founded in 1731, the Society’s stated purpose was to promote the 
economic development of the country through improvement in “hus-
bandry, manufacturing, and the useful arts,” according to the first 
issue of its Weekly Observations (1736-1737, 1). The Society’s goals were 
to be accomplished through several means such as grant-sponsored 
research, contests, widely disseminated publication, experimentation, 
and education, all of which had input from the general public. De-
spite its name, the Society’s impact reached beyond Dublin through a 
variety of projects, publications, and competitions. The Observations 
issued “an invitation to all persons, who truly love their country” to 
share their own best practices with the Society for dissemination 
(1736-1737, 8).1 Similarly, the Society’s subsequent competitions and 
sponsored projects enjoined the participation of all segments of Irish 
society to generate improvement for all of the economy. 
Although acknowledged as “the most successful instrument of so-
cial and economic reform in Ireland in eighteenth century” (Maxwell, 
1949, 201), and “the only national forum for the promotion of enlight-
                                                            
1 The title of the present article is drawn from this passage. 
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ened agricultural practice” (Dickson, 2005, 172), analyses of the Socie-
ty’s work are lacking in the economics literature. Such could be said 
of the study of eighteenth-century Irish economic thought overall, but 
the lack of coverage has started to be rectified for major figures like 
George Berkeley and Jonathan Swift. Berkeley’s monetary theory and 
philosophy are explored in Caffentzis (2000; 2003) and Johnston 
(1940; 1953). More recently Swift’s economic thought has been ana-
lyzed in both his satirical work in Prendergast (2015), and his non-
satirical economic pamphlets in Ramos (2017). The economics litera-
ture on the Dublin Society remains relatively thin. A History of Irish 
Economic Thought (Boylan et al., 2011) mentions the Society but does 
not dedicate an individual chapter to their work. Beyond Salim Ra-
shid’s (1988) contribution as part of his broader discussion of the Irish 
School as a whole, most of the work on the Society has come from 
history and literature, such as in the works of Patrick Kelly (2003), 
James Livesey (2004; 2012), and Gordon Rees (2014), rather than eco-
nomics. Due to its concerns and stated aims, the work and writing of 
the Society is an overlooked chapter of eighteenth-century economic 
thought that deserves further attention. This paper is one attempt to 
do so but focuses on only one aspect of the Society: its interaction 
with the Irish public to generate economic improvement, and how 
this can be viewed as a form of public reason. 
The eighteenth-century Irish economy faced various obstacles. Be-
sides cycles of crop failure, the economy faced restrictions on its ex-
ports due to English trade law, which suppressed local manufactur-
ing. Although Ireland had its own Parliament and was not officially a 
colony of Great Britain, its economic decision-making power was 
constrained by the UK Parliament, which had oversight over Irish 
decisions to ensure that the Irish would not pass legislation that the 
British might perceive to be hurtful to their economic interests. Fur-
ther, the disenfranchisement of most dissenters from the Church of 
Ireland, Catholics, and the native Irish meant that any public reason-
ing that took place between the parliament and the people was neces-
sarily limited. Rawls discusses public reason in terms of the political, 
but he acknowledges that it does not only take place in the political 
realm. I argue that the Dublin Society, in the absence of the Irish gov-
ernment’s will or capability, engaged in a form of public reason in an 
attempt to accomplish in the economic realm what seemed impossible 
in the political realm: the improvement of the Irish economy. The So-
ciety’s publications and meetings became a locus of discourse on the 
Irish economy where needs and concerns could be expressed and 
Irish solutions to them could be generated and disseminated without 
interference from Westminster. The Society initiated public reason on 
economic matters through its invitation for public input to its publica-
tions and meetings, and sponsoring of public competitions to discov-
er best practices in a variety of fields. Through their work and public 
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engagement, the Society thus undertook activities concerning eco-
nomic growth and development that under freer political circum-
stances the government would perform. 
Section one provides the political and economic context of eight-
eenth-century Ireland in which the Society formed. In section two, the 
activities of the Society are discussed as a form of public reason on 
economic issues. Examples of the Society’s public interaction are 
drawn from its publications, projects, and competitions concerning 
agriculture, arts, science, and education. Section three explores the 
ways in which the Society functioned like a government ministry 
both in its operation and in its advocacy of public participation, self-
sufficiency, and domestically generated solutions. The extent to 
which the Society did and did not deal effectively with the biases of 
eighteenth-century Anglo-Irish political and social views, is discussed 
in the conclusion in section three. 
1. The Irish Economy in the Eighteenth Century  
and Early Responses 
The Irish economy in the eighteenth century was severely disadvan-
taged by English trade policies fueled by mercantilist theory. Given 
the English mercantilist theory of nation building, as described by 
Lars Magnusson (2002; 2015), economic plenty was desired in order 
to assert and display national power. The mercantilist framework to 
maximize specie, trade, and power provided the economic rationale 
for England’s Navigation Acts and subsequent restrictions on the 
wool trade. Due to the possibility that English exports to the colonies 
and the English cattle market would suffer from Irish competition, 
the Navigation Acts of 1660 prohibited Irish exports to the colonies 
and in 1663 prohibited the Irish export of cattle to England. Duties 
imposed on Irish wool in 1699 destroyed the next best Irish industry. 
By 1701 exports had fallen by one-third compared to 1698 (Connolly, 
2008, 344). In strict mercantilist fashion, Ireland was to be used as a 
source of raw materials for English manufacturing and England 
would have the sole privilege of exporting finished goods. The re-
strictions of the Acts had crippling effects on the majority of the coun-
try.2 
The decline of Irish industry increased competition for land use. 
Due to the prohibition against cattle exports, in the 1670s Irish cattle 
owners began to sell hides, dairy products, and tallow to other Euro-
pean markets and the plantations and sheep owners began to increase 
their flocks to sell raw wool to England, which was not prohibited. 
Landowners began to use more of their land for pasturage than till-
                                                            
2 A major exception was the linen industry, which experienced immense growth 
due to demand from the English market (see Dickson, 2000, 114-116 and 138-141). 
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age, leaving tenant farmers less land on which to plant, leading to 
food shortages in the early 1700s that led to further economic decline 
due to emigration. In 1713 a period of respite came after the Peace of 
Utrecht ended the War of the Spanish Succession, and restored Irish 
trade with the Continent. However, food shortages due to a weak 
harvest in 1720 led to an increase in food imports, and the collapse of 
the South Sea Bubble in the same year led to a decrease in demand 
from England for Irish goods. The Bubble had the additional deleteri-
ous effects of first broadening the prospects for and then eroding the 
wealth of subscribers from Ireland. Due to the restriction of its ex-
ports, increasing demand for English imports, and absentee land-
lords’ expenditure of their rental income abroad, Ireland faced a coin-
age crisis for most of the early to mid eighteenth century. A series of 
crop failures in from 1727-1729 compounded the difficulties already 
in place and led to more economic hardship. At the same time the 
Irish Parliament was limited in the actions it could take to rectify the 
situation. The centuries-old Poynings’ Law gave the English Parlia-
ment oversight over drafts of Irish legislation and the Declaratory Act 
of 1720 granted the UK Parliament the power to create laws for Ire-
land. Any changes in Irish policy that were suspected to advantage 
Ireland over Great Britain would be vetoed (Connolly, 2008, 344-350; 
Dickson, 2018; Kelly, 1991; Kelly, 2003, 128-130). 
In the midst of these economic and political challenges, an argu-
ment arose in the popular pamphlet literature that the Irish should 
take steps to change their situation through economic rather than po-
litical means. Jonathan Swift, George Berkeley, and others pointed to 
the illogical nature of Ireland’s poverty, given its abundant natural 
resources and healthy population size. Swift powerfully protests the 
country’s condition in the Universal Use of Irish Manufactures in 1720, 
just one of a number of non-satirical pamphlets he wrote on economic 
matters. Rather than condemning either the Irish people, as was the 
standard English response to Ireland’s poverty since the time of Wil-
liam Temple, he condemns the trade restrictions which caused ex-
ported wool to be lucrative and fields turned to pasturage rather than 
tillage, the penal laws, the excessive imports of consumers, and over-
all inaction of the Irish legislature to amend the situation. Acknowl-
edging that political solutions are not forthcoming he instead argues 
that changes in domestic consumption would improve the country’s 
output, employment, and income. Berkeley argues similarly for a 
change in consumption patterns in The Querist (1735-1737). 
The founder of the Dublin Society, Thomas Prior, a successful land 
agent who worked closely with the landlord class, shared Berkeley’s 
and Swift’s opinions on the causes of Ireland’s economic issues. Pre-
vious to establishing the Society, Prior published A List of the Absen-
tees of Ireland (1729), which asserted that landlords should engage in 
improvement of their lands and the encouragement of Irish agricul-
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ture and manufactures rather than spending Irish money abroad. Pri-
or discussed three classes of landlords, who spent most, some, or 
none of their time in Ireland and their yearly expenditures outside of 
the country and expenditures by the wealthy in Ireland on imported 
goods (ibid., 1-17). Thus even those landlords who spent their time in 
Ireland were responsible for its lack of domestic demand. Like Swift 
and Berkeley, Prior advocated that the landed class stop importing 
goods from Britain that could be produced in Ireland. This theory of 
demand-driven growth for the economy through import substitution 
is common among the writings of the Irish School, whose prominent 
members include Swift, Berkeley, Prior, David Bindon, Samuel Mad-
den, and Arthur Dobbs.3 With this demand-based theory in mind, 
Prior founded the Society and he and his fellows set about imple-
menting ways in which they and the public could establish improved 
methods and disseminate knowledge of better practices across the 
country to increase Irish production and demand for Irish goods. 
The Dublin Society is regarded as one of a number of “improving” 
societies that preceded and existed alongside it in the eighteenth cen-
tury, as discussed in Stapelbroek and Marjanen (2012). It was aligned 
with the ideas of betterment of self and society and a belief in a better 
future that Paul Slack (2015) identifies as arising in seventeenth-
century England. The Dublin Society also shared with other improv-
ers the stress on dissemination of knowledge and the harnessing of 
information and experiment to accomplish improvement (1-8). There 
were other Irish improving societies in the eighteenth century, but as 
David Hayton (2012) explains, contemporary groups focused various-
ly on religious, personal, and social improvement. To some im-
provement meant the conversion of Irish Catholics to Protestantism; 
to some landlords it meant the establishment of ornamental gardens 
as a form of conspicuous consumption; and to others it meant the 
spread of “civility” through the education of the native population in 
English speech and customs (ibid., 175-198). To the Dublin Society 
improvement meant dedicated research, discussion, application, and 
dissemination of practices that generated economic growth and de-
velopment. Other Irish improvement organizations narrowed their 
focus to individual issues, such as the Incorporated Society’s promo-
tion of Protestant education. The Dublin Society was unique amongst 
its fellows for its diffuse support for improvement across the econo-
my, in agriculture, industry, the arts, sciences, education, and infra-
                                                            
3 Rashid notes that the aims of the Irish thinkers differed from those of later 
Scottish political economy in that Smith seeks “to maximize the monetary value 
of the nation’s output,” but the Irish sought to generate full employment (1988, 
3). While full employment is a major theme of the Irish writers, their theory of 
increasing growth through changes in domestic consumption patterns is also 
important and distinctive in an age of mercantilist growth theory focused on 
external trade that shaped English policy and practice. 
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structure. The Society’s closest intellectual predecessor, the Society of 
Improvers of Knowledge in Agriculture, founded in Scotland in 1723, 
was similarly concerned solely with economic change rather than re-
ligious conversion. Members were invited to participate in the collec-
tion and discussion of knowledge from their own practices and exper-
iments in agriculture and husbandry. Input was sought from farmers 
the members interacted with, but they did not invite the general pub-
lic to submit and discuss their ideas (Bonnyman, 2012). The Dublin 
Society was thus unique also in that it called for dialogue and partici-
pation in its activities from people across a broad range of occupa-
tions and interests. 
Besides its economic focus and partnership with the general pub-
lic, the Society also differs from the other improvement societies in its 
political context and its rhetoric that viewed all Irish people, regard-
less of class, religion, or other characteristics, as contributors to the 
economic success of the nation. James Livesey (2004) views the Socie-
ty’s work as an attempt to form a civil society for Ireland in the ab-
sence of a normalized system of governance. Similarly, I argue that 
the Society focuses on the economic realm as the civil, creating eco-
nomic governance for themselves in the absence of political govern-
ance by the Irish people for themselves. As a private association it 
could achieve what the Irish government was not allowed to: the im-
plementation of public-sanctioned, positive economic change without 
British approval. 
2. The Society’s Projects, Publications,  
and Public Participants 
2.1. The Projects of the Society 
The Society both conducted a variety of projects in private and spon-
sored experiments and contests for the public. All of them focused on 
economic improvement. Samuel Madden helped establish a fund for 
granting premiums for certain activities and grants for those who 
proposed the best ideas. His plan for the Premium Fund was present-
ed to the Society and passed. Mostly the fund was intended for the 
development of manufacturing of goods that were currently being 
imported but could easily be produced in Ireland, such as lace, paper, 
saltpeter, and table goods. Madden appealed to Society members and 
prominent members of Irish society at large to subscribe to the fund, 
and provided seed money himself. He also advocated that the Society 
begin experimental farms, all near Dublin, in order to test different 
kinds of soil and establish best practices for agriculture (Madden, 
1739). 
In 1740, the Society placed an ad in all Irish newspapers of their in-
tention to encourage manufacturing and the arts through grant fund-
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ing. The ad further stated that, “To carry out this design, they desire 
that gentlemen and others who are conversant with husbandry, trade, 
and manufactures, and wish well to their country, will favour them 
with their company and advice” in order to have the best input on the 
variety of trades and what practices should be encouraged, “what 
encouragements are convenient, and in what manner they may be 
best applied for the benefit of the public” (ibid., 1). 
Premiums were granted for experiments on growing flax, produc-
ing linen, improvements in agricultural implements, growing of vari-
ous vegetables and grains, and also for the arts. Contests were also 
established for painting and sculpture as well as largest orchard of 
fruit trees, largest field of wheat, and so on. Because the markets 
themselves were not sufficient to provide economic incentives for 
improved production, the Society provided the initial seed through 
cash and silver prizes. It was the public who determined best practic-
es through the outcomes of their experiments or through competition 
with each other and the Society who made sure the results were pub-
lished and disseminated. Winners of the grant premiums were re-
quired to report the results of their experiments first to a local author-
ity such as a magistrate or clergyman, who then reported to the Socie-
ty. Successful applicants had their methods and results published by 
the Society in pamphlet form. A committee was formed to oversee the 
process and judge the samples presented by applicants. Rewards 
were also advertised in 1740 for the best hops, lace, cider, thread, and 
flaxseed, among others (Berry, 1915, 55). 
Those who applied for the premiums included not only those in 
manufacturing and husbandry, but also in the fine arts. The first pre-
miums were awarded to those who worked in linen, napkins, lace, 
and for improvement of ploughs and shears, and “instruments for 
spinning, weaving, and cutting fustians” (ibid., 56). A new round of 
premiums was then advertised for wheat, barley, and hops, and the 
greatest number of fruit trees, largest quantity of wheat, and other 
similar ventures. Premiums for sculpture and brewing followed in 
1742 and extended to projects as varied as hats, cider, glassware, rags 
for the paper trade, art, and literature in the years following (Premi-
ums, 1768). By 1769, premiums were being offered for the production 
of a variety of goods, such as silk, wool, leather, iron, steel, glassware, 
earthenware, saltpeter, and oil of vitriol. Rewards were also given for 
land reclamation (bog-clearing), building a better jail, improved 
thread milling, cotton manufacture, and other agricultural exploits 
and exploration. 
Educational outreach was also an important part of the Society’s 
work. The Society’s Drawing School and the School of Art, which 
promoted painting and sculpture, were established in the 1740s. At-
tendance was free for all students from 1749 until 1849 when tuition 
began to be charged (Berry, 1915, 135). The purpose of the schools 
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was not simply to further the fine arts in Ireland, but also to prepare 
its students for professional occupations and thus further contribu-
tions to Ireland’s society and economic improvement. For instance the 
Plan of Instruction for the Drawing School discusses the inclusion of 
courses in mathematics, geometry, and the natural sciences purpose-
fully to prepare students for occupations in navigation, engineering, 
astronomy, and related fields (Fenn, 1769). 
John Wynne Baker, an English agriculturalist, was hired by the So-
ciety in 1764 to conduct initial experiments in growing cabbages and 
turnips. On the Society’s behalf he began an apprenticeship program 
for youths in husbandry and began to manufacture better farming 
tools than those currently available in Ireland. The Society published 
his plan of instruction in 1765. In 1772 a committee was established to 
assess the progress of the country in literature and the arts. Schools of 
Chemistry and Mineralogy were established in 1786. The Society’s 
Library was established in 1731, in accordance with its rule that all 
literature pertaining to improvement at home and abroad be pur-
chased and maintained. Members also donated their own writings 
and results of experiments. 
The work of the Society was undertaken with the cooperation of 
other private and public forces. In the 1730s a number of gardens 
were purchased for the purpose of experimenting but these plans 
were abandoned eventually in 1740. The project of establishing the 
Society’s Botanic Garden was successfully brought to fruition in 1790. 
Undertaken with the cooperation of the University of Dublin and the 
College of Physicians, it is assumed that the Garden’s purpose was 
seen as one contributing to instruction and improvement in botany 
and medicine rather than as purely ornamental (Berry, 1915, 186-188). 
Manufacturers and merchants likewise cooperated with the 1764 pro-
ject of establishing warehouses for the retail silk and wool trades, for 
the sale only of silks and wools made in Ireland. A percentage of sales 
would go to the Irish manufacturers (ibid., 198-200). 
2.2. Publications of the Society 
The Society was fortunate to exist in a time when Irish print was ex-
panding, which allowed them to more easily disseminate their ideas 
and engage with the public. In 1732 the Society hired the printer Aa-
ron Rhames to publish its work (Munter, 1967, 166). The Society pub-
lished pamphlets containing essays and letters by both members, in-
dividuals hired to complete specific projects, and members of the 
public who the Society felt could contribute to the improvement of 
knowledge of improved methods in agriculture, husbandry, and the 
arts. For instance, multiple pamphlets by Baker on agricultural meth-
ods were published in the 1760s and early 1770s. It also annually pub-
lished ads for the upcoming premium competitions and detailed out-
comes of the previous year’s contests. Most of the pamphlet essays 
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were on agricultural topics, such as The Management of Bees (1733), An 
Account of Saffron (1734), and the Art of Curing and Tanning (1764), but 
also expanded into other areas concerning development. Prior’s pub-
lications, An Essay to Encourage and Extend the Linen Manufacture in 
Ireland (1749), A Proposal for Erecting Granaries in the City of Dublin 
(1741), and an essay on the wonders of tar water, also demonstrate 
the varied areas of interest of the Society. 
Recognizing that there were many in Ireland who could benefit 
from its findings but who had limited income, the Society also pub-
lished its Weekly Observations in the less expensive Dublin News Letter 
in 1732. The essays were so popular that they were regularly copied 
in two other major Dublin newspapers, Pue’s Occurrences and the 
Dublin Journal.4 Regional papers, such as the Belfast New-Letter also 
regularly copied the essays into its contents (Munter, 1967, 166 and 
n2). Given this and that the Dublin newspapers were circulated 
throughout the country, the Society’s essays and advertisements 
reached the public beyond Dublin.5 The Observations encouraged in-
put from its readers and often included lengthy sections from the 
readership on various matters related to agriculture, the wool and 
linen trade, and other manufactures. It also continued to post lengthy 
ads encouraging application for its continued grants and rewards sys-
tems.6 The advertisement in the frontispiece of volume I, issue 2 of the 
digested version of the Observations states that it is circulated for free 
to its members, whose numbers included 800 in Dublin alone and the 
“principal Nobility and Gentry of Ireland, and to the leading Scien-
tific Institutions of the United Kingdom” and will also be sold to the 
public (n.p.). Subsequent issues of the newsletter covered various top-
ics from members’ scientific studies to Irish natural resources. 
In the first issue of the Weekly Observations the authors explain that 
the Society’s members also published pamphlets to communicate 
their ideas. The author asserts that ideas in the shorter newsletter will 
have more of a direct impact because “Directions to the Husbandman 
and others, confined and cramped by the Dimension of the Paper, 
something must be lost of the clearness and exactness, which are ab-
                                                            
4 The Society also placed ads in these papers. Some contemporaries said that 
Catholics preferred Pue’s Occurences and Protestants preferred the Dublin Journal 
(Barnard, 2014, 65). Thus the Society may have allowed the reprint of its essays, 
and certainly the circulation of its ads in all papers, to reach both groups. 
Circulation numbers were approximately 2,000 per paper in the 1720s and saw 
increases throughout the eighteenth century (Munter, 67-90). However, because 
more people than just the individual buyer of a paper accessed its contents, the 
circulation estimates do not fully indicate the number of readers. 
5 Barnard (2010) estimates that the Society published announcements of its 
premiums in 1000 pamphlets and in 2000 broadsides (79). As mentioned in note 
4, due to how print material changed hands and was read aloud, the numbers of 
people that this information reached likely exceeded these numbers. 
6 The Society established a formal Journal in 1855. 
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solutely requisite to make such Writings useful” and that this new 
format will make the Society’s instructions “more distinct and more 
explicit” (ibid., 4). The newsletter was a source not for rumination but 
for communicating direct practical knowledge to readers who would 
implement it. 
The introduction also stresses the benefits of the succinct newslet-
ter over pamphlets in that “Pamphlets fall into few hands, and are 
useful only to those only who are in a Capacity to purchase, and at 
leisure to peruse them” (ibid., 6). In terms of income classes, the Soci-
ety wanted to reach not only the wealthy reading public who had 
time and money to ponder the contents of pamphlets but also those of 
lesser means in time and money. Pamphlets were reasonably priced 
at 1 to 2 pence each in the first half of the eighteenth century, such 
that “these prices put the costs within the reach of a substantial pro-
portion of the literate anglophone population” (Kelly, 2006, 217). The 
Society thus was trying to make their work even more accessible 
through the availability of the even lower cost newsletter.7 
The main intended readers of the weekly publication were those 
who would implement the knowledge of the Society in their hus-
bandry and production. Rather than publishing instruction for the 
wealthy, the newsletter was intended for the lower and middle in-
come classes: “The poorer sort, the Husbandman and Manufacturer, 
are the proper Objects of Instruction, which can hardly ever reach 
them in any other Method other than the present” (ibid., 6-7). 
The stated purpose of the Society and the Weekly Observations are 
in the first volume: 
Their Intention is not to amuse the Publick, with nice and labored Specula-
tions; or to enrich the learned World … But to direct the Industry of com-
mon Artists; and to bring practical and useful Knowledge from the Re-
tirements of Libraries and Closets into publick View: in short, to be uni-
versally beneficial is their only End (ibid., 7). 
This end was to be attained either through new discovery, or making 
known old discoveries through publications, “by conveying present 
Knowledge, or by conveying it into more Hands,” (ibid., 8). 
Although the weekly was mostly intended for tradesmen and 
those working in husbandry and agriculture, the newsletter extended 
its invitation to participation to “all Persons, who truly love their 
                                                            
7 The Society’s various publications appeared at a time of immense growth and 
circulation of Irish print. Growth in literacy, estimated to be near 80% among the 
Anglo-Irish of both upper and middle class incomes, increased demand from 
middle class urban and rural readers, and access to more printing presses 
contributed to the increase of numbers of pamphlets and newspapers (Kelly, 
2006, 219). Barnard (2014) details the surge in printing in Ireland in the early 
1700s. Works on “improvement and utility” had increased from 1% of total titles 
in 1719 to 10% in 1729. By 1739 the percentage had fallen to 7% but was the fourth 
most popular category of printed works in Ireland (47). 
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Country” (ibid.). They asked the public to submit their own experi-
ments, observations, comments, and criticism to the Society and the 
weekly newsletter. It regularly published letters from the public to 
add insight and sometimes correction on the suggestions of previous 
issues’ observations. Letters and essays criticizing suggestions that 
had appeared in previous issues and offering different solutions were 
also published. Reasoned argument on the best soil in which to grow 
flax (vol 1, issues 8-15), “Directions for Making Roads (issues 21-22), 
“Instructions for Making Cyder” and others on turnips, flax, bogs, 
brewing, and raising riverbanks to avoid floods are examples of the 
contents, some of which were reprinted with expanded details in 
pamphlet form. 
The Weekly Observations ceased publication in 1740 when the Socie-
ty put more of its focus on the premiums for encouraging improve-
ment. The accounts and the proceedings of the Society were also pub-
lished at least since the 1760s, making the processes of the Society 
transparent, as if they were a formal public institution. 
Neither a lack of income nor a lack of literacy was a barrier to 
those who wanted to know the news or a familiarity with popular 
print. Newspapers were commonly lent to coffee house customers 
and were read aloud in taverns and other public spaces for those who 
could not read (Barnard, 2014, 67-68 and Kennedy, 2012, 148-149). 
The native Irish were not excluded from the proliferation of print. 
Although very few works were printed in Irish, most of the native 
Irish were bilingual and thus had access to the same English print cul-
ture as the Anglo-Irish. Additionally, works in English were often 
purchased and then translated by hand or read to others in Irish 
(Barnard, 2014, 17-20). Therefore those native Irish who participated 
in the Society’s competitions learned about them not only through 
word of mouth or local magistrates, but also through the print cul-
ture. The Society’s active use of various forms print both disseminat-
ed its economic ideas and allowed it to reach beyond its own mem-
bership to include other parts of the Irish public. 
2.3. The Public Contributors 
The activity of the Society was neither for the sole benefit of its mem-
bers nor Dubliners alone, but for the growth and development of the 
country of Ireland. Its activity meets Rawlsian criteria because the 
practices and ideas that were promoted by the Society were not de-
veloped by the membership of the Society alone. Society members 
tended to be lawyers, businessmen, physicians, clergy, gentry, and 
politicians but the participants in the competitions and projects of the 
Society came from varied professions. Craftsmen, agriculturalists, 
artists and others all provided their input either in writing, through 
presentation of results, or by winning a competition that had proved 
one’s methods yielded the best results. 
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Widespread public participation can be gauged by the Society’s 
pamphlets on the upcoming year’s competitions, which each had 
hundreds of categories, and the lists of the competition winners. Once 
the premium system was instituted, ads were placed throughout the 
country in newspapers and in the Society’s newsletters announcing 
the categories of competition, such as for the person who could pro-
duce the most honey and beeswax, plant the most oak trees, plant the 
greatest quantity of hops, establish fisheries in certain locations, pro-
duce the most linen, or produce the most lace. The competitions also 
included art and writing on various subjects, such as the 1765 entries 
for the person who could write a natural history of Ireland and an-
other to write a “farmer’s calendar,” indicating adherence to the Soci-
ety’s goal of gathering and disseminating practical knowledge to all 
people (ibid., 21). The lists of winners published every year show that 
people from various professions, including small holding farmers, 
milliners, brewers, artisans, artists, farmers, miners, silversmiths, pa-
permakers, clothmakers, clergy, and merchants participated from 
both high- and low-income groups (see Premiums). Even the rat catch-
er Michael Neadley was awarded a premium for catching and killing 
1300 rats with ferrets and nets (National Review, 1890-1891, 797). 
Unlike the formal political processes in Ireland, anyone who was 
resident in Ireland and earned below a certain income could compete 
for the Society’s numerous awards. The rules of the premiums also 
attempted to level the playing field between wealthy landowners and 
smaller agriculturalists. Those with incomes above £2000 or holders 
of 200 or more acres of land were barred from cash prizes for those 
categories for “renters of land,” but could still receive medals if they 
met criteria for improvements (1765, 22). To maintain fairness, Society 
members similarly could only earn medals rather than cash prizes. 
Catholics and Presbyterians were allowed to participate, which they 
could not fully do in all areas of the rest of Irish social and political 
life. Catholics often won the premium competitions (Barnard, 2010). 
As Samuel Madden observed, the majority of tradesmen and “at least 
four-fifths” of laborers were Catholic and thus an improved economy 
depended upon their participation (1739, 193). 
Although men feature largely in the publications of the Society, 
the presence and active contribution of women is seen in the competi-
tion winners and also in the input published by the Society. The Soci-
ety’s published accounts of premium winners show that women won 
many of the premiums for knitting, lace, spinning, and production of 
dyes. They also directly competed with men as the 1758 award to 
both Elizabeth Nix and George Kent for cutlery attests (Accounts, 
1764). Women were also represented in the awards for agriculture 
and planting of fruit trees and elms (Berry, 1915, 62). In 1732 the Soci-
ety published a letter from Abigail Greenfield, a dairy farmer, who 
wrote on behalf of her field asking the Society to research the best 
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methods for cheese making and included other practical advice. Be-
sides accepting input from women on improved practices, the Society 
also supported women’s entrepreneurship. Elizabeth Madden, a wid-
ow of a reverend with thirteen children, requested a premium for a 
thread manufacturing enterprise, and was awarded £100 to purchase 
a mill and other equipment (Sonnelitter, 113). 
Youth participation can also be seen in various competitions, espe-
cially in the arts, for example in the award for the best drawing by 
boys or girls under fifteen years old. The Society also engaged with 
younger people through its educational programs. Children and 
youths from all classes were eligible for places in the Society’s acade-
mies for the arts and drawing. Entrance depended upon ability, test-
ed through an entrance exam, rather than income as the tuition for 
students was paid for by the Society. A perhaps less savory form of 
engagement of the young were premiums awarded for “most em-
ployment of children” by a single employer as in the 1765 premium 
announcements, the objective of which was to reduce household pov-
erty. 
Through the trial and error process of experimentation and com-
petition, the current best practices available were arrived at by many 
sectors of society together. Input from the wealthier reading public 
and the poorer were both included in the publications of the group. 
Anyone demonstrating a proper level of ability could attend the Soci-
ety’s schools. Therefore the solutions to an array of issues in Irish 
production and longer-term growth were developed by the Society 
not through authoritarian or arbitrary decision-making but in con-
junction with those of the Irish public who chose to participate. The 
knowledge gained from these processes was disseminated as widely 
as possible through print and through sponsored demonstrations, 
making the reasoning of the participants transparent. The solutions 
and methods generated were not for the benefit of any one person, 
although an individual farmer or essayist might gain momentary in-
dividual financial gain and renown, but were for the improvement of 
all economic sectors and thus the entirety of the country. 
3. Public Reason, Paternalism, and Public Success 
To what extent the Society saw itself as creating a substitute for what 
would otherwise be the activities of a properly functioning Irish gov-
ernment can be debated. They were aware that they were conscious 
in taking actions in order to advance Ireland’s economy because they 
knew that on the one hand they could not wage this battle through a 
change in Irish legislation and on the other that even if the Naviga-
tion Acts and Penal Laws were to change there were still changes re-
quired in Irish production methods and the dissemination of 
knowledge that needed to occur. The published works of the leader-
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ship were always careful to discuss the work of the Society in terms of 
improvement rather than alternate governance, for understandable 
political reasons. Thus they often presented their work as an expres-
sion of patriotism for Ireland and asserted that Ireland’s prosperity 
would add to rather than harm British greatness. Joep Leersen (1986) 
shows that Madden and Arthur Dobbs in particular appeal to readers 
that to promote the commerce of Ireland is a part of promoting the 
commerce of Great Britain (349-350). 
However, the different methods in production and choices in con-
sumption encouraged by the Society were seen by the Society leader-
ship as a means to create their own “laws.” Samuel Madden wrote, 
“Though we cannot at will make acts of parliament the nation, we can 
certainly prescribe laws for ourselves and our own conduct” and cau-
tions gentlemen in individual households to make their choices in 
alignment with the good of the country (1738, 29). The Society was 
organized similarly to a government ministry overseeing the econo-
my, with subcommittees and an official presence in different regions 
of the country. Initially the founding members were each charged 
with building expertise through research and experimentation in a 
particular area of agriculture, husbandry, trade, the arts, science, and 
any other field deemed useful to improve the economic situation of 
the country. The member overseeing a particular area also directed 
the experiments and had a say in the publications and presentations 
of the public to the Society in his area of expertise. In terms of local 
governance and representation, the Society eventually established the 
system recommended by Madden in the 1730s. Rather than rely on 
local magistrates and clergy to report back to the Society, committees 
of local Society members were established in the major cities across 
the country to establish more organized communications and dis-
bursement of award funds between Dublin and the people of the 
country and for local participants to more easily apply for premiums 
or to have their work presented at the Dublin meetings (Premiums, 
1775). 
The members charged with developing an expertise in an area 
eventually each became heads of committees for the categories above 
mentioned. However it was not until 1773 that a select Committee on 
Commerce was established to oversee matters relating to manufactur-
ing and trade, including gathering information not only on produc-
tion, imports, and exports, but also on matters that affected them such 
as agriculture, population, and “the oppression of poor working 
manufacturer by low wages” (Appendix 12). The Committee on 
Commerce is very clear that it is performing a similar role as that of 
government boards in other countries. They observe that “every state 
in Europe have their Chambers of Commerce” and that Great Britain 
“has her Board of Trade,” but that Ireland had been denied such a 
means of gathering useful information on matters relating to manu-
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facturing and trade. Although they know that they could not engage 
in free exportation, the council saw itself as a means to analyse the 
Irish trade defects and to improve wages “for the industrious poor” 
(ibid., 5-6). The report of the Committee further opines that they 
could also be useful in recommending policy to the legislature and 
that the reason the government had given funds to the Society for dis-
tribution was because the government realized that the Society mem-
bers were “the most proper judges of applying their bounty to the 
advantage of the country” (ibid., 6). 
Thus there is by the late eighteenth century acknowledgment not 
only by the Society, but also informally by the Irish government that 
the Society is performing functions of governance. Rees (2014) ob-
serves that the Irish legislature passed agricultural bills on the sub-
jects addressed in the Society’s pamphlets and contests, but always 
after the Society had done so. Political action on economic issues was 
driven by the Society rather than the other way around. The Parlia-
ment had made its own premium scheme publicly available but the 
general public would not participate. The Society applied for the 
funds with the proposals for their various experiments and premiums 
schemes, thus establishing a means for the Parliament funding to 
reach its intended sources. Eventually Parliament did away with its 
premium scheme and allotted annual direct grants of £12,000 to the 
Dublin Society starting in 1761 (1 Geo III, c. 1). This indicates that the 
Society had a stronger relationship with the public than the Parlia-
ment did.8 In addition to allowing it to purchase land, the royal char-
ter granted to the Society in 1750 gave official recognition to what was 
already informally known. 
In many ways the Society was seen to be more effective than the 
Irish government in engagement with many sectors of society and 
accomplishment of economic goals. They were able to generate the 
public’s enthusiasm “to engage nationally with National concerns, 
and pursue the common welfare with a truly publick spirit,” as the 
final issue of the Weekly Observations exhorted its readers to do (1736-
1737, 342). Observers outside of the Society also noted its success rela-
tive to the government. The English Lord Chesterfield wrote to 
Thomas Prior in 1747 that the Dublin Society “have done more good 
to Ireland, with regard to arts and industry, than all the laws that 
could have been formed” and emphasized their use of premiums as a 
form of public “invitation” (6 May 1747). Chesterfield also confided to 
Madden his fear that the “infinite good” done by the Society could be 
                                                            
8 This is of course also not to say that the perception of the people was always 
correct. The Parliament’s premium scheme, its support for the Society, and its 
encouragement of the Linen Board and linen industry indicates its members 
knew and understood the importance of economic development. Indeed, as 
Dickson shows, several Irish M.P.s were also members of the Dublin Society 
(2005, 172). 
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threatened once it had a charter, that due to the parliamentary fund-
ing that such entailed, it could “become subservient to the worst ra-
ther than the best designs” (15 September 1748). In becoming behold-
en to the government for its charter and some of its funding, the Soci-
ety could lose its ability to be an effective economic ministry working 
with the public for the public interest. 
The Society’s engagement also reached beyond Ireland. Again 
mimicking a government function, the Society had a secretary for for-
eign affairs, of which Thomas Prior was the first, to provide outreach 
to other countries’ improving societies and to exchange knowledge 
with one another (Berry, 1915, 21 and Livesey, 2012). Besides the var-
ious projects outlined, the Society also established programs for the 
poor and those unable to work, and incentives for local solutions to 
unemployment. A pharmacy for the poor, the Pharmacopeia Pau-
perum, was established in 1767 and overseen by the chemist John 
Wade. The pharmacy not only supplied the poor with “pure, unadul-
terated medicines” but also provided medical advice and simple 
treatment free of charge. By 1770 the pharmacy had treated 1570 pa-
tients in Dublin and its surrounding area (Dublin Quarterly, 90-92). 
Although not offered every year, premiums in many years were of-
fered for the city that could eliminate begging by providing employ-
ment for the indigent. Kilkenny won in 1745 for employing over a 
hundred former beggars (National Review, 797). Premiums were also 
regularly offered, according to the Society’s reports for “discharged 
soldiers,” “employment of the blind,” and “employment of children” 
(Premiums, 1768). 
How then is the Dublin Society, as a private organization, not a 
private association as defined by Rawls, such as churches, universi-
ties, and other groups, making decisions for the public? I argue that 
the Dublin Society is a different case of a private association working 
not only on behalf of the public, but also with the public. The Society’s 
interaction with the public manifested itself in a variety of forms. 
Members of the Irish public were able to generate input into the pro-
jects of the Society, and therefore of their own economy, as they 
would have done in a politically independent situation. The Society 
was strongly egalitarian in its outlook that improvement was for eve-
ryone and made efforts to disseminate its knowledge to the relevant 
segments of the public. Because the Society viewed all citizens as par-
ticipants in the economic community, it offered a sense of egalitarian-
ism in participation and a voice to effect change that the political 
realm did not offer. 
3.1. Public Reason and Paternalism 
It is relevant to question to what extent the actions of the Society, de-
spite its laudable activities and rhetoric of inclusion, improved upon 
or simply maintained attitudes of paternalism of the Anglo-Irish rul-
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ing class towards the Irish people. Did the Society merely replicate 
the paternalistic norms of the Anglo-Irish Parliament and centuries of 
English oversight of the Irish economy? Barnard (2008) for instance 
views the Society as another iteration of longstanding Anglo-Irish 
and English attempts to “civilize” the Irish under the aegis of im-
provement.9 The changes that the Society promoted, he argues, were 
still based on the prejudiced views of earlier authors, such as William 
Temple, that Ireland was a backward place, the workforce was lazy, 
and the land unworkable due to its bogs. The Anglo-Irish landed gen-
try, Barnard argues, were of course interested in such a movement if 
it “appealed to the self-interest and altruism of the landed” (ibid., 31). 
It can be argued that the Society’s goals of increasing employment to 
help laborers and the poor native Irish in general appealed to the gen-
try’s altruism, and overall improvements to the economy benefitting 
their own manufacturing ventures and consumption choices ap-
pealed to their self-interest. While these things can be true, it is also 
true that the Society requested the input of the other classes of Ire-
land, rather than working as a private enterprise that could have col-
lected their data, hired various persons for their experiments, and 
published personal pronouncements of their findings and therefore of 
what they recommended the practices of the nation should be. It is 
also true, as shall be discussed below, that the Society included many 
members of the gentry but that the majority of active members were 
clergy, doctors, lawyers, tradesmen, merchants, and academics 
(Breuninger, 2014). 
As many English authors had done since Edmund Spenser in the 
sixteenth century, the writings of the Society discuss Ireland’s back-
wardness. However they do so in terms of economic diagnosis and 
prescription, rather than identifying underdevelopment as caused by 
the character flaws of the native Irish. Rather than changing Irish cul-
ture or making the Irish into Englishmen, they see the solution to Ire-
land’s economic “backwardness” in growth and development. The 
rhetoric of the Society focuses on the goal of working together on a 
joint enterprise, and it is this that sets it apart from the publications of 
individuals past and present who tried to “improve” Ireland. The 
publications of the Society and writings by its leaders do not deni-
grate the native Irish for their own poverty or the Irish land itself for 
not being productive. For instance, instead of seeing bogs as evil rep-
resentations of the hidden sloth of Ireland, as Barnard (2008) says 
                                                            
9 Programs to transform the Irish into Englishmen through land management, 
forced relocation, and cultural change had precedents in the policies of Cromwell 
and the writing of William Petty. A discussion of Petty’s theory of Irish 
transmutation can be found in McCormick (2009) and of how this theory relates 
to the notion of Irish dependency, and was applied to Scotland in the Act of 
Union, is in Ramos (2018, see chapter 3). An exploration of earlier policies, such 
as the plantation system, to change the landscape of Ireland is in Canny (2001). 
| The Dublin Society and Public Reason in Eighteenth-Century Ireland 451 
Œconomia – History | Methodology | Philosophy, 9(3) : 433-457 
other writers did, the Society’s leaders take a practical approach and 
study how bogs can be turned into land used for tillage. The bogs can 
be cleared, not to make Ireland like England as Barnard claims, but 
because the drained land could be used for crops that would feed the 
people of Ireland. 
Similarly, what sets the mindset and methods of the Society apart 
from the Anglo-Irish parliament is the acknowledgment that the im-
provement of Ireland’s economy requires the input, or public reason, 
of all the Irish, regardless of class, political, or religious affiliation. 
The Society’s view of the Catholic majority of the population is cast in 
a more active and less paternalistic light in this context. Rather than 
ignore them or focus on their conversion to Protestantism to make 
them “useful” subjects, as successive governments and other improv-
ing societies had, the Society invited engagement with Catholics as 
contributors to the economy. Society leaders such as Francis 
Hutchison and Arthur Dobbs recognized that the reason for the na-
tives’ poverty lay neither in their Catholicism nor in an inborn indo-
lence, but rather due to, “having no fixed property in their land, the 
want of which deprives them of a sufficient encouragement and in-
dustry” (Dobbs, 1729-31, 81 and Sneddon, 2008). Madden has preju-
diced views regarding “papists” but acknowledges that there is noth-
ing inherent in the native Irish that makes them poor and that they 
make up “many thousands of merchants and mechanicks” (1738, 
103). Similar to Dobbs he argues that “our poor People” who are “idle 
for want for Employment,” their “Labour would be all clear Gains to 
the Kingdom” if work could be generated for them (ibid., 128). As 
previously noted by Leersen (1986), rather than blaming the most 
vulnerable segment of society for their own poverty, the Society pre-
sents a new viewpoint as far as the Anglo-Irish Ascendancy was con-
cerned in their arguments that absentee landlords, bad trade policy, 
and the consumption of luxury goods were the causes of the poverty 
of the native Irish (77-78). 
The inclusivity of the Society in terms of soliciting the input from 
all people of Ireland, disseminating the methods of people of various 
confessions, ages, and backgrounds, and seeking to improve econom-
ic conditions for all the people of Ireland, besides being unique for its 
time and place, is an important aspect of why I characterize their 
work as a form of public reason. Ideally public reason should be in-
clusive of all in society, and as has been shown the ability to do this in 
the political realm was constrained. Another factor that sets the Socie-
ty apart and likely contributed to its viewpoint that practical action 
could be taken by all members of society and that agency did not be-
long only to the gentry is that the majority of its members were not 
aristocrats. As Breuninger comments, “within two years the vast ma-
jority … were drawn from law and business, which explains the more 
‘practical’ bent to their deliberations” (2014, 69). He shows also 
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through data analysis that the members’ interests were more diverse 
than those of its precursor, the Dublin Philosophical Society, reflec-
tive of the members’ variety of professions and backgrounds (ibid., 
70). 
Unlike the earlier waves of improvers in Ireland, the Society’s 
work was more prescriptive than paternalistic. Rather than dictating 
to the Irish people what they ought to do to change the economy, the 
group invited participation and dialogue to determine as a public 
what the best methods for production of various goods were and to 
encourage development, as seen in the larger-scale projects such as 
the Society’s schools. The projects and publications of the Society in-
volved sharing of information rather than an imposition of directives. 
That the process was facilitated mostly by the Anglo-Irish Ascendan-
cy can be seen as a form of paternalism because they brought an An-
glo sense of what improvement meant could be argued, but is also 
problematic because the Anglo-Irish by this period also started to 
view themselves as Irish rather than English. The Anglo-Irish of the 
Society differed in their outlook from earlier Englishmen like William 
Petty who sought command and control over Irish resources, and in-
stead sought a better allocation of resources such that the quality of 
life for the population as a whole might improve. 
The Society solicited the input of gentlemen, small farmers, scien-
tists, and the laboring classes in multiple fields. Although the native 
Irish did not have the social power of Society members, their input 
was still received and sought through a variety of means. The mem-
bers conducted their own experiments, but mostly relied upon the 
efforts of the people actually working in agriculture, manufacturing, 
and the arts for the best practices that they disseminated. More out-
reach could have been done of course, especially to counter the dis-
advantages suffered by the Catholic population. However, this also 
underscores that the native Irish were allowed to participate in the 
improvement of the country in a way that they were not allowed to 
participate in the polity of Ireland due to the penal laws that prevent-
ed Catholics from owning property, voting, and having other legal 
rights. 
Due to the limits of their inclusivity, however, it is arguable 
whether or not the Society fully performed the function of a govern-
ment engaged in public reason. Although Presbyterians could be non-
voting members, Catholics were denied full membership in the Socie-
ty. Barnard (2010) observes correctly that Catholics could win prizes 
but because they could not vote on the awarding of funds, were de-
nied the power to decide where the funds went. One could argue that 
in entering competitions, individual Catholics could make this alloca-
tion, but the problem remains that institutionally the Society replicat-
ed a major fault of the government’s policies of exclusion, which had 
implications for allocation of resources. If there were religious bias 
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amongst those who granted the certificates for prizes, then they had a 
means to further disadvantage Catholics in the distribution of finan-
cial resources and knowledge promotion. Although the prizes were 
awarded based on empirical observation, weight, and measure for the 
agriculture and husbandry prizes, “official” numbers could be altered 
to give an entrant a false advantage. The stated ideology of the Socie-
ty leadership was to encourage productivity and employment and 
that not allowing Catholic entrants to claim their just rewards would 
create further disincentives for them from work. Longstanding insti-
tutionalized prejudice already ensured the playing field between 
Catholic and Protestant entrants was not level because the average 
initial conditions of each were not equal. Indeed, the 1750 royal char-
ter mentioned the king’s support of improvements the Society made 
to further “civilize the natives” and make them less likely to rebel 
(quoted in Sonnelitter, 2016, 115). It is notable that various Society 
members wrote about the inequality that existed and the potential of 
economic activity to alleviate it, but did not seek to eliminate it in its 
own membership rules in the eighteenth century. While all the people 
of Ireland could vie for prizes and submit work for publication, it was 
still the Anglo-Irish leadership who determined who won the prizes 
and what would be published. In so doing the Society also replicated 
Davenant’s argument that the Irish were dependent on the English, or 
in this case, their Anglo-Irish descendants, to lead them out of a stag-
nant economy. 
3.2. Public Reason and Self-Sufficiency 
Because the Society’s engagement in public reason was based on Ire-
land’s prosperity through economic rather than political, religious, or 
class-based action allowed both for it to operate more freely and to 
attain more public trust in its works than the parliament. Additional-
ly because they were not bound by British oversight the Society was 
freer to pursue its goals and to encourage its vision. Its economic fo-
cus and invitation to all to contribute made the Society more inclusive 
compared to the parliament. Under the conditions of absentee land-
lordism and the various strictures on Catholics and Presbyterians in 
political life, as well as the necessity in parliament of being either 
Whig or Tory, public reason could not have occurred between the 
many sectors of the Irish public and the Irish parliament. However, 
the restrictions on full voting membership for Catholics, and exclu-
sion of women from membership altogether, however, demonstrate 
that the Society’s engagement with public reason was still bounded 
by the prejudices of its time.10 
                                                            
10 Women were acknowledged in the 1760s as patronesses of Society projects, 
such as the Dublin silk warehouse, but not as members of the Society (Berry, 
1915, 199). One notable exception is Lady Arabella Denny, a philanthropist who 
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However the overall goals of the Society to improve Ireland’s 
economy provided potential improved living standards for all. The 
proposals and projects were homegrown, rather than imposed from 
abroad, and the self-generation of ideas and their exchange in the 
sponsored projects, programs, and publications likely lent to their 
attractiveness to the Irish people compared to proposals or earlier 
premiums offered by the government. Participation by the public in 
the projects and publications of the Society demonstrate how diverse 
parts of Irish society supported the idea reinforced in the Society’s 
motto, nostri plena laboris, that Ireland’s economic needs and wants 
could be filled by its own labor, and had the skills to put it into prac-
tice. The Society provided an outlet for Irish participation and innova-
tion that could not occur through political means and that needed 
some stimulus to occur through economic means. Its work and writ-
ing demonstrated that public reason took place through economic 
participation when public, political participation to improve the 
economy was hindered. The public reasoning of the Irish people and 
the Dublin Society demonstrated that while external issues harmed 
the economy, there was a problem from within, a lack of demand for 
Irish products that could be solved from within. Economic success for 
the whole people of Ireland stemmed from the participation of the 
whole people of Ireland. 
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A Nationalistic Framework for Political 
Economy: Textbooks on Indian Economics 
during the Early-Twentieth Century  
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The end of the nineteenth century witnessed the emergence of the idea of 
Indian Economics, which its proponents hoped would address the issue of 
the scientific method of studying the Indian economy, and help in laying 
out a path for economic development. Some of the best sources to study 
these views are textbooks written as introductions to Indian Economics 
during the early-twentieth century. This paper will explore the manner in 
which the textbooks dealt with these issues. 
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Un cadre nationaliste pour l’économie politique : les manuels 
d’économie politique indienne au début du vingtième siècle 
La fin du XIXème siècle voit émerger l’idée d’une théorie économique 
indienne, concentrant tous les espoirs de ses promoteurs pour trouver une 
méthode scientifique appropriée à l’étude de l’économie indienne, et pour 
ouvrir la voie au développement économique. Les manuels d’introduction 
à l’économie politique indienne, écrits au début du XXème siècle, sont une 
source précieuse pour étudier ce projet théorique. Cet article se penche 
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This paper will discuss textbooks written in English as introductions 
to the emerging field of Indian Economics during the early-twentieth 
century, aimed at providing undergraduate and graduate students 
with an overarching view of the contours of the Indian economy. 
They are important because the authors took divergent positions on 
the relevance of classical political economy to Indian conditions and 
discussed certain aspects of British economic policy like trade. These 
textbooks are amongst the earliest sources available where a vision 
for the field of Indian Economics as the scientific method of studying 
economics was laid out more systematically, which the paper will 
elaborate upon. 
Most textbooks on Indian Economics referred back to a lecture ti-
tled ‘Indian Political Economy,’ delivered by Mahadev Govind 
Ranade (1842-1901), the Maharashtrian social reformer, in 1892.1 
Ranade found that the teaching and dissemination of political econ-
omy, during the nineteenth century, by colonial administrators, edu-
cators and English textbooks, was not suited to Indian historical con-
ditions (Ranade, 1906, 2).2 He specifically targeted English writings 
following David Ricardo, for their universalism, and favoured the 
work of Friedrich List, the German economic nationalist, and the 
German Historical School, borrowing from them the view that the 
body politic was the centre of modern thought, and not individualism 
and universality (ibid., 20-22). In order to be scientific, economics had 
to base itself on ‘Relativity’ and not ‘Absoluteness’ (ibid., 23). Ranade 
wanted to induct history and nationalism to the study of political 
economy in India. 3 
While Ranade’s lecture expressed discontentment with British 
economic policy, he appealed for a developmental agenda based on 
an understanding of Indian historical particularities. This influenced 
economists to follow, who worked upon this notion of the scientific 
study of the Indian economy, exemplified by these textbooks on Indi-
an Economics during the early-twentieth century. They were au-
thored by a generation of scholars trained in history, political econo-
my, philosophy, and the natural sciences in Indian universities estab-
lished by the British state in 1857.4 Notably, some of the earliest text-
                                                            
1 See Maria Bach (2018) for a detailed account of Ranade’s views on progress; see 
John Adams (1971) for his view of Ranade as an institutional economist. 
2 Anti-colonial nationalist sentiments emerged in India during the late-nineteenth 
century, aided by the growth of a class of elite English-educated intellectuals, 
who voiced their opposition to colonial economic policy. 
3 Manu Goswami (2004) illustrates the territorialization of abstract notions of the 
economy by Indian economic nationalists of the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth century, who created a discourse around the composition of the na-
tional economy of colonial India. 
4 Based on university records of Calcutta University and Bombay University, 
their education included a familiarity with the established canon of political 
economy starting with Adam Smith, Ricardo, Malthus, J.S. Mill, and the margin-
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books were authored by British administrators and educationists, 
such as Theodore Morison in 1906, who urged Indian students to not 
get swayed by public opinion critical of British economic policy, and 
offered a defense of classical political economy.5 The Indian authors 
being covered in this study, while displaying diverse views, took a 
contrary position and questioned the applicability of classical political 
economy in India.6 
The argument being made here is that the emergence of Indian 
Economics towards the early-twentieth century was linked to the po-
litical environment of the time and two important factors contributed 
to this. The first was increasing political agitation by nationalists, who 
were also discontented with the teaching of political economy and 
wanted a framework more suited to Indian developmental require-
ments. The second factor, also a response to the first, was the gov-
ernmental imperative of having a better grasp of Indian social and 
economic conditions, which led to the encouragement of research in 
economics by the 1910s (Savur, 2011, 11-12). Pedagogy and politics 
were intimately connected, and academic economics became an arena 
of contestation between the colonial government and nationalist forc-
es. Textbooks on Indian Economics are being treated here as a site of 
this political contestation. 
This paper is utilizing the approach of viewing textbook-writing in 
tandem with the institutionalization of political economy in India, 
and more specifically the attempt to create an Indian Economics re-
sponsive to national interests. Textbooks are being considered as the 
form of representation of this process of institutionalization (Augello 
and Guidi, 2012, 2).7 Section Two of the paper will provide a historical 
background to the textbooks on Indian Economics by flagging im-
portant educational policies in colonial India and briefly trace the de-
velopment of political economy as a discipline. The following section 
on textbooks will elaborate on the inter-relation between politics and 
academic economics during the early-twentieth century by focusing 
on certain themes covered by textbooks on Indian Economics. A dis-
                                                                                                                                     
alist school. By the 1890s, Alfred Marshall’s Principles of Economics was intro-
duced to the M.A. syllabus. 
5 Nationalist political mobilization increased rapidly by the early-twentieth cen-
tury, including many college students, which concerned the Education Depart-
ment of the government. 
6 The authors highlighted here are Jadunath Sarkar, Pramathanath Banerjea, 
Vaman Govind Kale, Radhakamal Mukherjee, and G.B. Jathar and S.G. Beri. 
7 The early-twentieth century witnessed the crystallization of the discipline of 
economics with the formation of university departments for postgraduate teach-
ing and research on Indian Economics from 1908 onwards (Krishnamurty, 2009, 
xvi). Simultaneously, the Indian Journal of Economics was established in 1916 and 
the Indian Economic Association was established in 1917 for the growing com-
munity of economists to create platforms for the discussion and dissemination of 
Indian Economics (Krishnamurty, 2016). 
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tinction is made between British and Indian authors of textbooks as 
they advocated the task of economics as a science differently to stu-
dents. The category of science was utilized by the authors to put for-
ward their positions on the scope of Indian Economics, with an un-
derlying political motive.8 A sub-section on the critique of British 
trade policy has been included as it was an important point of public 
discussion and was covered extensively in the textbooks authored by 
Indian economists. Lastly, the text by Radhakamal Mukherjee has 
been discussed separately since it was a unique communitarian ap-
proach to Indian Economics, thereby setting itself apart from others. 
1. The Discipline of Political Economy and  
Educational Policy in Colonial India 
A few salient moments in the history of education would help contex-
tualize the world of textbooks better. By 1835 Western education and 
English as the medium of instruction was officially adopted. The Ed-
ucation Despatch of 1854, commonly known as Wood’s Despatch, led 
to the establishment of universities in Calcutta, Bombay and Madras 
in 1857, modelled along the lines of the University of London (Ghosh, 
2000, 79). The universities were only examining bodies that conferred 
degrees, while teaching took place in recognized colleges, and a sys-
tem of grants-in-aid was instituted, giving government funding to 
many schools and colleges (ibid.). Departments of Public Instruction 
were set up in all the provinces, headed by a Director of Public In-
struction (ibid., 78). This body finalized the syllabi and list of text-
books for schools and colleges, thereby enhancing government con-
trol over education. 
Political economy was a popular subject amongst students, and in-
struction in the subject in vernacular languages was officially adopted 
by 1856 (Mitra, 2016, 511). It was subsequently introduced to the col-
lege curriculum due to the popularity of vernacular textbooks and the 
satisfactory performance of the younger students who sat for exami-
                                                            
8 A clarification on the category of science used throughout this paper needs to be 
made. ‘Science as legitimiser’ was widely used by people of varying political 
hues in colonial India as the category broadly implied ‘rational’ and ‘progressive’ 
activities (Zachariah, 2001, 3692). It was used to counter the colonial construction 
of the ‘backwardness’ of Indian society, economy, and knowledge. Works on 
economic development and nation-building tended to invoke ‘science’ alongside. 
Most claims to science were not well thought out in terms of a philosophy of sci-
ence, but ‘science,’ when used as a universal category had the ability to legitimize 
the colonized and their work, placing it on an equal plane with the colonizer 
(ibid., 3693). This could possibly explain the heavy invocation of this category in 
textbooks on Indian Economics. 
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nations (ibid.).9 Jane Marcet’s Conversations on Political Economy, J.S. 
Mill’s Principles of Political Economy, Richard Whately’s Easy Lessons on 
Money Matters, Millicent Fawcett and others were translated to a few 
languages.10 However, the officials of the Education Department also 
believed that Indians lacked the scientific temperament required for 
the comprehension of principles of political economy, the misinter-
pretation of which would lead to political discontentment (Education 
Branch, West Bengal State Archives, 1899). Therefore syllabi and text-
books in subjects like history and political economy were closely 
monitored by the Education Department. 
From the mid-nineteenth century, textbooks became central to 
pedagogy in the vernacular and anglo-vernacular government aided 
institutions. Increased bureaucratic control of education, which pro-
moted the cultural values and economic interests of the colonial state, 
created a centralized and impersonal system of examinations which 
required the standardization of education across a region. Students at 
the university level studied European political economists, reading 
texts abstracted from their own conditions. The syllabi and texts were 
alien to the context and experiences of students, leading to a ‘textbook 
culture’ in schools and colleges, based on the memorization of pre-
scribed textbooks (Kumar, 1988, 454). This problem persists till date, 
with prescribed economics textbooks being unrelated to the experien-
tial referents of students (De and Thomas, 2018). The lack of original 
textbook-writing in colonial India has been attributed to an ‘imperial 
symbiosis’ in the university system, whereby the syllabus at the Uni-
versity of London was followed in the wider empire (Tribe, 2012, 44). 
The discontentment expressed by Ranade can be attributed to these 
features of the education system during the nineteenth century. 
George Curzon, the Viceroy and Governor-General from 1899 to 
1905, believed that the growing nationalism was directly linked to the 
liberal education of Indians, which needed curtailment (Basu, 1974, 
9). He therefore enacted the Indian Universities’ Act of 1904, which 
allowed for a university department to directly teach and engage in 
research for the first time, but also increased the hold of government 
officials over colleges and the governing bodies of universities 
(Habib, 2017, 57). It was viewed as a measure to contain political agi-
                                                            
9 Low rates of literacy in India during the nineteenth and early-twentieth centu-
ries meant that, numerically, a ‘mass reading public’ would refer to some thou-
sands of readers and not tens of thousands (Stark, 2008, 17). 
10 Iman Mitra (2016) discusses three Bengali textbooks based on Richard Whate-
ly’s primer for children during the nineteenth century, examining the modality of 
translation and linguistic exchange necessitated between different social contexts; 
Veena Naregal (2018, 204) briefly mentions four Marathi translations of J.S. Mill 
during the mid-nineteenth century, in her work on translations in the Indian so-
cial sciences; Neeraj Hatekar (2003) covers the same Marathi translations as 
Naregal (2018), but considers their economic thought as being constrained by 
colonial dominance. 
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tation on the part of students and teachers, leading to protests from 
several quarters against the perceived government interference in ac-
ademic life (ibid.). As the government’s role in higher education went 
up, the officials of the Education Department felt that a better under-
standing of Indian economic, political and social conditions was re-
quired, out of which emerged an emphasis on research to be carried 
out in Indian universities (Education Department, Maharashtra State 
Archives, 1914; Savur, 2011). Teaching departments were established 
at the university level, starting with the first Department of Political 
Economy and Political Philosophy at Calcutta University in 1908. 
Manohar Lal, a former student of Alfred Marshall, was appointed the 
first Minto Professor of Economics at Calcutta in 1909. His job was to 
lecture and encourage research on topics in Indian Economics (Educa-
tion Branch, West Bengal State Archives, 1913).11 
This context of politics and pedagogy laid the ground for the writ-
ing of textbooks on Indian Economics. By 1906, when the first record-
ed textbook was published, a decade and a half had passed since 
Ranade spoke of an Indian political economy and the nationalist 
movement had gained further ground. Once courses on Indian Eco-
nomics were introduced in universities around this time, textbooks 
on the subject were required for students. 
2. Textbooks on Indian Economics 
Courses on the Indian economy were introduced towards the begin-
ning of the twentieth century, throwing up a demand for adequate 
textbooks. The books are classified as textbooks since they explicitly 
targeted students, and certain books such as Vaman Govind Kale’s 
Introduction to Indian Economics (1917), addressed general readers as a 
secondary audience. These texts charted new terrain by defining the 
composites of the national economy. They served a dual function, the 
first of which was to serve as reading materials for examination-based 
courses. The books were organized in a manner similar to that of 
standard textbooks written for pedagogical purposes, but comprised 
of an introductory chapter or preface dealing with the applicability of 
classical political economy to India, the answer to which varied 
amongst authors. The remaining chapters detailed the overall geog-
raphy of the national economy of India, and covered different con-
cepts such as production, consumption, exchange, currency, com-
merce, banking, capital, the cooperative movement etc. They were 
more descriptive than analytical in nature (Datta, 1978, 21). The se-
cond purpose of these texts was political in nature, encouraging their 
                                                            
11 The Minto Professorship was instituted after Lord Minto, who became the 
Viceroy and Governor General of India in 1905. The Minto Professorship was 
supported by a grant from the government. 
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readers to adopt a specific interpretation of classical political econo-
my, which in their view was scientific. Some of the earliest textbooks 
were written by British educationists and administrators, which will 
be discussed first. They critiqued the teaching of classical political 
economy in Indian universities, but ultimately upheld the canon of 
political economy. In contrast, Indian nationalist economists were 
critical of the established canon and asserted that economics had to be 
based on history and nationalism, with the exception of Jadunath 
Sarkar, who occupied a more unique position between these strands. 
The textbooks and authors have been demarcated on the basis of their 
varied objectives in writing these texts and their view on the scientific 
study of the Indian economy which students should adopt. 
Nineteen books were written in English between 1906 and 1930, 
identifiable through library and archive catalogues in India and Brit-
ain. All the authors were either college lecturers or university profes-
sors. The textbooks of the most prominent scholars, who were also 
public figures, have been selected for this paper. Theodore Morison 
and William Harrison Moreland have been selected since their text-
books were part of university reading lists, while J.R. Cornah’s book 
was selected for its explicit position on the task of economics as a sci-
ence. The Indian authors were important figures in educational insti-
tutions, being instrumental to the creation of departments of econom-
ics, and contributed significantly to upcoming journals and associa-
tions of economists. The following sections will explore how these 
textbooks were defining political economy as a science in the colony 
and the manner of its recasting as the result of nationalist critique. 
2.1. Defense of Classical Political Economy 
The earliest textbook on Indian Economics on record was Theodore 
Morison’s The Industrial Organization of an Indian Province, published 
in 1906. Morison was the former Principal of the Mohammedan An-
glo-Oriental College at Aligarh (now known as Aligarh Muslim Uni-
versity). The text was based upon information gathered from the 
United Provinces of British India. Morison found that there were 
many official studies available on particular economic problems in 
India but none that were suitable for students, and there was no exist-
ing study of industry in India written from the point of view of the 
economist (Morison, 1906, vi). 
This text represented the concern of British officials to assuage the 
claims of economic nationalists that the doctrines of political economy 
adopted by the administration were not in tune with the reality of the 
country. Morison felt that Indian students were taught economics far 
too abstract for their comprehension because the ‘industrial facts’ 
provided by English texts were drawn from Europe. His stated objec-
tive was to ‘review the principal facts in the society,’ which students 
could connect with, and to build the relation between those ‘facts to 
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the abstract economics’ which they had previously studied (ibid., v). 
Since no textbooks on Indian economics were recognized by the Edu-
cation Department during the early 1900s, texts had to be written by 
collecting material from government publications, which Morison 
relied upon. 
Morison addressed nationalist critiques of classical political econ-
omy by stating that the part of ‘economic science’ considered univer-
sally applicable only comprised of a few concepts. The majority of 
economic doctrines were not universal in nature, but only statements 
on general principles which may be applicable in specific conditions. 
The most prominent economic theories which influenced public opin-
ion were those based on industrial organization in Europe and Amer-
ica (ibid., 1). 
Contrary to the conventional position of the colonial administra-
tion, Morison acknowledged that any study of Indian economic con-
ditions was ‘not the type tacitly assumed in most books upon abstract 
economics’ (ibid., 2). This stance on the limitations of classical eco-
nomic theory to empirical conditions in India, was indicative of the 
larger shift within British educational policy.12 Morison almost sug-
gested a relativistic view of political economy by stating it should aim 
at the creation of ‘an independent body of economic doctrines which 
could be logically deduced from the observed facts of Indian society’ 
(ibid.). However, it was not realizable since the materials at hand for 
such a study were insufficient (ibid.). 
An often-quoted textbook prescribed to university students was 
An Introduction to Economics for Indian Students by William Harrison 
Moreland, published in 1913 and reprinted for the sixth time by 1923. 
Moreland was the Director of Land Records and Agriculture in the 
United Provinces for many years. He wrote two handbooks on agri-
culture and revenue administration in the United Provinces, and later 
worked on Mughal history (Case, 1965). An Introduction to Economics 
was not a textbook on Indian Economics but a book on general eco-
nomics. Its uniqueness lay in the explicit reference to Indian society 
and history to illustrate general concepts, by incorporating examples 
based on familiarity and experience, which differentiated it from pre-
vious textbooks. 
Similar to Morison, Moreland highlighted the historically contin-
gent nature of economic laws to students. However, Moreland went 
further by trying to remove the sense of universality, rigidity and 
prescriptiveness associated with a term such as ‘law’ while upholding 
the position of economics as a science, defining science as the 
knowledge of a subject which could be expressed in terms of laws or 
                                                            
12 Morison had stated in another work of his, Imperial Rule in India (1899), that 
Indian students were not inherently ‘disloyal’. They were capable of ‘correct rea-
soning’ only if ‘facts and arguments’ were placed before them, which textbooks at 
the time were not providing (Alston, 1910, 152). 
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generalizations: ‘in science there is no idea of telling people what to 
do. In science a Law is simply a statement that something is likely to 
happen in certain conditions … we are referring to the conclusions that 
have been drawn from experience as to what is likely to happen when 
certain conditions exist’ (ibid., 5). Laws were conclusions drawn from 
experience and observation, and were not to be mistaken for com-
mands, with people being free to accumulate and spend their wealth 
in any manner they pleased. The economic law was contrasted with 
laws in the natural sciences, where the former could be conclusively 
arrived at through observation, while the latter could also avail of the 
method of controlled experimentation (ibid., 6). Moreland identified 
this as the cause behind the divergent interpretations of economic 
phenomena, as changes in economic conditions could not be con-
trolled but only observed. He used this point to caution Indian stu-
dents against reports in the press as they ‘may attribute a result to a 
cause which, in fact, has had little or nothing to do with it, just be-
cause they have overlooked the true cause or causes’ (ibid., 7). He in-
stead urged students of economics to focus on the acquisition of ‘facts 
on which the laws are founded,’ based on an extensive study of eco-
nomic history and statistics (ibid.). 
A lesser known textbook was J.R. Cornah’s Simple Economics for In-
dian Schools and Colleges (1912).13 Cornah had studied at Pembroke 
College, Cambridge, and was the former Vice-Principal of the Mo-
hammedan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh. At the time of writing 
Simple Economics, he was the Assistant Principal at Aitchison Chiefs’ 
College, Lahore. Cornah openly expressed his concern that the results 
of teaching economics in India from a Western standpoint were ‘mis-
chievous’ (Cornah, 1912, v). He hoped to address the ‘misrepresenta-
tion and prejudice’ that had built up and ‘train the mind of young 
India towards sound judgement and fair inquiry’ (ibid.). Cornah was 
attempting to steer students away from an association of political 
economy with normativity by not paying heed to the ‘moral view … 
which one may feel is the truly right and just view of what should be 
the aim and scope of the Economist’ (ibid., 1). The notion of econom-
ics as an amoral, positivist science was harnessed to ‘take facts as they 
really are, and to leave the question of what they should be to teachers 
of social reform’ (ibid.). However Cornah did not consign economics 
to value neutrality and ahistoricism. In discussing two different ap-
proaches to the discipline, he first quoted J.S. Mill to pitch economics 
as a ‘pure science,’ concerned only with the relation between cause 
and effect. For the second approach, Cairnes’ views on imbibing so-
cial institutions and custom were put forth, termed as economics’ at-
tempt to fashion itself as an ‘art,’ or that which spoke of desirable 
                                                            
13 Cornah referred to Francis Walker’s Political Economy to provide the student 
with an introduction to wealth, production, consumption, and distribution; and 
Theodore Morison (1906). 
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ends. The objective was to combine the two approaches by which the 
laws governing production, exchange, distribution, and consumption 
of wealth would be arrived at in a scientific manner, in the first place, 
only after which this foundation would be used to build an econom-
ics committed towards social purposes (ibid., 6). The student was in-
structed to prioritize the scientific or dispassionate reading of eco-
nomics, or ‘to apply the Science to build up the Art’ (ibid.). 
The period under consideration was during the aftermath of wide-
spread protests in 1905, when the government announced the parti-
tion of Bengal. Students participated in these protests in large num-
bers which saw a campaign for swadeshi14 and the boycott of British 
manufactured goods (Habib, 2017, 59). Alternative educational insti-
tutions, like the Technical College at Jadavpur, Calcutta, was estab-
lished in 1907 in response to events in Bengal, maintaining itself 
through private contributions (ibid.). In retaliation against the Indian 
Universities’ Act of 1904, the National Education Movement was ini-
tiated in Bengal in 1905, which aimed to establish educational institu-
tions more suited to national requirements (Mukherjee and Mukher-
jee, 1957). The following set of textbooks by Indian economists should 
be considered as flowing from this tumultuous period in Indian poli-
tics. 
2.2. The Critics of Classical Political Economy 
Ranade gave an impetus to the scientific study of the Indian econo-
my, resulting in a number of textbooks by authors who were the first 
generation of academic economists in India, having studied in Indian 
universities and a few studying abroad at London, Cambridge, and 
Germany. The number of reprints and revised editions of these text-
books suggests that they were being widely read by the student 
community. 
The earliest textbook was by Jadunath Sarkar (1870-1958), titled 
Economics of British India (1909), and by 1917 the fourth edition of the 
book was printed. Sarkar is better known for his contributions to his-
tory as an academic discipline in India. His prominent works are sev-
eral volumes on the last major Mughal ruler, Aurangzeb, and the sev-
enteenth-century Maratha ruler, Shivaji.15 Sarkar was knighted in 
1929 and was the first Indian historian to become an honorary mem-
ber of the American Historical Association. Sarkar’s text differed in 
one crucial manner from the rest of the textbooks by Indian econo-
mists. While others tried defining Indian Economics or addressed the 
                                                            
14 The swadeshi movement emerged towards the end of the nineteenth century for 
the promotion of indigeneous manufactures. 
15 See Dipesh Chakravarty’s The Calling of History: Sir Jadunath Sarkar and His 
Empire of Truth (2015) for a detailed analysis of Sarkar’s place in the tradition of 
historiography in India. 
| Textbooks on Indian Economics during the Early-Twentieth Century 469 
Œconomia – History | Methodology | Philosophy, 9(3) : 459-480 
question of the applicability of classical political economy to India, 
this issue remained untouched by Sarkar. Other Indian authors 
acknowledged Ranade for his contribution to Indian Economics, but 
Sarkar did not mention Ranade in this regard. 
The textbook was an exposition of Indian economic affairs, stating 
the ‘advantages’ and ‘disadvantages’ of British rule. Sarkar was not 
an avowed critic of Empire and favoured some of its effects on Indian 
social structures and values. In his chapter on ‘The State,’ Sarkar con-
sidered the ‘modernisation’ of the Indian economy as beneficial, since 
it brought India out of isolation and within the circuit of global com-
merce (Sarkar, 1917, 113). The British had introduced competition in 
the economic sphere, by rewarding ‘merit’ and creating ‘opportuni-
ties’ not possible in medieval India. The ‘collectivism’ of Indian socie-
ty regulated and restricted individual economic activity, but it was 
being replaced by ‘individualism,’ which would be socially destruc-
tive at first, but would eventually become the ‘root of invention’ 
(ibid., 115). Sarkar believed that the British had ‘placed Science at the 
service of man’ by not leaving room for old customs and conventions. 
The advancement of science would usher in a social and economic 
reconstruction (ibid.). This contrasted the views of Sarkar’s contem-
porary, Radhakamal Mukherjee, who felt that modern exchange rela-
tions had disrupted the indigenous village-based economy and social 
structure (Mukherjee, 1916). However Sarkar’s endorsement of the 
modernization of Indian economic life was not absolute. He quoted 
J.S. Mill and List to support the protection of infant industries in India 
(Sarkar, 1917, 318-321). Being amongst the earliest textbooks on eco-
nomics in India, Sarkar’s text was initially proposed for inclusion in 
the list of books for students of Bombay University in 1912. Its inclu-
sion was supported by some members of the Board of Studies for His-
tory and Economics in 1912, but due to unknown reasons it was cut 
from the final list. Theodore Morison, who had left India by that time, 
also supported its inclusion (Education Department, Maharashtra 
State Archives, 1913). 
The second textbook on Indian Economics written by a prominent 
economist was A Study of Indian Economics by Pramathanath Banerjea 
(1879-1960), published in 1911. Banerjea completed his M.A. from 
Calcutta University and D.Sc. (Econ.) from the London School of Eco-
nomics in 1916, writing a thesis on public administration in ancient 
India under the supervision of H.B. Lees-Smith, who was interested 
in the project of Indian Economics (Lees-Smith, 1909).16 Banerjea was 
appointed the Minto Professor of Economics at Calcutta University in 
1919, and was amongst the founders of the Indian Statistical Institute 
                                                            
16 Lees-Smith visited India to draft a report on the state of the study of Indian 
economics. He mentioned that that there was neither ‘perpetualism nor cosmo-
politanism’ in the larger discipline and that a proper textbook on Indian Econom-
ics for students was required (Lees-Smith, 1909, 20-22). 
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in 1931, being closely associated with the statistician, P.C. Mahalano-
bis. In the preface to the first edition of the textbook, Banerjea wrote 
that it was from the point of view of a ‘scientific inquirer,’ implying 
an absence of political bias (Banerjea, 1927, vii).17 Indian economists 
upheld the project of national political economy as a science, defend-
ing it against accusations of prejudice and misinterpretation, in order 
to gain legitimacy for the scheme of building an Indian Economics. 
Indian and British authors diverged on the question of the ap-
plicability of classical political economy to India. Morison, Moreland 
and Cornah stated that classical economists did not intend for eco-
nomic laws to be universal, while the Indian critics believed there was 
an assumption of the universal validity of economic doctrines akin to 
laws in the physical sciences, with the exception of a few classical 
economists. This divergence signalled the contentious relationship 
between political economy and the colony. Following Adam Smith, 
political economy consolidated itself as a body of knowledge during 
the nineteenth century. However, in its filtration down to the public, 
students, and its role in framing economic policy, the corpus of ideas 
coalesced around a few principles considered to be universal, ignor-
ing the nuanced views of Smith and later political economists (Ambi-
rajan, 1978, 26). For instance, state intervention in the economy is not 
altogether absent in theory, but in practice the laissez-faire doctrine 
was considered the foundation of British economic policy in India, 
and was received as such by students of political economy and civil 
servants during the nineteenth century (ibid.). Emergent economic 
nationalism during the late-nineteenth century opposed the British 
policy of one-way free trade and demanded the protection of Indian 
industries, attacking the tariff policy on cotton and sugar (Chandra, 
1966), or the economic drain becoming a focal point of nationalist dis-
course. The Indian nationalist intelligentsia was responding to this 
sense of the universality of political economy, and were less liable to 
acknowledge the qualifications built in by theorists, as opposed to 
British administrators and educationists. 
In opposition to this perceived universality of the principles of po-
litical economy, Vaman Govind Kale (1876-1946) worked on the in-
corporation of history into Indian Economics. Kale graduated from 
Fergusson College in Pune and was Professor of History and Eco-
nomics for many years at the college. Kale was Ranade’s reader and 
writer for a short while and was influenced by his political work. He 
was a member of the Indian Council of States from 1921 to 1923, and 
served on the first Indian Tariff Board from 1923 to 1925 (Krishna-
murty, 2009, 1). He founded the Historical and Economic Association 
at Fergusson College in 1916, creating a platform for students to pre-
                                                            
17 Banerjea’s textbook was reprinted several times. The first edition was reprinted 
once in 1912. The second edition of the book, published in 1915, was reprinted 
eight times until 1926. 
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sent papers on various issues (Karve, 1941). Kale’s most prominent 
work was his textbook, An Introduction to the Study of Indian Econom-
ics, published in 1917.18 Multiple editions of the book were published 
within the span of a few years, making it one of the most popular 
textbooks on Indian Economics.19 Bhabatosh Datta (1978) mentioned 
that while Banerjea’s textbook was widely considered, it was not ana-
lytical in nature. Students found Kale’s textbook more up to date 
(Datta, 1978, 21).20 
Kale argued for a ‘scientific investigation’ of the ‘peculiar’ condi-
tions in colonial India. In contrast to Moreland and Cornah, Kale set 
out the task of economics in India for the student and general reader, 
very differently: 
Indian Economics … is not an independent science, because it does not 
seek to discover new laws which were not known to earlier thinkers. We 
have indeed to observe things as they are, describe the economic activities 
of the different classes of the population and to study the different eco-
nomic phenomena like high prices, low wages, expanding trade and in-
creasing rents, and have to point out the relation of cause and effect. But 
we have also to indicate how improvement may be effected by individual 
and collective action, and how evils may be prevented and remedied. It 
thus suggests an application of economic laws to Indian conditions and 
partakes more of the nature of the art of Economics or of a normative sci-
ence. It is, besides, national in this sense that it deals with the peculiar con-
ditions of India and has in view the special requirements of the material 
advancement of its people. [emphasis added] (Kale, 1920, 9) 
These assertions by economists in textbooks and other forums such as 
the conferences of the Indian Economic Association, has led existing 
literature to classify the economists of the early-twentieth century as 
the early development economists of India (Krishnamurty, 2009; 
Krishnamurty and Kale, 2009; Omkarnath, 2016). By setting the task 
of Indian Economics as the ‘material advancement’ of people, it was 
labelled as a normative science by Indian economists, thus distin-
guishing themselves from the British authors. Since Indian Economics 
did not aspire to be an autonomous discipline but set the pragmatic 
goal of creating a national developmental agenda, it ‘located its 
standpoint of critique within and against the structural and experien-
tial contradictions of colonial state space’ (Goswami, 2004, 235). 
                                                            
18 Kale co-authored a Marathi textbook in 1929, titled Bharatiya Arthashastra, based 
on An Introduction to the Study of Indian Economics. He also published a textbook, 
Indian Administration (1913), intended for Bombay University students. 
19 1100 copies of the first edition were printed in 1917 (Catalogue of Books Printed 
in the Bombay Presidency, 1918), which was a significant number at the time for 
a book in english. This information was catalogued because it was printed by an 
Indian publishing house, Aryabhushan Press. 
20 Datta cited the edition of An Introduction to the Study of Indian Economics pub-
lished in 1925. This paper is referring to the third edition published in 1920. 
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Kale advocated the historical method for economics, believing that 
any meaningful study of contemporary economic conditions mandat-
ed an inquiry into the evolution of ‘practices and institutions’ through 
its historical stages in India, starting from antiquity. Responding to 
the view that Indian spirituality and culture were responsible for its 
passivity and lack of economic growth, Kale devoted a chapter to 
provide ‘evidence from history’ that prominent social institutions 
such as religion had not hampered prosperity in India (Kale, 1920; 
Krishnamurty and Kale, 2009). He drew a comparison with Europe to 
show the dominance of churches in social and economic life. The rea-
sons for India’s lack of economic development lay not in its culture, 
but in extraneous factors which arrested its progress. Kale, like many 
contemporary Indian economists, was not willing to give up on tradi-
tion in the hope of modern economic advancement (Kale, 1920, 40). 
Yet, Kale’s views in the debate on tradition versus modernity in India 
were more complex since he believed that spirituality and material 
prosperity could coexist. He did not accept the colonial construction 
of the ‘spiritualism’ of India, which distinguished him from many 
contemporary Bengali swadeshi nationalists, who embraced the orien-
talist reading of India (Goswami, 2004, 236). Kale defended Ranade 
against the interpretation that Western economic theory had no role 
to play in the ‘economic progress’ of India. In his estimation, Ranade 
pitched different schools of Western theory against each other, to 
guide economists to follow, who had to repeat the process to find the 
most suitable model for the Indian economy (Krishnamurty and Kale, 
2009, 303). 
The books discussed thus far were not in-depth analytical studies 
or research based publications. According to Datta these texts only 
served the purpose of drawing the attention of readers to major facts 
of India’s economy (Datta, 1978, 22). Consequently, Datta claimed 
that ‘a new stage in the world of textbooks was reached’ with the 
publication of the first edition of the two-volume, Indian Economics: A 
Comprehensive and Critical Survey, in 1928, by G.B. Jathar and S.G. Beri. 
For two decades following its publication, Jathar and Beri’s textbook 
was the predominant text on Indian Economics (ibid.). Its popularity 
can be gauged from the fact that the seventh revised edition of the 
book was printed by 1942, within a span of fourteen years. The au-
thors claimed not to have a ‘viewpoint,’ and every chapter began 
with a historical analysis where ‘different viewpoints of the crucial 
issues were presented objectively’ (ibid., 22). Jathar and Beri wrote on 
agriculture in the first volume and the second volume focused on var-
ious aspects of industry, finance and exchange in India, treating these 
subjects in much greater detail than previous textbooks. They be-
longed to a generation of economists trained in economics at Cam-
bridge University, and their interpretation of economics was influ-
enced by the Marshallian exegesis. Nonetheless, their essential under-
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standing of the scope and meaning of Indian Economics did not differ 
from the authors discussed before. They argued in favour of the unity 
of economics as a science, based on the assumption that basic human 
nature held true everywhere, and so the fundamentals of economics 
held good (Jathar and Beri, 1937, 3). However Indian Economics 
could be considered as a separate subject of study where the econom-
ic conditions of the country needed to be studied in detail (ibid.). 
In the preface to the first edition of the textbook, Jathar and Beri 
claimed ‘absolute impartiality and moderation’ and that their aim 
was ‘to be accurate rather than exciting, useful rather than polemical’ 
(ibid., vi). However, in contrast to Datta’s opinion of this textbook, 
Jathar and Beri positioned themselves in favour of protection for In-
dian industries. The objectivity that Datta referred to perhaps 
stemmed from the style and syntax of the textbook, which was closer 
to what is today accepted as an academic text. 
As mentioned earlier, these textbooks fulfilled both pedagogical 
and political functions. The impact of the policy of free trade on the 
Indian economy was a major issue in political discourse at the time. 
One of the major points of focus in these textbooks, which was ad-
dressed to students, was a critique of the trade policy of the British 
state. 
2.3. Free Trade and Protection: The Nationalist Critique  
of British Economic Policy in Textbooks 
The nationalist economic critique of colonialism coalesced around a 
few crucial issues: free trade and protectionism; an economic policy of 
laissez-faire or a state that developed the ‘productive powers’ of the 
nation, with reference to List; the industrialization of India and its 
confinement as an agrarian economy that produced raw materials in 
the global division of labour; a debate on deindustrialization and the 
immiserization of the peasantry; land revenue policies; and the ques-
tion of whether British investments in India were beneficial or did 
they imply an economic drain (see Chandra, 1966; Ganguli, 1977). In 
principle, many Indian economists had no objection to the idea of free 
trade, provided that economic conditions were advanced enough to 
no longer require the protection of industries. On the issue of protec-
tion, the opinion in India was not uniform, with support and opposi-
tion for tariff protection. Some economists, such as Gyanchand, pro-
posed tariff protection as a policy of last resort after providing state 
assistance, cheap capital, communications, and subsidies to promote 
industrial activity (Krishnamurty and Kale, 2009, 310). Ranade pro-
moted the idea of state assistance to industry in the absence of any 
prospects for tariff autonomy (ibid.), with tariff protection for indus-
try in India only being enforced a few decades later. Pramathanath 
Banerjea positioned himself against the free trade doctrine in his text-
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book, terming the trade relations with Britain a ‘drain’ upon the re-
sources of India (Banerjea, 1927, 180). 
Kale found it important to introduce the student to the debate on 
free trade, in a chapter titled ‘Commercial Policy,’ which opened with 
the salvo that trade had to be regulated if it was to benefit the nation 
(Kale, 1920, 218). Kale argued for protection by referencing contem-
porary international relations to support his ideas on national interest 
and patriotism. He drew an analogy with the ‘pacifist,’ represented 
by the creation of the League of Nations and the drafting of Woodrow 
Wilson’s Fourteen Points for international peace. The cosmopolitan 
ideals of international cooperation and harmony, which also rested 
on free trade, were stated to be desirable but could not ignore the ex-
istence of nationalist sentiment (Kale, 1920, 225). In support of the 
protectionist lobby, Kale argued that if nations were left free to devel-
op their resources in their own capacities, the international communi-
ty would be better off as it would comprise of ‘a commonwealth of 
fully developed peoples’ (ibid.). 
Ranade and Kale were reformists who attempted a historical and 
institutional analysis of Indian society and economy. Their under-
standing was that if India wanted to be a member of the global capi-
talistic community, it was necessary to replace caste and status with 
contractual relations as the principle of economic organization 
(Ranade, 1906). While the application of the tenets of classical political 
economy—its reduction to laissez-faire as economic policy—was the 
object of criticism, there were some economists who saw it as an ideal, 
provided the nation had the same advantages and historical condi-
tions from where the principles of political economy emanated. There 
was no agenda for the structural transformation of national and glob-
al society but to bring the nation on a level playing field with indus-
trially developed nations, which also entailed a degree of social re-
form within the nation. However, in this debate on the influence of 
colonial social and economic policy on the socio-economic fabric of 
India, the work of Radhakamal Mukherjee has to be included, as he 
provided a divergent approach to the matter. Amongst the set of 
prominent authors of textbooks on Indian Economics, Mukherjee 
gave a communitarian view on the subject. 
2.4. The Communitarian Approach to Economics 
The work of Radhakamal Mukherjee (1889-1968) requires separate 
consideration from the texts and authors discussed thus far. Mukher-
jee completed his education at Presidency College, Calcutta, later be-
coming the first Chair of Sociology at the Department of Economics 
and Sociology at Lucknow University in 1921. He was deeply influ-
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enced by his teacher, Patrick Geddes, the urban planner and a critic of 
Empire (Madan, 2011, 21).21 
Mukherjee wrote The Foundations of Indian Economics in 1916, with 
an introduction by Geddes. Geddes stated that the purpose of the text 
was to draw attention back to village society, which had lost its self-
sufficiency as a result of Western notions of progress, based on indus-
trialization and urbanization. Mukherjee emphasized on the commu-
nitarianism of Indian social life and that the essence of the nation was 
found in its villages. His views were part of a body of economic 
thought during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century called 
the Bengal school, which rose to eminence during the period of anti-
colonial swadeshi politics, concerning itself with issues such as the re-
structuring of the land revenue system, agrarian relations, rural in-
debtedness, and the revitalization of indigenous institutions and 
practices (Goswami, 2004, 236). Radhakamal Mukherjee’s brother, 
Radhakumud Mukherjee, was closely associated with the efforts of 
the National Education Movement, initiated in Bengal in 1905 
(Mukherjee and Mukherjee, 1957).  
Mukherjee believed there was a ‘relativity of economic life and in-
stitutions,’ and ‘theories,’ ‘practices’ and ‘economic systems and 
methods,’ which had not been successful in the West, were imposed 
on India. Instead a proper study of ‘the regulative social and ethical 
ideals of India’ was required, and the adaptation of ‘economic institu-
tions’ to it (Mukherjee, 1916, xix). According to him the ‘historico-
comparative method,’ taken from sociology needed to be applied to 
economics, thereby widening the ambit of the ‘science of pure eco-
nomics’ (ibid., xx). 
The method adopted by Mukherjee in Foundations of Indian Eco-
nomics was the inductive study of cottage and village industries, and 
the examination of ‘socio-economic data drawn from caste and the 
joint family as well as the economico-religious ideas and institutions 
… and special features of Indian consumption’ (ibid.). The main 
source of information was his field research of these industries and 
their systems of trade, credit and transport. Mukherjee wrote of the 
laboriousness of his research, moving from village to village collect-
ing data from artisans and traders, making them overcome their 
‘fears and suspicions’ of him. The researcher’s place in the field was 
important as ‘the real sources of information are accessible only to 
sympathy and fellowship with simple labour and life, in its distress 
and sufferings, its aims and aspirations’ (ibid., xx-xxii). He estab-
                                                            
21 Geddes was appointed the first Professor of Sociology when the School of Eco-
nomics and Sociology was established in Bombay University in 1919. For a more 
detailed history of the discipline of sociology in India, and its relation to the ped-
agogical imperatives of the colonial state, see Sujata Patel (2011) and Manorama 
Savur (2011). 
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lished a cooperative credit society in Murshidabad district for agricul-
turalists and traders in the countryside (ibid., xxii). 
Mukherjee’s edifice for the construction of Indian Economics dif-
fered from other texts. He acknowledged Ranade’s contribution to the 
growth of Indian Economics but utilized methods from the emergent 
field of economic sociology, using Ernst Engels’ method to collect sta-
tistics on consumption (ibid., xxii). Mukherjee also drew on the ob-
servations of Werner Sombart, the German historical economist, and 
quoted selections from Marshall’s Principles of Economics, to create an 
argument in favour of workshop- and home-based industries, and 
cottage industries, instead of large enterprises as the basis of industri-
al and agricultural organization (ibid., 356-376; Goswami, 2004, 237). 
For a few industries, such as mining, iron works, steamers and ship-
building, not in competition with cottage industries, Mukherjee sup-
ported large-scale production to take advantage of the economies of 
scale (Mukherjee, 1916, 344). A sound policy of development entailed 
space for both small and large industries (ibid., xxi). He supported a 
cooperative system for cottage industries to facilitate access to credit 
through cooperative societies. Development entailed a revitalization 
of the village for Mukherjee, who believed in diminishing the increas-
ing divorce between the urban and the rural, manifested through the 
exploitation of the countryside by the city. He put forward two social 
institutions as fundamental to the organization of economic life in 
India: caste, which was the social ideal and took the shape of a com-
munity for artisans; and the joint family system as the basic unit of 
economic organization, in opposition to individualism, considered a 
product of Western civilization. 
Mukherjee’s ideas based on rural economic development were 
challenged by his contemporaries, such as Brij Narain, who dismissed 
the notion of a civilizational difference between India and the West 
based on spirituality (Krishnamurty and Kale, 2009, 302). Although 
Mukherjee’s analysis explained the ‘historical production of forms of 
unevenness on multiple scales’—urban versus rural, metropole ver-
sus colony—he sought to revive the autonomous village economy 
built on the social hierarchies of caste, making his ideas deeply prob-
lematic (Goswami, 2004, 239). Mukherjee’s communitarianism offered 
a different conception of the priorities of economic organization and 
economic development from the authors discussed previously, indi-
cating the heterogeneity amongst nationalist economists. 
3. Conclusion 
A study of textbooks on Indian Economics has made apparent the 
close relationship between pedagogical political economy and the 
evolving political forces during the early-twentieth century. Public 
discourses that were critical of British economic policy and were en-
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visioning an economic future for India (Ranade for example), made 
their mark on academic economics. Even though nationalist critiques 
of classical political economy overlooked subtleties in the body of 
economic thought, the challenge was serious enough that textbooks 
prescribed at the university level, like those by Morison and Mo-
reland, had to clarify the task of economics as a science in India. The 
British authors were compelled to defend classical political economy 
and its place in India, while Indian economists used these textbooks 
to advocate for a national developmental agenda, invoking the cate-
gory of economics as a ‘science’ to try and further historical analysis 
in Indian Economics. Through the textbooks authored by Kale and 
Mukherjee, we get a sense of the different methods that Indian econ-
omists were borrowing and looking to apply in India. Kale’s was a 
modernist vision based on the Listian developmental framework, 
looking to develop Indian Economics by focusing on Indian historical 
particularities. Mukherjee, in contrast, gave an institutional analysis 
of Indian social and economic life, building his developmental 
framework on the indigenous village economy. 
These textbooks represent an important phase in economics in In-
dia, both chronologically and intellectually, as they set the stage for 
the later, more far-reaching work on development. Indian Economics, 
as presented in these books, was a forerunner to the debates on de-
velopment and planning that took place in India from the 1930s on-
wards, culminating in the consolidation of the post-colonial Nehruvi-
an developmental state. 
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The Economic Advisory Staff and  
State-Building in Israel, 1953-1955  
Daniel Schiffman* and Eli Goldstein** 
 
This paper documents the activities and influence of the Economic Advi-
sory Staff (EAS), a group of US economists that advised the Government 
of Israel (GOI) between May 1953 and July 1955. The EAS’ senior members 
were Oscar Gass (Director), Bernard Bell (Deputy Director), Bertram 
Gross, Abba Lerner, Marion Clawson and Arye Gaathon.  
We evaluate the EAS’ influence using the conceptual framework of learn-
ing and signaling. The EAS promoted learning by producing 120 memo-
randa on a broad range of topics, more than paying for itself through pro-
ject evaluation, and developing good relationships with four GOI minis-
tries. However, several factors impaired learning and signaling, thus pre-
venting the EAS from actualizing its full potential.  
The following factors impaired learning: GOI policymakers disparaged 
advisors while boasting of their own expertise; the GOI had multiple for-
eign and domestic advisors who often disagreed with the EAS; and there 
was no problem-solving intermediary between the GOI and the EAS. 
The following factors impaired signaling: The GOI recruited a Democrat-
ic/New Deal-oriented EAS, just as the Eisenhower Administration (EA) 
was taking office; the EAS failed to produce a long-term plan, as demand-
ed by the GOI and the Eisenhower Administration; the Eisenhower Ad-
ministration showed complete indifference towards the EAS; when Isra-
el’s short-term debt situation improved, the Eisenhower Administration 
reduced Israel’s aid for fiscal year 1955, thus creating perverse incentives 
for the GOI; and the Eisenhower Administration completely lost interest 
in Israeli economic policy, beginning in August 1954. 
The EAS’ recommendations were broadly consistent with the Washington 
Consensus, but with some significant exceptions (e.g. the EAS’ support for 
export subsidies). Despite the EAS’ efforts to persuade policymakers and 
the public, the GOI rejected most of the EAS’ recommendations in the 
money doctoring fields, industry, agriculture/irrigation and antitrust 
(project evaluation was the only exception). This was almost inevitable, 
because the EAS and the GOI had divergent policy goals: The EAS priori-
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tized allocative efficiency and cost control, while the GOI prioritized state-
building—national security, regional development and full employment.  
Our findings support the view that the Eisenhower Administration failed 
to promote economic reform abroad via conditionality, because of its gen-
eral policy of cutting foreign   aid, and its prioritization of strategic con-
siderations over economic considerations.   
Keywords: economic policy advice, development, planning, Israel, learn-
ing and signaling 
L’ « Economic Advisory Staff » et la construction de l’Etat en Israël, 
1953-1955 
Cet article documente les activités et l’influence du « Economic Advisory 
Staff » (EAS), un groupe d’économistes états-uniens qui conseilla le 
gouvernement d’Israël (GOI) de mai 1953 à juillet 1955. Les membres le 
plus en vue de l’EAS étaient Oscar Gass (directeur), Bernard Bell (vice-
directeur), Bertram Gross, Abba Lerner, Marion Clawson et Arye 
Gaathon. 
Nous évaluons l’influence de l’EAS via une grille conceptuelle basée sur 
les notions d’apprentissage et de production de signal. L’EAS promut 
l’apprentissage, via la production de 120 memoranda sur une vaste 
gamme de sujets, plutôt que de s’engager lui-même dans l’évaluation de 
projet, et via le développement de bonnes relations avec quatre ministres 
du GOI. Cependant, différents facteurs faisaient obstacle à l’apprentissage 
et à la production de signal, en empêchant ainsi l’EAS d’atteindre son 
plein potentiel d’influence. 
Les facteurs suivants faisaient obstacle à l’apprentissage : les décideurs du 
GOI dévalorisaient les conseillers de façon générale, tout en ayant une 
haute estime de leur propre capacité d’expertise ; le GOI disposait de 
divers conseillers nationaux et étrangers qui étaient souvent en désaccord 
avec l’EAS ; il n’y avait pas d’organisme intermédiaire qui puisse 
construire une médiation entre le GOI et l’EAS. 
Les facteurs suivants faisaient obstacle à la production de signal : le GOI 
recruta dans l’EAS des Démocrates ou des soutiens du New Deal, au 
moment même où l’administration Eisenhower (EA) prenait ses 
fonctions ; l’EAS échoua dans la production d’un plan de long terme, 
comme le lui demandaient le GOI et l’administration Eisenhower ; cette 
dernière se montra complètement indifférente vis-à-vis de l’EAS ; lorsque 
la situation d’Israël sur le front de la dette de court-terme s’améliora, 
l’administration Eisenhower réduisit l’aide à Israël pour l’année fiscale 
1955, en créant ainsi des incitations négatives pour le GOI ; enfin, 
l’administration Eisenhower perdit, à partir d’août 1954, tout intérêt pour 
la politique économique en Israël. 
Les recommandations de politique économique de l’EAS étaient 
globalement cohérentes avec le Consensus de Washington, tout en 
comportant de exceptions significatives (par exemple le soutien de l’EAS à 
des mesures de subvention aux exportations). Malgré les efforts de l’EAS 
pour persuader les décideurs politiques et le public, le GOI rejeta la 
plupart des recommandations de l’EAS dans le domaine monétaire, de la 
politique industrielle, de la politique agricole et d’irrigation et des 
politiques de la concurrence (la seule exception étant l’évaluation de 
| The Economic Advisory Staff and State-Building in Israel, 1953-1955 483 
Œconomia – History | Methodology | Philosophy, 9(3) : 481-536 
projet). Ceci était presque prévisible, puisque l’EAS et le GOI avaient des 
objectifs politiques divergents : l’EAS privilégiait l’efficience en termes 
d’allocation et de contrôle des coûts, alors que le GOI privilégiait la 
construction de l’Etat dans une logique de sécurité nationale, de 
développement régional et de plein emploi.  
Nos résultats montrent que l’administration Eisenhower échoua dans la 
promotion de réformes économiques à l’étranger via la conditionnalité, en 
raison de sa politique générale de coupe dans l’aide à l’étranger et de la 
priorité accordée à des considérations stratégiques vis-à-vis de 
considérations économiques. 
Mots-clés : conseil aux politiques, développement, planification, Israël, 
apprentissage et signal 
JEL: N45, O19, O20  
 
 
A small but growing literature studies the advisory missions of West-
ern economists in developing countries in the 1950s and 1960s, using 
recently discovered archival materials: Douglas North in Brazil (Bo-
ianovsky, 2018), Wolfgang Stolper in Nigeria (Morgan, 2008), Arthur 
Lewis in Ghana (Mosley and Ingham, 2013, chap. 6), and Albert 
Hirschman and Lauchlin Currie in Colombia (Bianchi, 2011; 
Alacevich, 2011; Sandilands, 2015; Alvarez et al., 2017). This paper 
documents the activities and influence of the Economic Advisory 
Staff (EAS), a group of American economists that advised the Gov-
ernment of Israel (GOI)1 between May 1953 and July 1955. The GOI 
established the EAS with the US Government’s approval, and asked 
the EAS to formulate policies that would move Israel towards eco-
nomic independence—that is, the elimination of Israel’s dependence 
on foreign debt. GOI officials hoped that the EAS’ establishment 
would demonstrate the GOI’s commitment to achieving economic 
independence, and thus signal its creditworthiness to the US Gov-
ernment, US banks and American Jews.   
To evaluate the EAS’ influence, we use a simple conceptual 
framework taken from the public choice literature—learning and sig-
naling. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first historians of 
economics to apply this conceptual framework to foreign advisory 
missions. As Letterie and Swank (1997) explain, policymakers have in 
mind two objectives when they choose advisors: Learning about the 
likelihood of success of a proposed policy, and signaling other agents 
that the policy has a high likelihood of success. The policymaker faces 
a tradeoff between learning and signaling: To maximize learning, the 
policymaker should choose an advisor with preferences that are close 
to her own. However, to maximize signaling, the policymaker should 
choose an advisor whose preferences are close to those of the agents 
                                                            
1 For a list of recurrent abbreviations, see Appendix A. 
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whom she wishes to signal. In our case, the GOI faced a tradeoff be-
tween maximizing learning by choosing advisors who sympathized 
with the GOI’s ideology, and maximizing signaling by choosing advi-
sors who were ideologically close to the Eisenhower Administration 
(EA). 
Although several researchers have evaluated the EAS’ contribu-
tion (Halevi, 1969; Tishler, 1975; Kleiman, 1981; Krampf, 2010), their 
conclusions are based on (at best) a partial examination of the archiv-
al record. This paper is the first to utilize the complete archival record 
of the EAS’ activities, which is located primarily at Israel State Ar-
chives.  
During its 26 months, the EAS produced 120 memoranda in vari-
ous fields, of which 114 have survived (for the full list, see Appendix 
C). A detailed analysis of the hundreds of recommendations con-
tained in these memoranda, and the extent to which they were im-
plemented, would require a book-length treatment. Therefore, we 
focus on the EAS’ recommendations in the following fields: money 
doctoring—fiscal policy, central banking and monetary policy, inter-
national trade, exchange rates and the balance of payments (BoP), 
wages and foreign debt management;2 industry; agriculture and irri-
gation; and antitrust.    
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Sections 1-2 describe 
the EAS’ formation and its complex relationship with the GOI, in 
light of the learning and signaling framework. Section 3 presents the 
EAS’ recommendations and the GOI’s policy decisions, in the fields of 
money doctoring, industry, agriculture and irrigation, and antitrust. 
1. The EAS’ Establishment  
1.1 The Israeli Economy (December 1952) 
The GOI decided to establish the EAS in December 1952. Israel was a 
developmental state with a heavy defense burden; large-scale immi-
gration; a massive fiscal deficit financed by money printing; monetary 
chaos in the absence of a central bank; a massive trade deficit; an 
acute short-term debt problem; and government control over orga-
nized labor, capital investment, credit and foreign currency. In 1952, 
GDP per capita was at 26.0% and 63.8% of the US and Western Euro-
pean levels, respectively (Maddison Project Database, 2018). Agricul-
ture and industry accounted for 11.4% and 21.7% of National Domes-
tic Product, and 17.4% and 20.1% of employment, respectively 
                                                            
2 Bianchi (2011, 220) defines money doctoring as “[Advice on] how government 
authorities should act to establish a central bank, regulate the financial sector, 
reform the fiscal system, and secure access to foreign capital.” We expand Bian-
chi’s definition to include the interrelated topics of international trade, exchange 
rates, the balance of payments and wages.  
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(Michaely, 1975, 193). Israel’s leading exports were citrus fruits (37.9% 
of total exports), diamonds (26.4%), other industrial products (12.9%) 
and textile products (11%) (Appendix D, Table 11).  
The State of Israel was established in May 1948, and was immedi-
ately compelled to fight for its survival. Despite its dramatic victory 
in the War of Independence, Israel continued to face existential 
threats. Over 1948-1951, mass immigration increased the population 
by 82% (ibid., Table 1).  
From mid-1948, the GOI, led by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion 
and his Mapai party, imposed austerity and rationing, which resulted 
in large-scale excess demand and suppressed inflation (Gross, 1990). 
By mid-1951, the need for reform was painfully obvious: The public 
had tired of austerity and rationing, and foreign currency reserves 
were dangerously low (Appendix D, Table 8). In February 1952, Ben-
Gurion and Finance Minister Levi Eshkol introduced the New Eco-
nomic Policy (NEP): devaluation via two new exchange rates (100% 
and 180% above the original rate); fiscal and monetary contraction; 
increased capital inflows; near-elimination of rationing and price con-
trols; and price increases on (price-controlled) essential goods (Barkai 
and Liviatan, 2007, 48-52). 
Israel and West Germany signed the Holocaust reparations 
agreement in September 1952. Germany promised to pay DM 3 bil-
lion to the GOI (“reparations”) and DM 450 million to survivors (“res-
titution”) over the next 12 years.  
The Israeli economy stagnated in 1952, primarily due to the NEP, 
which significantly reduced money growth (Appendix D, Table 4) 
and the fiscal deficit (ibid., Table 5). Growth in real per capita GNP 
and consumption fell to -0.1% and zero, respectively, from 11% and 
3.9% in 1951 (ibid., Table 2). Real investment fell 14.1% (ibid., Table 
3). Inflation rose to 58.2%, vs. 14% in 1951 (ibid., Table 4). The trade 
deficit and capital imports were almost 20% of GNP (ibid., Table 6). 
However, exports grew, both absolutely and as a percentage of GNP 
(ibid., Table 6), and unemployment fell to 8.1%, vs. 13.9% in 1949 
(ibid., Table 1). 
From April 1952-June 1953, Israel asked the US eight times for 
emergency aid to repay/refinance external short-term debt (see Table 
9 for details). In June 1952, with Israel’s external short-term debt at 
$124 million (equivalent to 8.1% of GNP) and the ratio of gross re-
serves to external short-term debt at just 0.26 (ibid.), Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson sent Raymond Mikesell to Israel as to play the role of 
money doctor—a Western economist who brokers money for reforms 
(see Flandreau, 2003, 4).3 In July 1952, Mikesell recommended ap-
proving Israel’s request to use $25 million of its 1953 Mutual Security 
                                                            
3 Mikesell was appointed after Milton Friedman declined the State Department’s 
invitation to go to Israel (FRUS, June 17, 1952; Friedman to Patinkin, April 2, 
1952, cited in Leeson, 1998). 
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Agency grant to cover short-term debt, conditional on avoidance of 
new short-term debt and implementation of a foreign currency budg-
et.4 Israel accepted these conditions and the US authorized the $25 
million (Mikesell, 2000, 121).    
 Israel’s short-term debt problem came to the attention of Presi-
dents Truman and Eisenhower; both approved the State Depart-
ment’s policy of imposing tougher conditionality on Israel (Truman-
Byroade meeting, FRUS, August 8, 1952; NSC meeting, FRUS, July 9, 
1953).5 By March 1954, the situation had improved: External short-
term debt fell to $73 million, and the ratio of gross reserves to short-
term external debt rose to 0.68. This allowed the US to “substantially 
reduce” grants to Israel in fiscal year 1955 (Nolting to Dulles, FRUS, 
March 18, 1954); the economic grant and total aid were cut by 60% 
and 29%, respectively (Appendix D, Table 7).  
1.2 Why Did the Government of Israel Establish the EAS?  
Following the Mikesell mission, Israel and the US reached a mutual 
understanding that Israel should establish a foreign advisory group. 
In October 1952, Teddy Kollek, Director-General of the Prime Minis-
ter’s Office, met with Mikesell in Washington. Kollek and Mikesell 
formulated the following proposal: The GOI would recruit 6-10 for-
eign experts, who would be acceptable to both Jerusalem and Wash-
ington. These experts would be employed by the GOI within various 
ministries, but would be paid by the US Technical Cooperation Ad-
ministration (Kollek to Shalit, October 23, 1952, 5364/11-Gimmel).6 
(The Technical Cooperation Administration ultimately decided not to 
fund the EAS; Gass to Kollek, April 24, 1953, 5509/3-Gimmel). Ben-
Gurion stated his strong preference for “foreign Jewish economists” 
(Avriel to Gaathon, May 1, 1952, 5509/3-Gimmel, 375) with a “Zionist 
spark” (Knesset Minutes, June 9, 1953); apparently, he understood 
intuitively that ideological compatibility maximizes learning.  
On December 1, 1952, Ben-Gurion decided to establish a “Central 
Bureau for Economic Coordination and Planning,” whose “ultimate 
aim” would be “the balanced planning of the national economy for 
                                                            
4 On the subsequent evolution of the foreign currency budget, see Michaely (1975, 
29). 
5 The State Department had the following goals: a. promote Israeli economic in-
dependence through structural reforms (FRUS, August 8, 1952; July 9, 1953); b. 
avoid (indirectly) financing increased Jewish immigration, thus angering the Ar-
abs (FRUS, July 9, 1953); c. stop antagonizing the Arabs via repeated bailouts of 
Israel; d. Avoid setting a precedent for other debtor nations (FRUS, March 24, 
1953). 
6 The State Department saw Middle East Technical Cooperation Administra-
tion/Point IV programs as a means “to strengthen the Arab States and Israel … 
and to increase their will and ability to resist penetration by the USSR” (Hoskins 
to Byroade, FRUS, April 7, 1952). 
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several years in advance and the consolidation of the independence of 
the State.”7 Ben Gurion said nothing about signaling (Ben-Gurion to 
Kollek, December 1, 1952; “Proposal,” November 19, 1952, 5509/3-
Gimmel). Kollek, however, thought that the Bureau was essential for 
both learning and signaling (December 26, 1952, 5509/3-Gimmel; 
translated from Hebrew): 
Questions are [asked of] us with increasing bluntness: How long will we 
continue to require financial aid? How will the isolated development 
plans that are in different stages of implementation be coordinated? What 
form will [our] economy take once it reaches the stage of a balanced econ-
omy?  ...  Isn’t Israel a bottomless barrel? 
These questions arise whether we intend to apply to the US Export-Import 
Bank for another development loan8 or for consolidating our short-term 
debt. The same question is [asked] also by the American authorities, to 
whom we have applied for a third grant of over $1 million to finance our 
foreign currency budget  ...  Similar questions come up even when we turn 
to [Diaspora Jews to] sell  ...  bonds  ...  
We need to know how to answer these questions not only in order to an-
swer  ...  [foreign financial] institutions whose financial resources we re-
quire, but also and in the main to ourselves. 
Kollek elaborated: In the past, the GOI had not been required to 
demonstrate that it was utilizing foreign funds efficiently, so the GOI 
had gotten by without accurate economic data. But in May 1952, for-
eign creditors started asking more questions; GOI ministries, especial-
ly the Ministry of Finance (MOF), were repeatedly embarrassed “be-
cause they could not answer the most direct and simple questions 
regarding our financial condition.”9 Furthermore, the incoming Ei-
senhower Administration would almost certainly demand greater 
accountability. Time was of the essence: The Truman-Eisenhower 
transition opened a brief window of opportunity to recruit experi-
enced US government economists, whose services were essential due 
to the shortage of qualified GOI economists.  
By early 1953, Kollek was even more convinced of the importance 
of signaling. Writing from Washington, he told Ben-Gurion that Israel 
needed an economic plan (to be prepared by the foreign experts) to 
signal the US government and its financial agencies, or else lose ac-
cess to US government credit and possibly grants (Kollek to Avriel, 
undated, ca. February 1953, 5509/3-Gimmel). Ben-Gurion did not 
dispute Kollek’s assessment. Nevertheless, Ben-Gurion continued to 
focus exclusively on learning, as evidenced by his letter of invitation 
                                                            
7 The word “balanced” suggests the possible influence of Rosenstein-Rodan’s Big 
Push theory. 
8 This was not to be; only in 1958 did Israel borrow again from the EIB (Sharp, 
2016).  
9 Israel had no sovereign credit rating until 1988. 
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to Gass (undated, ca. March 1953; 5509/3-Gimmel), which discussed 
learning extensively without mentioning signaling at all. 
1.3 Negotiations and Establishment of the EAS  
The EAS was established in April 1953 after three months of conten-
tious negotiations between EAS Director Oscar Gass and GOI repre-
sentatives Kollek and Ehud Avriel (5509/3-Gimmel). The major issues 
were as follows: 
1. The EAS was almost aborted because Eshkol wanted the EAS to en-
gage in long-term planning (henceforth LTP) and avoid short-term is-
sues; Gass was vehemently opposed (more on this below).  
2. GOI ministers had serious reservations regarding Gass, due to his 
reputation for abrasive behavior. Kollek persuaded them to appoint 
Gass nevertheless, because Gass would recruit an excellent staff.   
1.4 Recruiting the EAS Staff: Learning vs. Signaling 
Despite Kollek’s emphasis on signaling, in recruiting the EAS staff 
(February-May 1953), Kollek and Gass demonstrated either prioritiza-
tion of learning over signaling, or a total lack of awareness regarding 
effective signaling strategies vis-a-vis the EA:  
a. Kollek and Gass sought Truman Administration veterans. Therefore, 
they did not contact any Republican-connected economists, even if only 
to solicit recommendations. Gass did not exploit his connections with Ar-
thur Burns, Chairman of Eisenhower’s Council of Economic Advisers 
(during 1951-1953, Gass and Burns were both active in the Columbia 
University Center for Israel Studies; Salo Baron Papers, Stanford Univer-
sity, 55:1, 55:5), and Burns’ student, the labor economist Eli Ginzberg, 
who had “continuing contact with Eisenhower [throughout his Presiden-
cy] both in person and by letter” (Ginzberg, 1989, 78).10 
b. To minimize costs, Kollek (unsuccessfully) sought one or two British 
economists. For unknown reasons, Kollek limited his search to Labour 
circles: Kollek’s British contact was the industrial economist Herbert A. 
Silverman (an associate of G.D.H. Cole), who, in turn, spoke with Hugh 
Gaitskell and Richard Kahn. At the height of the Cold War, Gass (on 
Kollek’s recommendation) tried to recruit Solomon Adler, who had left 
the US Treasury in 1950 after being accused of communist sympathies 
(5509/3-Gimmel)!11 
                                                            
10 Ginsberg would visit Israel in Summer 1953 to advise on human resources. It is 
unlikely that Gass or the GOI knew of Ginzberg’s personal connection with Ei-
senhower. 
11 Kollek and Gass were unaware of these accusations. Note that Mikesell was 
Adler’s close friend, and did not believe the accusations (Mikesell, 1994); in any 
event, Kollek and Gass did not know this, and did not know (at this point) 
whether Mikesell would continue as State Department representative under Ei-
senhower.   
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Kollek and Gass ultimately formed a New Deal/Democratic EAS, 
which was a poor choice for signaling the EA; this may explain why 
the GOI never even mentioned the EAS to Washington-based Eisen-
hower Administration officials. However, the EAS was an excellent 
choice for signaling American Jews, who overwhelmingly voted 
Democratic (only 36% voted Eisenhower in 1952; Aridan, 2017, 81). 
The EAS’ formation (which was widely reported in American Jewish 
newspapers) most likely contributed to the surge in transfers from 
World Jewry to the GOI, from $75 million in 1953 to $123 million in 
1954 (Michaely, 1975, 200), and to the United Jewish Appeal’s consol-
idation loan, which transformed $65 million in short-term debt into 
five-year debt by November 1954 (Kollek personally persuaded US 
Jewish communities to participate; Haaretz, March 1, 1954). 
1.5 EAS Personnel 
As Kollek predicted, Gass recruited a stellar staff. The six senior 
members were: 
• Oscar Gass (Director) was an economist in the office of the US Treasury 
Secretary (1938-1943) and the War Production Board (1943-1944), and Is-
rael’s economic advisor in Washington (1946-1953). He represented Israel 
in its successful applications for Export-Import Bank (EIB) loans (1949, 
1950) and its dealings with Mikesell (1952), and designed Israel’s first 
foreign currency budget (1952). Gass coauthored a seminal study on the 
economy of Palestine (Nathan, Gass and Creamer, 1946). 
• Bernard Bell (Deputy Director, specializing in international finance) was 
formerly chief economist of the EIB. In that capacity, he spent three 
weeks in Israel in January 1953.  
• Bertram Gross (Senior Officer—construction/housing, education and 
health) was formerly Executive Secretary of the US Council of Economic 
Advisers (1946-1952) and a leading Democratic Party operative. He was 
one of the drafters of the 1946 Employment Act.  
• Abba Lerner (Chief Monetary and Fiscal Officer) was a world-renowned 
theorist.  
• Marion Clawson (Senior Officer—agriculture) was formerly director of 
the US Bureau of Land Management (1948-1953). Clawson was the only 
non-Jew, and the only Ph.D. besides Lerner. 
• Arye Gaathon (Senior Officer—investment and development plans) was 
Israel’s leading government economist, and the former Director of Eco-
nomic Research in the Prime Minister’s Office. 
Gass and Gaathon’s extensive experiences with Israel greatly reduced 
the possibility of “visiting economist syndrome”—“the habit of issu-
ing peremptory advice and prescription by calling on universally val-
id economic principles and remedies ... after a strictly minimal ac-
quaintance with the ‘patient’” (Hirschman, 1984, 93; see also Bianchi, 
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2011). The EAS had a Democratic/New Deal orientation: Gass’ per-
sonal attorney was the general counsel to the Democratic National 
Committee; Bell had left the EIB over a policy disagreement with Ei-
senhower; Gross and Clawson were staunch Democrats; and Lerner 
was nonpartisan.   
2. The EAS-GOI Relationship 
Israel’s leading economic policymaker was Finance Minister Eshkol, 
who enjoyed almost complete autonomy under Prime Ministers Ben-
Gurion and Sharett. Nevertheless, the GOI placed the EAS within the 
Prime Minister’s Office.12 
The EAS-GOI working relationship was problematic from the 
start. The GOI/MOF did not cooperate with the EAS as promised: 
The EAS was not consulted regarding GOI investment plans (Gass to 
Eshkol, May 7, 1954, 5509/14-Gimmel), did not receive timely infor-
mation from the ministries, and was excluded from key interministe-
rial committees and from regular participation in the Council of Eco-
nomic Ministers (chaired by Eshkol; Sharett, 1978, March 1, 1954).  
The following factors complicated the GOI-EAS relationship, thus 
reducing the EAS’ contribution to learning: 
a. Eshkol and other policymakers had a “know-it-all” attitude—they did 
not welcome advice in their own areas of expertise.  
b. The GOI had other advisors who often disagreed with the EAS: David 
Horowitz, Eshkol’s informal macroeconomic advisor and (from De-
cember 1954) Governor of the Bank of Israel (BOI); the American wa-
ter engineers John S. Cotton, Abel Wollman, Harry Bashore and John 
Savage; the labor expert Eli Ginzberg; and the United Nations’s Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 
Gass had acrimonious relationships with Eshkol, Sharett, Horowitz 
and others. By March 1954, he was effectively replaced by Bell. Gass 
left Israel on May 30, 1954 and did not return; in total, Gass was 
abroad for 16 of the EAS’ 26 months. 
The EAS took an independent, non-partisan approach, and did not 
hesitate to question some of Mapai’s core beliefs. As Clawson wrote, 
“one of our chief functions should be to subject to critical scrutiny 
those ideas which are widely and uncritically accepted ... we would 
be seriously failing in our responsibilities if we hesitate to speak up 
on unpopular issues” (#84). The EAS’ independence enhanced the 
quality of its advice but made partisan policymakers less receptive to 
it. 
Despite all the tensions, the EAS-GOI relationship had significant 
positive aspects. By the end of its term, the EAS established good 
                                                            
12 Kollek would later regret this (Kollek to Eshkol, February 23, 1955; Kollek to 
Gass, February 7, 1955; 5509/15-Gimmel).   
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working relationships with four ministries (Trade and Industry, Agri-
culture, Labor, Development). Furthermore, the EAS more than paid 
for itself through project evaluation;13 the GOI saved large sums by 
rejecting poorly conceived projects based on EAS advice (Kollek to 
Eshkol, February 23, 1955, 5509/15-Gimmel). 
We now detail the Eshkol-EAS disputes regarding LTP and 
breaches of confidentiality—disputes which significantly affected 
both learning and signaling.        
2.1 The Dispute over Long-Term Planning  
The EAS was almost aborted due to a dispute between Eshkol and 
Gass regarding its mandate (Gass to Kollek/Avriel, March 31, 1953, 
5509/3-Gimmel). Eskhol, a true believer in LTP,14 expected the EAS 
(which he called “Office of Economic Planning and Advice”) to en-
gage in LTP and avoid short-term issues entirely. Gass, on the other 
hand, disparaged LTP15 and insisted that the EAS must address short-
term issues of “larger significance” (Gass to Kollek/Avriel, April 1, 
1953, 5509/3-Gimmel). Accordingly, Gass insisted on omitting the 
word “planning” from the name and the contract of the new advisory 
body. 
Kollek (who advocated LTP for signaling purposes) saved the EAS 
by convincing both parties to accept the following compromise lan-
guage (Letter of Terms [attached to EAS contract], March 15, 1953, 
5509/3-Gimmel):  
The EAS may ... render recommendations on the most immediate econom-
ic problems, on questions involving a limited time span, or on issues con-
nected with  ... long-run development ... It is however the understanding 
of the GOI that ... it would be particularly to issues of long-run develop-
ment that the EAS would wish to devote its most continuing efforts.  
                                                            
13  The typical project proposal was a request for GOI loans to build a privately 
owned factory. 
14 In 1952, the GOI had serious discussions about establishing a LTP office; it told 
Gass explicitly that he would play an important role in LTP (Avriel to Gass, in 
Eshkol’s name, September 15, 1952, 5509/14-Gimmel). Eshkol’s reasons for em-
bracing LTP are unknown.  
15 Gass’ reasons for opposing LTP during the EAS contract negotiations shifted 
over time: LTP implies the EAS’ exclusion from fiscal and monetary issues 
(March 31, 1953); LTP “deals with the future which being future never comes … 
could not get people of discrimination to come to Israel with me to work on such 
planning”; “only long run in which economist is interested is that which consists 
of a series of short runs” (April 1, 1953); LTP implies executive authority that the 
EAS lacks (April 28, 5509/3-Gimmel, 1953). Gass’ assertion that LTP was not in-
tellectually respectable is consistent with Balisciano’s (1998) finding that planning 
(except Keynesian macroeconomic planning) went out of style in the US by 1950. 
Gass never mentioned the “program” vs. “project” controversy in early devel-
opment economics (see Alacevich, 2011).    
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Gass won—the word “planning” was omitted. But as we shall see, 
Eshkol’s concession was illusory; he never stopped believing that LTP 
was the EAS’ raison d'être.16  
In June 1953, Eshkol met with Mikesell (who had arrived on a se-
cond mission) and Bruce McDaniel, Technical Cooperation Admin-
istration (US) director in Israel; no EAS representative was present. 
McDaniel urged Eshkol to draw up seven-year plans for agriculture, 
industry and natural resources (5364/11-Gimmel).17 On October 26, 
Eshkol presented seven-year plans for agriculture and industry to 
Diaspora Jewish leaders (702/7-Peh Tzadi). The agricultural plan 
(known as “Plan C”) was a serious but flawed plan prepared by the 
Jewish Agency Planning Center and the Ministry of Agriculture, 
without EAS input. The industrial plan, whose authorship is un-
known, was not a serious effort (Sharett, 1978, November 4, 1953). 
There is no evidence that Mikesell and McDaniel noticed these short-
comings.   
Gass continued to oppose LTP, due to his conviction that the GOI 
harbored serious misconceptions regarding LTP and was unprepared 
to implement it properly (Gass to Eshkol, May 7, 1954, 5509/14-
Gimmel). Gass made four criticisms in this context [our interpretation 
appears in brackets]:  
a. Eshkol wrongly denies the need for planning in fields where Israel 
possesses significant technical knowledge. Mere technical knowledge 
does not constitute planning. [The GOI refuses to learn.] 
b. “Each [minister] thinks ‘planning’ is needed in the sphere of others 
but not in his own ... because each does not so much as entertain the 
thought that the very fundamentals of [his] policy ... may need recon-
sideration ... No one should pretend to plan unless he thinks genuinely 
that he may be going wrong without planning” [emphasis in origi-
nal]. [The GOI refuses to learn.] 
c. The GOI does not desire genuine planning, defined as “the compre-
hensive consideration of all those factors of costs and returns, in ap-
propriate time perspective, which taken together should govern the 
determination of an economic policy.” This was (largely) why he in-
sisted on omitting the word “planning” from the EAS’ name and con-
tract. Genuine planning would improve governance by counteracting 
the common perception that “[the] authorities have no clear and con-
sistent idea of what they are doing.” [Because the GOI refuses to 
learn, it cannot signal the Israeli public.] 
                                                            
16  Why didn’t Eshkol hold firm, and insist on a contractual commitment to LTP? 
Eshkol believed that any outstanding issues could be resolved once Gass arrived 
in Israel, and (presumably) he did not wish to block the implementation of Ben-
Gurion’s decision.  
17 After World War II, the US Government promoted LTP abroad even though it 
was out of style in the US. For example, France (Cazes, 1990), Brazil (Boianovsky, 
2018) and Nigeria (Morgan, 2008) all used LTP in their financial aid negotiations 
with the US Government.   
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d. The GOI confuses planning with “advertising, negotiation or public 
relations,” which the EAS is contractually prohibited from undertak-
ing. [The GOI thinks LTP is just a signaling device—no learning is 
necessary.] 
Gass’ first two criticisms were valid (as we shall see). The third is dif-
ficult to evaluate. Gass’ fourth criticism amounted to a denigration of 
Eshkol’s need for LTP to satisfy US policymakers. Obviously, an ad-
visor who denigrates the policymaker’s signaling needs cannot be 
effective; to maximize his effectiveness, Gass should have accepted 
LTP as a necessary evil. 
On August 3, 1954, Eshkol (ignoring Gass) presented a planning 
document to the Council of Economic Ministers, which began:  
Out of recognition of the need for a comprehensive plan ... the govern-
ment established the EAS ... After the EAS spent about a year in Israel, 
and had the opportunity to ... learn [Israel’s] economic problems, [its 
members] are now approaching the implementation of their main task: the 
preparation of the comprehensive plan.    
With the Council of Economic Ministers about to authorize a LTP ini-
tiative, Bell, recognizing LTP’s inevitability, tried to influence 
Eshkol’s thinking (Yochanan Beham to Gass, August 12, 1954, 
5509/15-Gimmel): 
[Bell] tried very hard  ...  to convince Eshkol that a lot will depend on how 
the case is presented. Eshkol promised to make it clear to all [Economic 
Ministers]  ...  that planning is more than trying to show the other fellow 
what he ought to do, and that in many cases it might hurt the affected par-
ties considerably  ...  [Bell] said, “Let’s take an example that is close to 
home, Mekoroth [the national water carrier, founded 1937 by Eshkol]. We 
expect the Irrigation Committee to go into all aspects of Mekoroth  ...  
Eshkol reacted, as expected, by saying, “Well, how, as far as irrigation and 
Mekoroth are concerned, we know pretty well what we want to do.18 
Planning in industry is much more important and you should ... stress ... 
those areas where nothing has been done in the past.”  ...  Eshkol seemed 
... to have come round to [Bell’s] point of view ... We will see  ...  whether 
[Eshkol will] make it clear that some people’s pet plans might get lost in 
the shuffle.  
In September 1954, the Council of Economic Ministers authorized a 
committee of DG’s of all economic ministries, five sectoral committees 
(agriculture/irrigation, industry/mining/electricity, transportation, 
commerce and construction/housing) and a Planning Secretariat ap-
pointed by Eshkol. The Secretariat—MOF Director-General Pinhas 
Sapir, Kollek, Bell and Shimon Horn (MOF)—first met on September 
15. As Kollek recalled: “the [Council of Economic Ministers] decided 
                                                            
18 “We have a skill for the Land of Israel, which is greater than … [some] expert 
who comes … for 1-2 months. Why shouldn’t we utilize the experience that we 
gained over fifty years of conquest, draining swamps and finding water?” 
(Eshkol, cited in Nevo-Eshkol, 1988, 35).      
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on a system which would encourage greater cooperation between the 
EAS and their Ministries. The chances for  ...  success  ...  were not 
overestimated by anybody. In fact, Eshkol, Bell, as well as Sapir  ...  
were a bit doubtful of its ultimate success; nevertheless, everybody 
believed it was worth trying” (Kollek to Gass, February 7, 1955, 
5509/15-Gimmel). 19 
On November 17, 1954, Eshkol wrote Gass in Washington 
(5509/15-Gimmel). Eshkol complained that the EAS “[has] not made 
a determined attempt with regard to the one thing we so badly 
need—a plan,” and asserted that “it would  ...  be a great pity to dis-
band the EAS without making a determined [LTP] effort.” He updat-
ed Gass regarding the LTP initiative, and after acknowledging “some 
differences of opinion between us on this subject,” he requested the 
EAS’ “whole-hearted cooperation.” 
At a February 16, 1955 meeting, Eshkol stated that he “wanted the 
EAS in the remaining period [until its term expired on July 31, 1955] 
to devote itself exclusively to preparing an overall economic plan or 
framework  ...  this would represent the culmination of the two years’ 
work.” All “agreed  ...  that every effort ought to be made by the EAS 
to prepare at least an outline for an overall [LTP]  ...  Bell said that he 
believed [this could be done] within ... five or six months  ...  Kollek 
said that of course the contract could be extended for a month or two 
if necessary [this never happened—authors]  ...  Eshkol said that if 
Gass were willing to participate actively  ... , such participation would 
be more than welcome [Gass never participated—authors]” (5509/15-
Gimmel). 
In an address published that month, Eshkol (1955) announced:     
The Office for Economic Advice and Planning [Eshkol’s name for the EAS] 
is now diligently preparing [a comprehensive development plan]. I hope 
that within a certain [period] the Office for Economic Advice and Plan-
ning will be able to prepare a “blueprint” for [the comprehensive plan]. 
Certainly, under our conditions it is difficult to prepare a plan in the man-
ner of “this you shall follow to the letter.” Most probably there will be 
changes to it. But I believe that this time an effort will be made to prepare 
a comprehensive plan, based on the coordination of the needs and possi-
bilities of the various sectors of the economy 
The EAS ultimately failed to produce this “blueprint,” but Bell was 
unconcerned (Bell to Eshkol, August 2, 1955, 5509/15-Gimmel):  
The [GOI] has a great deal of planning to do, not as extensive as that of the 
Soviet Government but more extensive than that of the US Government ... 
[This] must ... be ... planning of policies and actions which will induce  ...  
non-government entities to invest, to produce, to export, etc. This involves 
both fiscal and monetary actions and the creation of certain facilitating, 
                                                            
19 This was an attempt “to salvage something out of the idea of an economic advi-
sory unit” (Bell to Kollek, April 21, 1955, 5509/15-Gimmel).  
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controlling, and regulating institutions. The [GOI] is doing planning in 
many fields, will continue to do it and has personnel capable of it. 
Bell’s conception of planning, in which private sector decisions are 
influenced but not controlled by the government (see also #14), re-
sembled French indicative planning. However, no one in the EAS, 
GOI or US government ever discussed European planning models 
and their possible applicability in Israel.  
When the EAS’ term ended, Eshkol expressed his disappointment 
with Bell (Beham to Eshkol, September 5, 1955, 5509/15-Gimmel), but 
this was unfair: As Kollek told Eshkol (February 23, 1955, 5509/15-
Gimmel), the GOI/MOF had “neither the time nor the inclination” for 
LTP, because it was too preoccupied with short-term issues; the GOI’s 
administrative and political problems hampered LTP (Gilboa to Ben-
Artzi, September 9, 1956, 901/8-Peh); EAS personnel sought new po-
sitions as the EAS’ term wound down (Bell to Kollek, April 21, 1955, 
5509/15-Gimmel). 
Why didn’t Eshkol extend the EAS contract, and thus extend the 
LTP effort? Direct evidence is lacking. Presumably, Eshkol was moti-
vated by the following: 
a. By 1955, Israel’s financial condition had improved significantly, espe-
cially short-term debt and external reserves (Appendix D, Table 9), 
unilateral receipts from abroad and the fiscal deficit (ibid., Table 5). 
The Eisenhower Administration responded by cutting aid to Israel, 
thus creating a perverse incentive for Israel to avoid signaling its pro-
gress towards economic independence. 
b. The Eisenhower Administration showed complete indifference to-
wards the EAS.20 Presumably, because the EAS was uninvolved in 
brokering money for reforms (that was Mikesell’s role), it had no val-
ue as a signal to the EA. 
c. The Eisenhower Administration lost interest in Israeli economic inde-
pendence. Mikesell’s second mission of June 1953 was his last, and 
the State Department did not replace him. From August 1954 (when 
the GOI launched its LTP initiative), the Eisenhower Administration 
had no substantive discussions regarding Israeli economic independ-
ence; its interactions with Eshkol focused exclusively on the Arab-
Israeli water dispute (authors’ reading of FRUS). 
d. Eshkol wished to sever ties with Gass. 
2.2 Breaches of Confidentiality  
Both sides routinely violated the EAS’ confidentiality clause, which 
prohibited the GOI from “[making] any public attribution of any view 
to the EAS,” and the EAS from “any public discussion of any issue on 
which the EAS is making any recommendation” (Letter of Terms, 
                                                            
20 Gass/EAS is only mentioned once in FRUS; Gass’ interlocutor was a US Em-
bassy official.  
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March 15, 1953, 5509/3-Gimmel). GOI personnel leaked the latest 
EAS memoranda to the newspapers, which gladly published the 
memoranda, accompanied by sensationalized, politicized reporting 
that made rational discussion impossible (Applebaum, 1955). This 
reduced the EAS’ ability to signal the Israeli public. 
Eshkol clashed with the EAS over Gass’ unauthorized press con-
ferences, especially that of May 26, 1954 (just before Gass’ departure 
for the US). Gass told the public the unpleasant truth about Israel’s 
BOP situation: Over the past 12 months, Israel had spent $250 million 
in foreign currency, only 20% of which was obtained from exports; 
the other 80% was obtained from German reparations, US aid, bond 
sales and contributions from Diaspora Jewry. “Israel’s economy con-
tinues to be based on the bread of charity.” To change this reality, he 
suggested three policy options:  
a. Cut wages by almost half to reduce export prices;  
b. Real devaluation—implement a 50% nominal devaluation, and avoid 
inflation resulting from compensation of workers for that devalua-
tion. 
c. Massive export subsidies, financed by increasing taxes by 12.5% (on 
average) on (unchanged) wages.  
Gass argued that Israeli exports (except citrus) are negligible and 
stagnant due to excessive wages. For example, to make Israeli cloth-
ing exports competitive with the UK, a 35%-40% wage cut is required. 
Higher labor productivity growth will take many years to achieve, 
because it requires improved management/organization. Israel 
should aspire to Western living standards, but it cannot pretend that 
it has already achieved them (Jerusalem Post, May 27, 1954; Davar, 
May 28, 1954). 
Eshkol objected vehemently (Eshkol to Gass, May 28, 1954, 
5509/14-Gimmel):  
[Your] statement [to the press] constitutes a clear breach of a specific stip-
ulation in your contract  ...  
I am gravely concerned about the repercussions on the public morale 
which inevitably will result from this statement, as it is bound to create 
confusion and serve as a destabilizing factor in our economy.    
I came to realize now, more than ever, how necessary and pertinent was 
the above-mentioned stipulation, and I sincerely hope that you will act ac-
cordingly in the future.  
Bell, replying to Eshkol in Gass’ absence, was unapologetic (June 4, 
1954, 5509/14-Gimmel):  
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I am troubled because ... you do not contest the accuracy of Mr. Gass’ di-
agnosis ... but rather are concerned that the public21 should know that the 
economic situation is grave and that drastic and immediately painful steps 
need to be taken to remedy it. My own regret is, and I think I speak for 
Mr. Gass as well in this, that no such courageous statement of the truth 
has been made by a high officer of the GOI. Certainly it should be the ob-
ligation of an advisor to do so.  
I am sure that you recognize that Mr. Gass made this statement out of his 
deep and sincere concern ... for the future of Israel and because he felt that 
it was the obligation of someone whose words would command attention 
to focus the eyes of the Israeli public on the true facts of its situation.    
 ... one of the greatest dangers to Israel today and one of the greatest 
blocks to effective action is the mood of public complacency and self-
congratulation which has been permitted to develop in place of honest 
and courageous facing of the facts. 
Presumably, Eshkol was offended for two reasons: 
a. By sounding the alarm regarding the BOP, Gass had sent the public a 
negative signal regarding Eshkol’s competence (as Swank, 2000 demon-
strates, the policymaker prefers to hear advice in secret, because public 
knowledge of advisor-policymaker disagreements harms the policymak-
er’s reputation). 
b. The EAS believed that learning must include the public.22 It sought to 
educate the public regarding the BOP situation, so that the public would 
support Eshkol in implementing difficult (but unavoidable) measures. 
Eshkol rejected the EAS’ attempt to promote American-style partici-
patory democracy, which was the antithesis of Mapai’s hierarchical, 
highly centralized system (see Bareli, 2007 and Lammfromm, 2014, 
86-87).  
2.3 Was Teddy Kollek a “Problem-Solving Intermediary”? 
Mosley and Ingham (2013, 165-169) emphasize that a foreign advi-
sor’s success depends critically on the presence of a “problem-solving 
intermediary.” The intermediary must be credible and must be will-
ing and able to “translate what the adviser needs into a language that 
the [policymaker] understands,” so that the advisor’s recommenda-
tions receive serious consideration (ibid.). In our terminology, the in-
termediary’s role is to facilitate learning.  
Did Teddy Kollek play this role? No. Kollek brokered the com-
promise that led to the birth of the EAS, mediated (with little success) 
the interpersonal conflicts between Eshkol and Gass, and played a 
major role in facilitating the GOI-EAS LTP effort (a learning and sig-
naling enterprise). However, there is no evidence that he ever tried to 
                                                            
21 Presumably, Eshkol and Bell were referring to the Jewish public only. The non-
Jewish public (11% of the population) lacked influence over GOI policy.  
22 Currie and the IBRD held the same view (Alvarez, Guiot and Hurtado, 2017). 
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persuade the GOI to pay attention to an EAS recommendation; the 
task of persuasion was left to Gass and Bell. 
3. EAS Recommendations and GOI Policy Decisions 
3.1 Money Doctoring Fields   
Fiscal Policy 
The EAS called on the GOI to plan for the cessation of capital imports 
over 5-8 years, by abolishing or reforming “institutional devices for 
maintaining real consumption,” and using tax and investment poli-
cies to stimulate investment and reduce consumption (#12). If the 
GOI took any significant measures in this direction, they were a co-
lossal failure: From 1955-1961, 90% of GNP growth was accounted for 
by growth in private and public consumption (Schiffman et al., 2017, 
71). 
The EAS recommended issuing CPI-linked government bonds 
(#18); the GOI began doing so in 1955. On the other hand, Lerner’s 
call to index all loans exceeding 12 months (#21) was ignored. In-
stead, the GOI introduced partial indexation of 2-8 year loans, effec-
tive April 1, 1954. 
The EAS adopted Lerner’s Functional Finance theory: “Narrowly 
fiscal considerations should not trump the needs of price stability and 
growth” (#35).23 In the Israeli context, the EAS opposed fiscal deficits 
for fear of inflation. In a letter to Eshkol, Bell “urgently” recommend-
ed contraction on both expenditure and tax sides (Expenditure: cut IL 
15-20 million, except for education, health, investment; cut 7-10% in 
each ministry. Tax: subsidy rebate, direct tax increases, do not broad-
en income tax exemptions, improve tax collection) (#25). Bell warned 
that “if [expenditures] are not cut, you will be forced to finance them 
by directly inflationary means”—printing money or cutting subsidies 
via devaluation (the GOI subsidized certain commodities by import-
ing them at artificially low exchange rates). Eshkol did not cut ex-
penditures or increase direct taxes. He proposed a subsidy rebate, but 
did not implement it due to the opposition of the General Zionist 
ministers (Maariv, July 15, 1954). Tax exemptions and tax collection 
remained problematic: Even in 1959, tax officials were still negotiat-
ing special income tax rates with specific groups of workers (Rubner, 
1960, 76). 
                                                            
23 Oddly, this statement appears in a memorandum on cement. 
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Central Banking and Monetary Policy24 
Eshkol asked his friend David Horowitz to draft what became the 
Bank of Israel Law (1954) and serve as the founding governor of the 
BOI. Horowitz prepared the draft legislation without EAS input. In 
late April 1954, Lerner (with Gass) recommended that the GOI not 
pass Horowitz’s draft legislation, for two reasons (#8): 
1. The Governor sets monetary policy alone but lacks true independence. 
An independent monetary board should set monetary policy. 
2. The Governor’s banking supervision powers are excessive and “arbi-
trary.” The BOI will exploit these powers to limit competition in return 
for banks’ cooperation with the GOI’s directed credit program, all in the 
name of protecting depositors. Instead, the GOI should permit free com-
petition, replace directed credit with direct subsidies, and introduce US 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation-style deposit insurance.  
Lerner urged reconsideration, with the help of a Fed or IMF expert 
who would be brought to Israel, but Horowitz refused, citing en-
dorsements from Edward Bernstein (IMF), Robert Triffin (Yale Uni-
versity), Arthur Bloomfield (New York Fed) and Louis Rasminsky 
(Bank of Canada). Eshkol supported Horowitz; he wanted a depend-
ent BOI that would develop the country via directed credit and regu-
late the banks.25 Eshkol overcame the opposition of the right-liberal 
parties (which was partially based on Lerner’s memorandum): The 
final BOI law (August 1954) was essentially identical to Horowitz’s 
draft. 
International Trade, Exchange Rates and the BOP 
Lerner and Bell advocated export subsidies as means of promoting 
economic independence (#10, #19).26 The GOI utilized export subsi-
dies; in 1956, the GOI changed the basis for export subsidies from 
gross value to value added (Pomfret, 1975), consistent with what Bell 
had recommended. However, the GOI failed to keep the trade deficit 
constant, as recommended by Lerner—over 1954-56, the trade defi-
cit/GNP ratio ballooned from 19% to 25% (Appendix D, Table 6). 
Furthermore, Gass’ call to abolish the system of discretionary ex-
change rate-linked export premiums (#15) was not heeded. 
                                                            
24  This material is taken from Schiffman et al. (2017, 21-24).  
25 Two points (based on Helleiner, 2003): a. Eshkol’s expectation that the central 
bank would develop the country via directed credit was standard in developing 
countries. b. In the 1950s, US money doctors legitimized developing countries’ 
rejection of classical monetary orthodoxy, due to the rise of Keynesianism and the 
need to prevent the spread of Soviet influence. This may explain why Bernstein, 
Triffin, Bloomfield and Rasminsky endorsed Horowitz’ draft.  
26 Israel was free to give export subsidies because it did not join the GATT until 
1962. 
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Bell advocated unifying the exchange rate at IL 1.8/$ (accompa-
nied by compensation of low-income households for the resulting 
food and fuel price increases (#20). This was never implemented: Alt-
hough the exchange rate was officially unified in 1955, in practice, the 
highly complex multiple exchange rate system was maintained. 
Four months later, Bell opposed on anti-inflationary grounds a 
GOI proposal to cut subsidies on certain imported goods by raising 
the relevant exchange rates. Instead, he suggested what he saw as a 
noninflationary alternative—a subsidy rebate, in which higher in-
come workers rebate to the GOI the food and other subsidies which 
they currently receive (#23; also #20,  #25). The GOI did exactly the 
opposite: It rejected the subsidy rebate, and in July 1954, Eshkol 
raised exchange rates for some imports, including wheat for baking 
bread. 
The EAS supported import substitution via export subsidies (#19). 
However, it opposed import substitution where consumers were 
forced to pay more for import substitutes than they would pay for 
freely imported goods.  The EAS also opposed import substitution in 
intermediate goods because it harmed export competitiveness (#33, 
#48, #113). The GOI rejected this advice; it favored import substitu-
tion so strongly that it blocked imports even when domestic goods 
cost over 50% more (Rubner, 1960, 171). 
Wages 
Lerner (#24) warned that the Cost of Living Adjustment (CLA) was 
highly inflationary and hurt international competitiveness: When the 
CPI increased, wages increased more than proportionately. He 
strongly implied that major CLA reform was necessary (in 1956, he 
would advocate abolishing the CLA). Although Eshkol publicly sup-
ported Lerner’s view (Schiffman et al., 2017, 31), no CLA reform was 
implemented.  
Gass (and Lerner) advocated wage cuts (in both traded and non-
traded sectors) to improve international competitiveness and promote 
economic independence. Gass excoriated the “false and meretricious 
prophets” who denied the need for wage cuts, based on overoptimis-
tic projections of future productivity growth (cover letter to #29, May 
24, 1954). Gass’ public advocacy of wage cuts (including his May 26, 
1954 press conference) generated a firestorm of controversy. The GOI 
strongly rejected the EAS’ recommendation. In a 1957 speech (5535/9-
Gimmel), Eshkol prioritized equality over efficiency in wage setting, 
and enthusiastically adopted the optimistic productivity growth pro-
jections that Gass had excoriated.27  
                                                            
27 Both the EAS and the GOI ignored Keynesian arguments against nominal wage 
cuts. 
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Foreign Debt Management 
The GOI considered asking the EIB to rearrange the maturities of Is-
rael’s debts. Gass warned that this action was irreversible and would 
harm Israel’s credit abroad. Apparently, the GOI decided not to re-
quest rearrangement. Thus, Gass made a modest contribution to the 
GOI’s signaling effort.    
3.2 Industry  
Bread 
The EAS recommended the following: freeze bread prices, cut exces-
sive bakery wages, abolish the compulsory linkage between bakeries 
and flour mills, cut distribution costs by prohibiting deliveries in ur-
ban areas until after 11 AM, mechanize bakeries with GOI assistance, 
and allow free entry into the bakery sector (#29). On July 18, 1954, 
Eshkol increased bread and flour prices simultaneously, so that the 
bakers gained nothing. The EAS’ finding that bakery wages were ex-
cessive was harshly criticized in GOI and Histadrut (General Federa-
tion of Labor) circles; the other EAS recommendations were ignored.  
Bell and Deputy Trade and Industry Minister Zalman Susayeff (of 
the right-liberal General Zionist party) declared that bread prices 
should be based on the costs of large, mechanized bakeries, not small, 
primitive bakeries (#31). The GOI adopted this principle by 1958. 
Sugar 
Bell sat on the GOI’s Sugar Committee, which was optimistic that 
sugar beet could be grown and processed profitably, and advocated 
subsidies for these purposes (#45). To minimize transport costs, Gass 
recommended six small, geographically dispersed sugar refineries, 
using West German-made equipment (#43). However, the GOI estab-
lished just two refineries by 1956—an excessively large refinery in 
Afula (#45) using US-made equipment (the investment was made be-
fore the Committee could oppose it) and a small one in Ramat Gan.  
Cement 
Gass affirmed two principles (#35): a. In setting official prices, cost-
plus pricing should be rejected, while guaranteeing producers “an 
adequate profit return for prudent investment and efficient opera-
tion.” b. Consumers should not pay higher prices to support excess 
capacity. The GOI rejected these principles.  
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Tires 
The EAS (#33) recommended maintaining the price freeze that it had 
advocated three months earlier, merging the two existing firms (Alli-
ance and General) to reduce excess capacity/overhead, and giving 
the merged firm a “transitional” export subsidy. Eshkol maintained 
the price freeze but ignored the merger recommendation. 
Kaiser-Frazer Auto Plant 
The EAS gave Kaiser-Frazer a lukewarm endorsement, as follows: 
Kaiser-Frazer is Israel’s largest industrial exporter (accounting for 
20% of Israel’s industrial exports, with 90% of output exported), and 
is (unlike many other industrial enterprises) a net contributor to for-
eign currency reserves. However, Kaiser-Frazer is a “pygmy opera-
tion” whose exports depend entirely on clearing agreements with 
“dollar-short countries”—Turkey, Finland and Yugoslavia. Further-
more, Israeli consumers pay 10%-32% more for an Israeli-made Kai-
ser-Frazer auto, vs. a US-made Kaiser-Frazer auto. The EAS recom-
mended that Kaiser-Frazer manufacture or purchase more parts do-
mestically, and begin manufacturing trucks. The EAS rejected cost-
plus pricing in favor of a pricing formula based on prices of imported 
equivalents (#48). Implementation of EAS recommendations was par-
tial at best: From 1961, Kaiser-Frazer manufactured parts at its new 
Ashkelon facility; the extent of import substitution is unknown. Cost-
plus pricing was replaced by return-on-investment-based pricing in 
1957 (Haaretz, August 21, 1957); domestic consumer prices remained 
high because the GOI generally blocked competing imports (Rubner, 
1960, 275). The demise of Kaiser-Frazer USA’s passenger car division 
in 1955 led to drastic changes at Kaiser-Frazer Israel: By 1961, Jeep 
trucks accounted for 28% of total sales (all Jeep vehicles accounted for 
70%) (Edgar F. Kaiser Papers 343:12). Kaiser-Frazer Israel was sold in 
1969.   
American-Israel Paper Mills 
The EAS argued that the American-Israel Paper Mills monopoly, with 
its exorbitant prices, caused a net loss for the economy; Israel would 
be better off importing all of its paper needs (#36). Nevertheless, the 
GOI supported American-Israel Paper Mills in various ways, includ-
ing infant industry protection and acquiescence to unauthorized price 
increases (Kelman, 2016).  
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3.3 Agriculture and Irrigation 
Marion Clawson identified the following major weaknesses (#62, un-
less otherwise indicated):  
1. Agriculture is not geared to land characteristics. 
2. The types and sizes of farms result in low productivity, high costs and 
hence low real incomes.  
3. Compared to the US, Israeli agriculture is often more capital intensive, 
although capital is more expensive and labor is cheaper.  
4. Distortions are rampant in agricultural markets; some distortions worsen 
Israel’s foreign reserve shortage (#53). GOI controls of credit, supplies 
and equipment stimulate production in high-cost regions.  
5. Current and projected irrigation costs are 5-10 times the maximum costs 
in similarly situated countries. Therefore, crops such as cotton cannot be 
grown competitively. Irrigation construction costs are excessive (#54).  
6. The timing of irrigation development by region has been very poor. Cost-
ly irrigation in the Negev desert comes at the expense of much cheaper 
irrigation in the coastal plain. 
7. GOI agricultural plans are “unrealistic” because they almost completely 
ignore economic considerations (#64). Plan C projects a massive increase 
in agricultural output by 1960, without taking into account that prices 
must decline sharply in order to sell the increased output. Therefore, Plan 
C’s projections for agricultural income, farm units and employment are 
extremely overoptimistic (#83).  
Clawson recommended the following:    
1. Reduce central irrigation construction costs by 20% (#54).  
2. Reduce local irrigation distribution costs (equivalent to 1/3 of total irriga-
tion costs), by setting a minimum field size of 40 dunams (#6) and ex-
ploiting gravity (#58).  
3. Cease establishing new agricultural settlements until the number of par-
tially developed settlements declines from 300 to 100 (#62). For the next 
5-7 years, establish at most 10 new Negev settlements, and reduce 
planned diversion of water to the Negev from 200 to 90 million cubic me-
ters—less than enough for full irrigation of existing settlements (#82). 
4. Agriculture should not absorb many more workers, at least for several 
years (#84).    
Clawson knew that he was bucking the conventional wisdom on 
Negev irrigation and settlement: 
I recognize that there is strong sentiment and powerful forces pushing for 
maximum irrigation development ...  The idea of dry but fertile land lying 
more or less unused, and of potential irrigation water wholly unused, im-
presses many people as unsound national policy, if not downright un-
moral. But costs cannot be escaped (#51). 
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The GOI rejected Clawson’s recommendations. Eshkol declared 
that expensive irrigation projects would continue, regardless of for-
eign experts’ disapproval (Knesset Minutes, January 13, 1954). He al-
so told Gass to discard the EAS’ agricultural plan, and prepare a new 
plan that would allow for costly Negev irrigation (Nevo-Eshkol, 1988, 
80): 
Mr. Gass: According to your plan, Israeli agriculture ends here [50 km 
south of Tel Aviv] ... We want it to end here [170 km south of Tel Aviv] ... 
Please take care of this, expert gentlemen.    
Similarly, Eshkol stated: “[The LTP] must take into account the de-
velopment of all parts of the Land, from Metulla to Eilat” (emphasis 
in original; August 3, 1954, 762/7-Peh).  
3.4 Antitrust  
During the 1950s, monopolies and GOI-sanctioned cartels were ram-
pant (Rubner, 1960, 81); Israel had no antitrust law. On January 1, 
1954, the GOI formed a Cartel Committee, consisting of Deputy Min-
ister Susayeff (Chair), Bell (EAS), Shimon Horn (MOF) and A. Arieli 
(MOF) (Haboker, January 3, 1954). In April 1954, Gass brought Dem-
ocratic National Committee general counsel Harold Leventhal (who 
was also Gass’ personal attorney) to Israel. Leventhal drafted an anti-
trust law, providing for a “Competitive Practices Authority ... to en-
sure ...  free and fair competition ...  to the maximum extent, and to 
reduce trade restraints ... except where ...  necessary and desirable in 
the public interest.” Leventhal allowed two exemptions—exports and 
labor agreements, with the important caveat that labor-managed 
firms were not exempt (#42). 
When the Cartel Committee finished its work in January 1955, it 
unanimously supported an antitrust law providing for a Competitive 
Practices Authority, but was deadlocked on one key issue: Horn and 
Arieli wanted to exempt vertically integrated arrangements, which 
were common in the Histadrut sector, from Competitive Practices 
Authority oversight. Susayeff and Bell opposed this exemption, con-
sistent with Leventhal’s caveat. After efforts to break the deadlock 
failed, the Cartel Committee submitted two separate reports (7752/6-
Gimmel). Mapai and the left-wing parties adopted the Horn-Arieli 
report; Eshkol called the Susayeff-Bell report “a blow to the founda-
tions of the Histadrut ... economy” (Maariv, January 10, 1955). The 
right-liberal parties adopted the Susayeff-Bell report. 
Bell went public. In a February 2, 1955 address to the Israeli Politi-
cal Science Association (reported by multiple newspapers), he argued 
that all concentrations of economic power that are being abused 
should be subject to the antitrust law, with no distinction between 
horizontal and vertical arrangements. He also lamented the public’s 
indifference to the economic harm caused by the cartels.  
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The Knesset finally passed Israel’s first antitrust law in July 1959. 
The new law categorically exempted vertical arrangements, in ac-
cordance with Eshkol’s position; Leventhal and Bell-Susayeff were 
ignored. 
Conclusion 
When policymakers choose foreign economic advisors, they have two 
objectives: Learning about a proposed policy’s likelihood of success, 
and signaling to others that the policy has a high likelihood of suc-
cess. 
How successful was the EAS in maximizing learning and signal-
ing, in its role as foreign advisor to the developmental State of Israel? 
The EAS contributed to learning in the following ways: 
a. The EAS’ staff produced 120 memoranda in various fields; 
b. The EAS more than paid for itself through project evaluation; 
c. By the end of its tenure, the EAS developed good working relation-
ships with four GOI ministries.  
However, several factors impaired both learning and signaling, thus 
preventing the EAS from actualizing its full potential. Some of these 
factors were attributable to the GOI, some were attributable to the 
EAS, and others were beyond either party’s control. The following 
factors impaired learning: a. GOI policymakers disparaged advisors 
while boasting of their own expertise.28 b. The GOI had multiple for-
eign and domestic advisors who often disagreed with the EAS. c. 
There was no intermediary who could persuade the GOI to seriously 
consider the EAS’ recommendations.  
The following factors impaired signaling: 
a. With an incoming Republican president, the GOI recruited a Demo-
cratic/New Deal-oriented EAS, most probably because it saw a Dem-
ocratic EAS as more ideologically compatible and thus more condu-
cive to learning; 
b. The EAS failed to produce a LTP as demanded by the EA, due in part 
to a delay caused by Gass’ opposition; 
                                                            
28 Ben-Gurion and Eshkol repeatedly claimed that they knew better than foreign 
advisors, and were unafraid to say so to Mikesell (Mikesell, 2000, 125; 5364/11-
Gimmel and Russell to State Department, June 26, 1953, FRUS). Bell said of 
Eshkol: “It was really only the abstract idea of having foreign … experts around 
which appealed to him. Abstractly,  ... he feels that on the whole they are useful 
and that he should … be able to call upon their knowledge and experience … 
Concretely, and when the chips are down … he does not really feel that he either 
needs or wants any help or advice from foreign (or probably local) … experts … 
[Therefore,] it practically never occurs to him to consult the people who are 
available here or to discuss with them whatever they may write to him” (Bell to 
Kollek, April 21, 1955, 5509/15-Gimmel).  
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c. The Eisenhower Administration showed complete indifference to the 
EAS; 
d. When Israel’s short-term debt situation improved by March 1954, the 
Eisenhower Administration reduced Israel’s aid for fiscal year 1955, 
thus creating a perverse incentive for Israel to avoid signaling its pro-
gress towards economic independence; 
e. From August 1954, the Eisenhower Administration completely lost 
interest in Israeli economic policy, and shifted to an exclusive focus 
on the Arab-Israeli conflict.29 
The EAS’ recommendations were broadly consistent with the “Ten 
Commandments” of the Washington Consensus (as formulated by 
John Williamson in 1989; see Williamson, 2004), with the following 
exceptions: The EAS did not call for cutting marginal tax rates, repeal-
ing the 9% interest rate ceiling (known as the “Ottoman Law”) or pri-
vatization. The EAS emphasized antitrust policy, which was not an 
element of the Washington Consensus. The EAS also advocated ex-
port subsidies, contrary to GATT rules.30  
Despite the EAS’ efforts to persuade policymakers (and the pub-
lic), the GOI rejected most of the EAS’s recommendations in the mon-
ey doctoring fields, industry, agriculture/irrigation and antitrust (the 
only exception was project evaluation, in which the GOI adopted 
most of the EAS’ recommendations). This was almost inevitable, be-
cause the EAS and the GOI had divergent goals for economic policy: 
The EAS prioritized allocative efficiency and cost control, while the 
GOI prioritized state-building—national security, regional develop-
ment and full employment. This divergence led to fundamental disa-
greements on many issues: central bank independence and DC, mul-
tiple exchange rates, import substitution and export promotion at 
domestic consumers’ expense, exemption of vertically integrated ar-
rangements from antitrust laws, costly irrigation projects and new 
agricultural settlements—especially in the Negev region, and wage 
cuts as a remedy for excessive wages.  
We close with a general observation regarding the Eisenhower 
Administration’s economic diplomacy. Calvo-Gonzalez (2006) argues 
that the Eisenhower Administration failed to promote economic re-
form abroad through conditionality, for two reasons: 
a. Due to its general policy of cutting foreign aid, the Eisenhower Ad-
ministration was unwilling to increase foreign aid in exchange for re-
forms; 
                                                            
29 Therefore, the EAS would most likely have had little signaling value, even if it 
had been comprised of Republican economists, and/or had produced a LTP. 
30 A broader definition of the Washington Consensus includes adherence to 
GATT/WTO rules. The GATT always prohibited industrial export subsidies; 
agricultural export subsidies were severely restricted in 1979. 
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b. The Eisenhower Administration prioritized strategic (i.e. Cold War) 
considerations over economic considerations. 
Our story supports this narrative: By opportunistically cutting Israel’s 
foreign aid in fiscal year 1955, the Eisenhower Administration sent a 
clear message that it would punish (and certainly not reward) the 
GOI for improved economic outcomes or free-market reforms. By los-
ing interest in Israeli economic independence to focus exclusively on 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Eisenhower Administration demonstrat-
ed that strategic considerations would always be paramount; this 
tendency would only intensify during the 1956 Suez crisis and its af-
termath.      
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Appendices 
A. List of Abbreviations  
BOI Bank of Israel 
CLA Cost of Living Adjustment 
EA Eisenhower Administration (US) 
EAS Economic Advisory Staff 
EIB Export-Import Bank (US) 
GOI Government of Israel 
LTP long-term planning/long-term plan 
MOF Ministry of Finance 
MSA Mutual Security Agency (US) 
MTI Ministry of Trade and Industry  
NLI National Library of Israel 
B. Chronology of Major Events, 1952-1955 
1952 
February 13 New Economic Policy announced. 
April Israel’s first appeal to the US for emergency aid to  
repay/ refinance short-term debt. 
June 11 Ben-Gurion appoints Eshkol Minister of Finance,  
replacing the ailing Eliezer Kaplan. 
Late July Mikesell Report recommends that the US allow Israel 
to use $25 million of its MSA grant to pay down short-
term debt, on condition that Israel avoid new short-
term debt and implement a foreign currency budget. 
August 8 Truman approves imposing tougher conditionality on 
Israel. 
September 10 Reparations Agreement signed with West Germany. 
September 12 Gass submits a foreign currency budget for July 1, 
1952-June 30, 1953. 
November 4 Eisenhower is elected President of the US. 
December 1 Ben-Gurion decides to establish a “Central Bureau for 
Economic Coordination and Planning,” which will 
later be called EAS; asks Kollek to expedite it. 
December 2 In a three-page document, Kollek explains why the 
EAS is needed. 
December 22 Ben-Gurion presents his new government, which  
includes the General Zionist and Progressive parties. 
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1953 
January Beginning of intensive preparations to establish the BOI. 
Beginning of negotiations to establish the EAS.  
March 27 Reparations Agreement with West Germany goes into 
effect.  
April 2 After contentious negotiations, Gass and Eshkol agree to 
go forward with EAS. 
April 7 Gass signs the EAS contract and Kollek’s “Letter of of 
Terms.”  
April 26 The Council of Economic Ministers approves Gass’ ap-
pointment as EAS Director.  
May 27 Gass arrives in Israel and the EAS begins work. 
June Mikesell’s second mission to Israel. 
June 13 Eshkol appoints Pinhas Sapir Director-General of the 
MOF, replacing Ehud Avriel. 
July 9 Eisenhower approves imposing tougher conditionality on 
Israel.   
July 16 EAS meets with Ben-Gurion and the Council of Economic 
Ministers.  
August 24 Gass leaves for Stockholm on his way to the US; expected 
to spend a month abroad. 
October 20 The US announces that it will withhold $50 million in 
MSA aid over the Jordan River water project.  
October 28 US-Israel agreement: Israel will cease construction on the 
Jordan River water project, and the US will resume MSA 
aid to Israel ($26 million for first half of fiscal year 1953). 
October 28 Ben-Gurion announces his retirement as Prime Minister.  
December 7 Ben-Gurion officially resigns as Prime Minister,  
broadcasts farewell address.  
December 10 The United Jewish Appeal launches its Consolidation 
Loan campaign with a $75 million goal; in June 1953  
Dulles had rejected Israel’s request for a $75 million  
consolidation loan from the EIB. 
1954 
January 26 Prime Minister Sharett takes office. The Sharett  
government is chaotic in many respects; Ben-Gurion 
manages many affairs of state from his home in Sde 
Boker (160 km from Jerusalem).  
March The short-term debt situation improves significantly.  
March 4 Gass returns after approximately two months in the US. 
March 27 Bell-Eshkol meeting without Gass. Preliminary discus-
sions about a potential EAS role in LTP. By now, Bell has 
effectively replaced Gass as the EAS’ leader.  
Ca. April Gass and Bell form the consulting firm Gass, Bell and 
Associates.  
May 12 Cabinet approves BOI Law drafted by Horowitz,  
ignores the objections of Lerner and Gass.  
May 13 Gass denies a report that he will soon resign. 
May 26 At a press conference, Gass sounds the alarm regarding 
Israel’s BOP.   
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May 28 Eshkol rebukes Gass in writing for his May 26 press con-
ference. 
May 30 Gass departs for the US and remains there for 11 months. 
Bell becomes Acting Director.  
June 4 Bell defends Gass for his May 26 press conference.  
July 12 Israel joins the IMF. 
July 23 The “Rotten Business”–Egyptian authorities arrest the 
first of thirteen Israelis, for a failed plot to bomb Ameri-
can and British targets in Cairo and blame Egypt. The 
resulting “Lavon Affair” would dramatically influence 
Israeli politics through the 1960s.  
Early August GOI-EAS push for LTP.  
August 29 The Council of Economic Ministers approves LTP pro-
posal.  
September 15 First meeting of the Planning Secretariat.  
September 15 The Prime Minister’s Office denies rumors of Gass’  
impending resignation. 
November 5 Eshkol lauds American Jewry for the United Jewish Ap-
peal’s $65 million Consolidation Loan.  
December 1 The BOI opens.  
1955 
January 1 Beginning of “Operation Alpha,” an unsuccessful US-UK 
initiative for peace between Israel and Egypt.   
January 31 Kollek notifies Bell that the EAS will terminate on July 31, 
1955. 
February 16 Bell, Eshkol and Kollek agree that over the next few 
months, the EAS will make “every effort ... to prepare at 
least an outline for [a LTP].”  
February 21 Ben-Gurion returns to the GOI as Minister of Defense, 
replacing Pinhas Lavon, who was forced out over the 
“Rotten Business.” 
February 28 Launch of Operation Black Arrow (a counterterrorism 
operation) on the Egyptian border. 
April Eshkol asks senior EAS staff members (excluding Gass) 
to remain for an additional year on individual contracts.  
Ca. April 30 Gass arrives for a visit after an 11-month absence. 
May 20 Gass departs.  
June 29 Sharett drops the General Zionist and Progressive parties 
from the coalition. 
July 14 Gass returns to Israel to close his office.  
July 26 General election. Ben-Gurion leads Mapai to victory and 
begins to form a new coalition (this would take until  
November 3). Meanwhile, Sharett presides over a  
caretaker government.   
July 31 The EAS terminates its operations. Lerner accepts 
Eshkol’s offer to remain for one more year as advisor to 
the MOF. Gross accepts Labor Minister Golda Meir’s  
offer to direct the Institute for Labor Productivity.    
August 1 Bell holds farewell press conference.   
August 2  Bell-Sharett farewell meeting. 
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C. List of EAS Memoranda by Topic 
Macroeconomics and International Economics  
(including Economic Independence, Planning and Public Finance) 
# Title Author Date Note Location 
1 
Israel’s Econom-
ic Performance, 
1949-1953 
Gaathon 5/12/54  
5509/5-
Gimmel, 
10757/10-
Gimmel 
2 
Projection of 
Israel’s Econom-
ic Development 
Towards Eco-
nomic Inde-
pendence 
Gaathon ?/?/55  
1956 revi-
sion AGP, 
1831/2-
Peh 
3 
Provisional Es-
timates of Isra-
el’s National 
Accounts, 1954 
Gaathon 5/19/55  
AGP, 
1831/2-
Peh 
4 
Resources 
Available and 
Their Use, 1953 
and 1954, at Cur-
rent and at 1953 
Prices 
Gaathon 5/11/55 Draft 
AGP 
1831/2-
Peh 
5 
The Israel Econ-
omy in 1954 
 
Bell and 
entire EAS 
Staff 
7/25/55 Hebrew 
AGP, 
1831/4-
Peh 
6 National Income in 1954 Gaathon 3/25/55 3rd draft 
AGP 
1831/2-
Peh 
7 Prices in Clear-ing Agreements Rosenberg 1/24/55 
Cited by 
Rubner (1960, 
204) 
Did not 
survive 
8 
Report on the 
Bank of Israel 
Bill* 
Lerner 4/27/54  5617/13-Gimmel 
9 
Bank of Israel’s 
Annual Report 
on Money Sup-
ply Expansion, 
January 1954 to 
January 1955* 
Lerner 5/16/55 
with hand-
written mar-
ginalia by 
Bell 
5509/15-
Gimmel 
10 
Export Subsidies 
and Unem-
ployed Re-
sources* 
Lerner 7/5/55  5509/15-Gimmel 
11 Growth of In-dustrial Exports* Bell 2/22/54  
4569/21-
Gimmel 
12 Utilization of Riemer, 8/9/54 In response Ben Guri-
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Capital Imports 
in Israel 1948-
1954* 
 
assisted by 
Bell, Ler-
ner, Beham 
to inquiries 
by Ben-
Gurion 
on Ar-
chives 
 
13 
The Nature and 
Requirements of 
Industrial Plan-
ning 
Perloff 9/17/54  5780/11-Gimmel 
14 
The Major Func-
tions of Econom-
ic Planning and 
Coordination 
Perloff 9/20/54  5509/15-Gimmel 
15 
Some Sugges-
tions on Assist-
ing Israel Indus-
trial Exports* 
Gass 8/4/53  5509/14-Gimmel 
16 
Memorandum 
for Discussion at 
Finance-EAS 
Meeting 4 PM, 
Thursday De-
cember 31* 
Gross 12/30/53 Topic: Fiscal Policy 
5780/11-
Gimmel 
17 
A memorandum 
on the BOP (title 
unknown)* 
Kessler  Cited by Gaa-thon in #2 
Did not 
survive 
18 
Outline of a 
Proposal for a 
Stable Purchas-
ing Power Bond 
to be Issued by 
the Treasury of 
the State of Isra-
el* 
Gass 6/27/53  
718/11-
Peh, 
5509/14-
Gimmel 
19 
Letter to Eshkol 
on 1955/56 
budget* 
Bell 12/1/54  5509/15-Gimmel 
20 
Letter to Eshkol 
on 1954/55 
budget and Ap-
pendix II on 
Cash Subsidy 
Proposal* 
Bell 1/20/54  718/11-Peh 
21 
Dissenting Opin-
ion, Lehman 
Committee on 
Indexation of 
Government 
Loans* 
Lerner 1/4/55  NLI 
22 
Financial Effect 
of the Elimina-
tion of the Unit-
ed States Grant-
Bell 10/20/53  718/11-Peh 
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In-Aid* 
23 
Letter to Eshkol: 
“Removal of 
Subsidies by 
Raising Ex-
change Rates”* 
Bell 5/20/54 cc. Dov Yosef 718/11-Peh 
24 
The Inflationary 
Potential of the 
Current CLA 
Agreement* 
Lerner 3/30/54  718/11-Peh 
25 
Letter to Eshkol 
recommending 
budget 
cuts/improved 
tax collection* 
Bell 2/14/54  718/11-Peh 
26 
Should the 
Terms of the 
Consideration to 
be Received by 
the GOI, as 
Countervails for 
Loans under the 
Development 
Budget, be Ad-
justed in Rela-
tion to General 
Fluctuations in 
the Value of 
Money?* 
Gass 7/22/53  718/11-Peh 
27 
Advisability of 
Attempting to 
Postpone Re-
payment of Isra-
el’s Indebtedness 
to the Export-
Import Bank of 
Washington* 
 
Gass 7/12/53  718/11-Peh 
28 
Materials Re-
quired for Eco-
nomic Decisions 
by the Govern-
ment of Israel 
Bell 9/13/54 Topic: Plan-ning 
5509/15-
Gimmel 
* denotes memoranda in money doctoring fields, including recommendations for 
improving the BOP at the macroeconomic (not sectoral) level.  
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Industrial Economics and Microeconomics  
# Title Author Date Note Location 
29 The Price of Bread 
in Israel 
Beham and 
Rosenberg 
5/24/54 Requested by 
MTI 
718/11-
Peh, 
4126/14-
Gimmel 
30 Comments on 
Memorandum 
Prepared for the 
Council of Eco-
nomic Ministers 
by Ministry of 
Trade and Indus-
try on the Eco-
nomic Advisory 
Staff Bread Report 
Beham and 
Rosenberg 
7/4/54  4126/14-
Gimmel 
31 Joint EAS-MTI 
memorandum on 
bread prices 
Bell and 
Deputy 
Minister 
Susayeff 
7/6/54  4126/14-
Gimmel 
32 Production Costs, 
Sales, Prices and 
Profits in the Isra-
el Tire Industry 
Edna Gass 2/1/54    
33 Tire Prices Maxi-
mums and Relat-
ed Issues 
Edna Gass  5/23/54 Requested by 
MTI and 
MOT 
5509/5-
Gimmel 
34 Official and Free 
Prices  
Ramati 9/22/53 Cited by 
Rubner (1960, 
59) 
Did not 
survive 
35 Production Costs, 
Sales, Prices and 
Profits in the Isra-
el Cement Indus-
try  
Erdreich, 
assisted by 
A. Schweit-
zer 
5/17/54  Requested by 
MTI 
5509/5-
Gimmel  
36 American-Israel 
Paper Mills  
E. Alt-
schuler 
7/27/55 Cited by 
Rubner (1960, 
170) and 
newspapers 
 
37 Citrus Packing 
Cases  
E. Alt-
schuler 
6/6/55 Cited by 
Rubner (1960, 
186n1) 
Did not 
survive 
38 Report on Watch 
Industry Study  
 
A. Kessler 
and Er-
dreich  
10/10/54 Cited by 
Rubner (1960, 
270-271) 
1865/26-
Gimmel 
39 Comments on the 
Report of the Stan-
ford Research 
Institute  
Perloff 9/13/54  5780/11-
Gimmel 
40 The Stanford 
Study on the In-
dustrial Economy 
of Israel 
Lerner 8/25/54  5780/11-
Gimmel 
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41 First Draft of Pos-
sible Statute Es-
tablishing Com-
petitive Practices 
Authority – Com-
petitive Practices 
Act 
Leventhal 5/12/54  5780/11-
Gimmel 
42 Suggestions Relat-
ing to the Prob-
lems of Restrictive 
Business Practices; 
Recommendation 
of Competitive 
Practices Authori-
ty 
Leventhal 5/10/54   5780/11-
Gimmel 
43 Sizes and Sources 
of Raw Sugar Fac-
tories for Israel  
Gass 8/6/53 Requested by 
MTI 
5509/14-
Gimmel, 
4568/8-
Gimmel 
44 Tentative Themes 
Regarding the 
Production of 
Sugar From Sugar 
Beets in Israel 
Anonymous 10/19/53    4568/8-
Gimmel 
45 Letter to Bern-
stein-initial rec-
ommendations of 
Sugar Committee 
Bell 1/6/54 Requested by 
MTI. There 
was also an 
EAS memo 
that was dis-
cussed in the 
media but did 
not survive. 
5780/11-
Gimmel, 
4568/8-
Gimmel 
 
46 Junk and Scrap 
Problems in Israel 
Arieh 
Nesher 
4/5/54  Sent to Gross 1219/7-
Gimmel 
Lamed 
47 Projected Invest-
ment in Mining 
and Mineral Ex-
ports  
Bell  Development 
Minister Dov 
Yosef read 
and rejected it 
(718/11-Peh, 
102) 
Did not 
survive 
48 Profitability of 
Kaiser-Frazer Op-
erations to the 
Israel Economy   
 
Erdreich, 
assisted by 
EAS Staff 
3/30/55  3460/18-
Gimmel 
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Agriculture and Irrigation 
# Title Author Date Note Location 
49 Per Capita Food 
Consumption in 
Israel and in Other 
Countries 
 6/30/5
3 
  
50 Progress Report. 
Training for Agricul-
ture in Israel 
 8/11/5
3 
  
51 Proposed Purchases 
of Irrigation and 
Agricultural Equip-
ment under Repara-
tions Program (Shi-
lumim) 
 9/7/53   
52 Comprehensive 
Economic Program 
 9/14/5
3 
  
53 General Survey of 
Agriculture in Israel 
 9/20/5
3 
  
54 Cost of Irrigation 
Water in Israel, and 
its Economic Signifi-
cance 
 9/20/5
3 
  
55 Retail Food Prices in 
Israel and in United 
States 
 9/21/5
3 
  
56 Agricultural Plan-
ning in Israel 
 9/30/5
3 
  
57 Agriculture and 
Food in Israel, 1952-
53 
 10/6/5
3 
  
58 Estimated Future 
Cost of Irrigation 
Water to be Provid-
ed by Mekorot Wa-
ter Co., and its Eco-
nomic Significance 
 10/12/
53 
 Subse-
quent 
drafts: 
5486/1-
Gimmel 
(undated, 
sent by 
Gass to 
Ben 
Gurion 
11/19/53
), MCP 
(11/13/5
3) and 
10757/10-
Gimmel 
(11/13/5
3)  
59 General Survey of 
Agriculture in Israel 
 10/12/
53 
Revision of 
#49 
 
60 Agricultural Plan-  10/16/ Revision of  
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ning in Israel 53 #52 
61 Letter to Ben Gurion 
on irrigation plan 
Gass 10/22/
53 
 718/11-
Peh 
62 General Survey of 
Agriculture in Israel 
 11/12/
53 
Revision of 
#49 and #55 
 
63 Summary of Memo-
randum “Estimated 
Future Cost of Irri-
gation Water to be 
Provided by Me-
korot Water Co., and 
its Economic Signifi-
cance” 
 11/19/
53 
Summary of 
#54 
Also in 
5486/1-
Gimmel 
64 Agricultural Plan-
ning in Israel 
 11/16/
53 
Revision of 
#56 
 
65 Summary of Memo-
randum “Agricul-
tural Planning in 
Israel” 
Anony-
mous 
11/19/
53 
  
66 Research Plan for 
Agricultural Re-
search Station (with 
Consideration of 
Economic Aspects) 
 Undat-
ed 
  
67 Storage of Irrigation 
Water in the Loessal 
Soils of the Negev 
 12/10/
53 
  
68 Use of Reclaimed 
Sewage from the Tel 
Aviv Metropolitan 
Area, in the Negev 
and on the Coastal 
Sand Dunes 
 12/24/
53 
  
69 Farm Organization 
to Economize Use of 
Water in the Negev 
 12/28/
53 
  
70 Study of Livestock 
and Feed Price, De-
mand, and Subsidy 
Problems 
 1/1/54   
71 Tables on Irrigation 
Practices 
 Undat-
ed 
  
72 Current Proposals 
about Grain Import, 
Feed Prices and 
Prices of Livestock 
Products 
 1/19/5
4 
  
73 Price Relationships 
Among Agricultural 
Commodities 
 1/22/5
4 
  
74 Amount of Farm 
Machinery Needed 
in Israel 
 1/29/5
4 
  
520 Daniel Schiffman and Eli Goldstein | 
Œconomia – Histoire | Épistémologie | Philosophie, 9(3) : 481-536 
75 Current Status of 
Irrigation Studies 
 1/29/5
4 
  
76 Suggestions for 
More Efficient Use 
of Farm Machinery 
in Israel 
 2/5/54   
77 A Program to Subsi-
dize the Cost of Liv-
ing Index as far as 
Eggs, Bread and 
Related Commodi-
ties Are Concerned  
 2/14/5
4   
  
78 Use of Reclaimed 
Sewage from the 
Tel-Aviv Metropoli-
tan Area, in the 
Negev and on the 
Coastal Sand Dunes 
 2/17/5
4 
  
79 Suggestions for 
More Efficient use of 
Labor and Farm 
Machinery in Israel 
 2/22/5
4 
  
80 Some Notes on Mar-
keting of Vegetables 
in Israel 
 3/22/5
4 
  
81 Alternative Possibili-
ties on Egg and 
Grain Prices 
 2/1/54   
82 Irrigation, Agricul-
tural and Settlement 
Problems and Policy 
for the Coastal Plain-
Negev Regions.  
Appendix: Farm 
Organization to 
Economize the Use 
of Water in the Neg-
ev 
 4/25/5
4 
Attached to 
letter to P. 
Naphtali 
from Gass, 
5/3/54, relat-
ing to 
“Memoran-
dum on Irri-
gation Poli-
cy” 
 
83 Prices at which Ag-
ricultural Commodi-
ties Estimated in 
Plan C to be Pro-
duced will Sell in 
1960  
 6/8/54   
84 Manpower for Agri-
culture 
 6/23/5
4 
  
85 Prospective Prices of 
Agricultural Com-
modities, and What 
to Do about It 
 6/29/5
4 
Abridged 
version of 
#78 with 
implications 
 
86 Economic Factors in 
the Development of 
Agriculture in Israel. 
 7/8/54 
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Remarks presented 
at a meeting of the 
Farmers’ Federation 
of Israel, Tel Aviv 
87 Israel Agriculture in 
Recent Years, article 
submitted to Journal 
of Agricultural His-
tory  
 1955 Published in  
Agricultural 
History 29:2 
(April 1955). 
“Journal of 
Agricultural 
History” 
appears to be 
a typo.  
 
88 Labor Required to 
Produce Agricultur-
al Commodities in 
Israel 
 7/14/5
4 
  
89 Major Economic 
Problems and Policy 
Issues in Agriculture 
and in Irrigation  
 7/18/5
4 
  
90 Labor Requirement 
of Israel Agriculture, 
and Related Policy 
Issues 
 7/29/5
4 
Hebrew 
translation 
12/25/54 
 
91 Review of Current 
Status of Studies on 
Demand for Agricul-
tural Commodities 
and Some Further 
Possible Steps 
 8/25/5
4 
  
92 Cotton Report for 
the Development 
and Utilization of 
the Water Resources 
of the Jordan and 
Litani Basins 
 9/12/5
4 
  
93 Statement on Set-
tlement Program for 
Planning Commit-
tee/Formulation of 
the Best Settlement 
Program  
 9/26/5
4 
  
94 Letter Addressed to 
Mr. D. Kahane, Min. 
of Ag., Tel Aviv 
 9/27/5
4 
  
95 Theoretical Aspects 
of Milk Marketing in 
Israel 
 10/26/
54 
  
96 Same Memorandum 
Translated into He-
brew 
 2/14/5
5 
  
97 Inducing Farmers to  12/22/   
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Use Irrigation Water 
Wisely 
54 
98 Survey of Moshavim  Ca. Jan. 
1955 
reported by 
Zmanim 
newspaper, 
1/24/55 
Did not 
survive   
Unless otherwise stated, all memoranda were authored by Clawson and are located 
in MCP Box 8, Folder 1. 
Housing and Construction 
# Title Author Date Note Location 
99 Problems in 
Israel Housing 
Gross 8/28/53  5780/11-
Gimmel  
100 Memorandum 
on the “Shikun 
Olim” Proposals 
for the 1954/55 
Development 
Budget 
Gross 3/25/54  5780/11-
Gimmel 
101 The Size and 
Composition of 
Construction in 
Israel: 1949-1953 
Gross, in collabo-
ration with Arieh 
Nesher and Haim 
Duvshani 
1953  NLI 
102 Small Cities in 
Development 
Areas 
Gross 12/13/54 Hebrew 2756/8-
Gimmel 
Lamed 
Project Evaluation 
# Title Author Date Note Location 
103 Use of Group II 
(Machinery and 
Equipment)  of 
German Repara-
tions 
Bell 9/13/53  17/15-
Chet 
104 Reparations In-
vestments: Pro-
posal for Acquisi-
tion of Six Vessels 
by the Israel Nav-
igation Company, 
Ltd.  
Bell 10/26/53   718/11-
Peh, 
5509/14-
Gimmel 
105 Reparations In-
vestment in Con-
struction Equip-
ment 
Gross and 
Arieh 
Nesher 
?/?/53  NLI 
106 Proposed Sale of 
Enameling Plant 
to Turkey 
Erdreich 
and E. 
Altschuler 
3/21/55 Cited by 
Rubner (1960, 
181) 
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107 Preliminary Ob-
servations on the 
Phosphate Calci-
nation Project to 
Produce 300,000 
Tons of Calcine 
Product Annually 
Erdreich 8/24/54 Requested by 
Ministry of 
Development  
 
5509/15-
Gimmel 
108 Aluminum and 
Brass Rolling 
Mill—A Project 
Evaluation 
Erdreich 8/5/54 Similar to 
#100 (“Inter-
im Report”); 
often referred 
to as “non-
ferrous roll-
ing mill.” 
718/11-Peh 
has cover 
letter by Bell 
to Dov Yosef, 
Aug, 6, 1954, 
requesting 
his comments  
10757/10-
Gimmel 
109 Interim Report on 
Steel Rolling Mill  
 
Erdreich ?/?/54 Cited by 
Rubner (1960, 
233)  
 
110 Letter to Eshkol 
regarding pro-
posed Frutarom 
project  
Gass 10/2/53   4569/21-
Gimmel  
111 Letter to Dov 
Yosef regarding 
proposed agree-
ment with Pales-
tine Electric Cor-
poration  
Gass 10/5/53    718/11-
Peh, 
5509/14-
Gimmel 
112 Letter to Dov 
Yosef on proposed 
140,000 Kw power 
station 
Gass 12/1/53  718/11-
Peh  
113 Findings and Rec-
ommendations on 
the Growing and 
Processing of Flax 
in Israel 
Rosenberg 8/4/54  Requested by 
MTI 
10757/9-
Gimmel 
and  
10757/10-
(pages 
out of 
order)  
114 Project Review 
Memorandum for 
Ministry of Indus-
try and Trade on 
Aluminum Pack-
aging Containers 
Erdreich 
and B. 
Sadove 
12/14/53  4569/21-
Gimmel 
115 Letter to Dr. S. 
Lipschitz, Direc-
Gass 11/3/53  5780/11-
Gimmel 
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tor-General of 
Ministry of Indus-
try and Trade re-
garding Raymond 
Lepow’s proposal 
to erect buildings 
for export  
 
116 Planning and Pur-
chasing for Heavy 
Construction  
Gass 11/5/53  718/11-
Peh 
117 Suggestions as to 
Tnuva Central Co-
op. Request for 
Government Fi-
nancial Assistance 
to Construct a 
New Winery at 
Rehovot 
Rosenberg 3/4/54 Requested by 
MTI 
4119/8-
Gimmel 
118 Letter to Bernstein 
on Cargal Straw-
paper Plant (pos-
sible use-to pack 
citrus exports)  
Unknown 6/16/55 Only first 
page sur-
vived 
4612/15-
Gimmel 
CPI Measurement 
# Title Author Date Note Location 
119 Recommendations 
for COL Meas-
urement Program 
Ullman 7/23/54   5509/14-
Gimmel 
120 The Problem of 
Fresh Fruits and 
Vegetables in the 
Consumer Price 
Index 
Smith ca. Octo-
ber 1954 
only an ex-
tract has 
survived 
3557/22-
Gimmel 
Lamed 
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D. Tables 
Table 1. Population Growth, Labor Force Growth and Unemployment 
Year Popu-
lation 
(1000s, 
End  
of 
Year)  
Popula-
tion 
Growth 
 (%) 
Civil-
ian  
Labor 
Force  
(1000s,  
Annual 
Aver-
age) 
 
Civil-
ian 
Labor 
Force 
Growt
h (%) 
Unemploy-
ment  
Rate (%) 
Unemploy-
ment Rate 
Including 
Labor Force 
Potential of  
Immigrant  
Camps (%)    
1948 867.0      
1949 1,173.9 35.4 343  9.5  13.9 
1950 1,370.1 16.7 450 31.2 6.9  11.2 
1951 1,577.8 15.2 545 21.1 6.1  8.1 
1952 1,629.5 3.3 584 7.2 7.2  8.1 
1953 1,669.4 2.4 599 2.6 11.3  11.5 
1954 1,717.8 2.9 608 1.5 8.9 9.2 
1955 1,789.1 4.2 619 1.8 7.4  
1956 1,872.4 4.7 646 4.4 7.8  
1957 1,976.0 5.5 690 6.8 6.9  
1958 2,031.7 2.8 698 1.2 5.7  
1959 2,088.7 2.8 714 2.3 5.5  
1960 2,150.4 3.0 736 3.1 4.6  
Sources: Population, Population Growth and Civilian Labor Force Growth 
(Michaely, 1975, Appendix A, Table A-1). Civilian Labor Force is an annual average 
and includes persons aged 14 and older. Unemployment Rate (Pomfret, 1976, 142). 
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Table 2. GNP and Consumption Growth  
Year Real GNP  
Growth 
(%) 
Real Per 
Capita 
GNP Growth 
(%) 
Real Per Capita 
Consumption 
Growth (%) 
Consumption/GNP 
Ratio (%) 
1950    84.9 
1951 30.9 11.0 3.9 79.4 
1952 7.4 -0.1 0.0 79.5 
1953 1.2 -1.5 0.8 81.3 
1954 21.9 19.2 12.4 76.7 
1955 12.2 8.3 4.3 73.9 
1956 8.6 3.9 4.7 74.3 
1957 9.1 3.4 1.2 72.8 
1958 9.4 5.6 6.3 73.3 
1959 13.2 9.8 6.6 71.2 
1960 8.1 5.3 4.2 70.4 
Source: Michaely (1975, Appendix A, Tables A-2, A-3) 
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Table 3. Saving and Investment 
Year Real  
In-
vest
men
t 
Gro
wth 
(%) 
Gross  
Sav-
ings 
/GN
P 
Ratio 
(%)* 
Invest-
ment/ 
GNP  
Ratio (%) 
Net  
Sav-
ings 
/NN
P 
Ratio 
(%)** 
Share of  
Invest-
ment 
Under-
taken 
by Public 
Sector 
(%) 
Share of 
Residen-
tial In-
vestment 
Under-
taken 
by Public 
Sector 
(%) 
Share of 
Invest-
ment 
Fi-
nanced 
by  
Public 
Sector 
(%) 
1950  7.2 55.3 3.4    
1951 18.2 13.4 49.9 9.8    
1952 -14.1 7.7 39.9 1.3 34   
1953 -16.3 5.2 33.0 -3.3 45   
1954 11.5 7.2 30.2 -1.2 50   
1955 23.2 6.1 33.1 -2.3 59 41  
1956 -5.4 0.2 28.9 -9.0  39 52 
1957 17.0 6.2 31.0 -2.6  51 57 
1958 7.4 8.6 30.4 0.4 45 47 53 
1959 9.3 10.4 29.4 2.6 38 45 52 
1960 5.0 4.2 28.5 2.8 41 40 53 
*Gross Savings = GNP – Consumption 
**Net Savings = GNP – (Consumption + Depreciation) 
Source: Michaely (1975, Appendix A, Tables A-3, A-4, A-6) 
528 Daniel Schiffman and Eli Goldstein | 
Œconomia – Histoire | Épistémologie | Philosophie, 9(3) : 481-536 
Table 4. CPI Inflation and Money Supply Growth 
Year CPI Inflation 
(%) 
Money Supply Growth, 
Series 1 (%) 
Money Supply Growth, 
 Series 2 (%) 
1949   39.1 
1950   35.4 
1951 14.0 31.8 27.2 
1952 58.2 10.3 6.5 
1953 28.1 6.5 24.5 
1954 12.1 24.7 20.1 
1955 5.9 20.4 20.4 
1956 6.5 17.7 23.2 
1957 6.4 20.0 11.5  
1958 3.4 15.1 14.5  
1959 1.5 12.8 10.0  
1960 2.3 13.3 21.3 
Sources: CPI Growth and Money Supply Growth Series 1 (Michaely, 1975, Appen-
dix A, Tables A-16 and A-17). Money Supply Growth Series 2 (Michaely, 1975, 124, 
126; BOI, 1962, Table XIV-3; 1965, Table XV-5). 
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Table 5. Public Finances, % of GDP 
Fiscal  
Year* 
Ex-
pendi-
tures 
Tax 
Reve-
nues  
 
Unilat-
eral  
Receipts 
From  
Abroad  
Absorp-
tion = 
Tax Rev-
enues 
+  
Unilat-
eral  
Receipts 
From 
Abroad 
 
Deficit =  
Expendi-
tures – 
Absorption 
Long 
Term 
For-
eign  
Loans  
1949/50 54.4 11.2 8.9 20.1 34.3 2.0 
1950/51 55.2 13.1 5.5 18.6 36.6 3.7 
1951/52 42.4 14.0 5.0 19.7 22.7 4.7 
1952/53 38.4 15.6 8.2 23.8 14.6 7.5 
1953/54 36.8 17.7 6.7 24.4 12.4 6.3 
1954/55 39.8 18.9 13.3 32.2 7.6 7.0 
1955/56 39.6 21.4 10.7 31.1 8.5 5.4 
* Fiscal Year: April 1-March 31. For 1948/49, May 1, 1948-March 31, 1949. 
Source: Barkai and Liviatan (2007, 36) 
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Table 6. Exports, Imports, Trade Deficit and Capital Imports 
Year Nominal  
Export 
Growth 
(%)* 
 
Nominal  
Import 
Growth 
(%)* 
Exports 
(% of 
GNP)** 
Imports 
(% of 
GNP)** 
Trade 
Deficit 
(% of 
GNP)**  
Capital  
Imports*** 
(% of GNP) 
1950   3.6% 25.7% 22.1% 12.7% 
1951 45.7 29.9 3.4% 21.9% 18.5% 13.9% 
1952 28.4 -7.7 5.7% 25.5% 19.8% 19.9% 
1953 18.6 -7.1 8.9% 22.7% 13.8% 15.1% 
1954 32.4 2.2 12.7% 31.9% 19.2% 28.8% 
1955 6.7 14.5 12.2% 36.1% 23.9% 24.9% 
1956 23.6 25.3 12.6% 37.9% 25.3% 23.1% 
1957 24.7 4.1 13.6% 34.0% 20.5% 19.4% 
1958 5.9 2.2 12.4% 29.9% 17.6% 18.8% 
1959 21.7 5.8 13.1% 27.7% 14.5% 16.5% 
1960 25.5 15.6 14.7% 28.5% 13.8% 17.7% 
*Original series in current US dollars. 
**Original series for exports, imports and trade deficit are in current US Dollars. 
Original series for GNP is in current IL. Exports, imports and trade deficit have 
been converted to current IL using the formal IL/$ exchange rate. 
***Including national institutions (i.e. the Jewish Agency). Original series for capital 
imports in current US Dollars. Original series for GNP in current IL. Capital im-
ports have been converted to current IL using the formal IL/$ exchange rate for 
imports. 
Sources: Michaely (1975, Table 5-1, Appendix A, Tables A-10 and A14) and authors’ 
calculations. 
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Table 7. US Assistance to Israel, in Millions of $, from Fiscal Year 1949 
to Fiscal Year 1960 
Fiscal 
Year 
Total Military 
Loan 
Economic 
Loan 
Economic 
Grant 
Food 
For 
Peace 
Loan 
Food 
For 
Peace 
Grant 
Ex-
port-
Im-
port 
Bank 
Loan  
1949 100.0      100.0 
1950        
1951 35.1   0.1   35.0 
1952 86.4   63.7  22.7  
1953 73.6   73.6  <$50,000  
1954 74.7   54.0  20.7  
1955 52.7  20.0 21.5 10.8 0.4  
1956 50.8  10.0 14.0 25.2 1.6  
1957 40.9  10.0 16.8 11.8 2.3  
1958 85.4  15.0 9.0 34.9 2.3 24.2 
1959 53.3 0.4 10.0 9.2 29.0 1.7 3.0 
1960 56.2 0.5 15.0 8.9 26.8 4.5 0.5 
Source: Sharp (2016) 
 
 
Table 8. Gross External Reserves ($ millions), End of Year 
Year External Reserves Percentage Change 
1948 141  
1949 117 -17.0 
1950 66 -43.6 
1951 34 -48.5 
1952 31 -8.8 
1953 39 25.8 
1954 81 107.7 
1955 90 11.1 
1956 87 -3.3 
1957 84 -3.4 
1958 130 54.8 
1959 168 29.2 
1960 270 60.7 
Source: Michaely (1975, 35) 
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Table 9. External Debt and Short-Term External Debt ($ Millions),  
Israeli Requests and US Responses 
Date External 
Debt   
Of Which: 
Short- Term 
External 
Debt* 
Ratio of Gross Reserves**  to 
Short Term
 External Debt  
Israeli Request  US Reply 
April 
1952 
   Allow use of MSA 
funds to repay past 
due short-term 
debt. 
Allowed use of part 
of the fiscal year 
1951 MSA grant to 
repay past due 
short-term debt; 
asked Mikesell to go 
to Israel (Acheson 
note of April 30 said 
US would send an 
anonymous repre-
sentative).  
June 18, 
1952 
 124 0.26 Sharett: Debt con-
solidation by 
EIB or purchase of 
IL by US Treasury 
Stabilization Fund; 
The latter is prefer-
able because it is “a 
secret operation.”  
Acheson: “What 
must be determined 
is whether Israel’s 
financial policy will 
be effective or 
whether Israel will 
continue policies 
which would recre-
ate the present situa-
tion ...  
Mr. Mikesell is being 
sent to Israel to try to 
find an answer.” 
MSA funds may not 
be used. Unaware of 
Treasury SF possibil-
ity; “had assumed 
the only possibility 
was an EIB transac-
tion.”   
June 30, 
1952 
 124 0.26 Sharett to meet 
Truman July 1, may 
discuss the debt 
problem.  
Bruce: Truman 
should tell Sharett: 
“(1) The subject is 
now under study by 
Dr. Mikesell, who is 
on his way to Israel; 
(2) that any action 
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will depend in part 
on the nature of his 
findings; and (3) that 
Israel should by no 
means assume that a 
favorable reply is a 
foregone conclu-
sion.” 
July 1952  115  
(all in $) 
   
Late July 
1952 
    Mikesell (2000, 121): 
“In my report ... I 
recommended that 
$25 million of the 
MSA grant for fiscal 
1953 be made avail-
able to pay selected 
short-term obliga-
tions; that the Israeli 
government agree 
not to enter into new 
short-term obliga-
tions; and that the 
Israeli government 
establish a foreign 
exchange budget 
and system of ac-
counting that would 
enable the MOF to 
know its financial 
position at all times. 
The basic provisions 
of my report were 
agreed to by the Is-
raeli government, 
and the funds were 
made available.” 
March 
10, 1953 
 98 (Mikesell 
2000, 122) 
Reduced by 
>20 [not 
clear relative 
to what 
amount].  
“shortfall 
$20 million 
expected 
from April 1 
through 
June 30.” 
GOI “esti-
mates re-
funding op-
erations 
0.34 Sharett (with 
Eshkol present) to 
Davis, McDaniel, 
other US officials: 
GOI “will in any 
event have to come 
to United States 
Government for 
‘one time’ special 
assistance after June 
30. Proceeds to be 
used only for re-
funding purposes. 
Amount not speci-
fied.” 
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would yield 
$10 million 
saving”  
May 5, 
1953 
   “Israel has request-
ed a ‘one-time’ 
grant of $70,000,000 
to pay its ... short-
term debts”  
State Dept.: “We 
question whether 
large-scale aid to pay 
Israel’s debts would 
be justified at this 
time.  ... we are in-
clined to feel that if 
default becomes 
imminent, considera-
tion might first be 
given to meeting the 
problem from loan 
funds or, if this is not 
feasible, by making 
emergency use 
of MSA funds al-
ready appropriated.” 
May 13, 
1953 
387 100 0.34 Eshkol to Stassen, 
McDaniel, and oth-
er US officials: “the 
major problem now 
facing Israel was 
that of ‘debts’” 
Stassen: “for budget-
ary and other rea-
sons the US Gov-
ernment was screen-
ing its foreign aid 
programs carefully 
this year and conse-
quently was very 
much interested in 
the efforts recipient 
countries were mak-
ing toward attain-
ing economic stabil-
ity and self-
sufficiency.” 
May 14, 
1953 
380 100 0.34 Eshkol, Bernstein 
and Horowitz: “the 
most urgent of the 
problems was that 
of the external 
short-term debt ...  
by refunding the 
short-term debt and 
by discontinuing 
this short-term bor-
rowing, from $15 to 
$20 million would 
be saved annually 
in procurement.” 
“It was feared that 
the use [the EIB] for 
refunding purposes 
might preclude 
obtaining a further 
Stassen (with Dulles 
present): “[the US] 
will prefer to see the 
Israeli problem han-
dled, by refinancing 
of the short-term 
debt through the 
present holders of 
that debt or to pri-
vate financial institu-
tions.” 
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loan from this 
source at a later 
date for develop-
ment purposes.” 
 
June 18, 
1953 
386 
Creditors: 
“Eximbank, 
American 
and foreign 
private in-
terests” 
111 0.32 a. “$7 million re-
maining from un-
used 1953 appro-
priations” to repay 
short-term debts; 
b. a $75 million 
consolidation loan 
from the EIB 
 
“[Dulles] agreed to 
$7 million only and 
disapproved the 
rest.” 
March 
11, 1954 
400 73*** 0.68   
*Payable within one year 
** For this calculation, monthly values for Gross Reserves are interpolated using 
year-end values from Table 8. 
*** By December 1954, short-term external debt was reduced to $34 million, thanks 
to the consolidation loan from US Jewry (Eshkol budget speech, Haaretz, February 
9, 1955). The ratio of Gross Reserves to Short-Term External Debt rose sharply to 
2.38.   
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Table 10. Formal and Effective Exchange Rates 
Year Formal Rate-
Exports 
Formal Rate-
Imports 
Effective 
Rate- 
Exports 
Effective 
Rate- 
Imports 
1949 0.34 0.35 0.39 
1950 0.36 0.39 0.40 
1951 0.36 0.41 0.40 
1952 0.70 0.69 0.81 0.81 
1953 1.16 0.83 1.28 1.17 
1954 1.66 1.51 1.73 1.80 
1955 1.8 1.83 2.21 
1956 1.8 2.05 2.26 
1957 1.8 2.21 2.33 
1958 1.8 2.37 2.35 
1959 1.8 2.49 2.50 
1960 1.8 2.58 2.57 
Source: Michaely (1975, 122) 
 
 
Table 11. Composition of Exports (% of Total) 
Year 
Citrus 
Fruits 
Other Farm
 
Prod. 
Citrus 
Prod. 
Other 
Foodstuffs 
Diam
onds  
Textile 
Prod. 
Chem
icals 
Tires And  
Tubes 
M
ine And  
QuarryProd.  
Other  
Ind.  
Prod. 
1950 47.2 0.6 3.9 4.8 24.7 11.0 1.4  
— 
0.3 6.2 
1951 35.5 0.4 7.1 3.3 26.1 14.5 2.9 — 0.2 9.8 
1952 37.9 0.5 7.1 1.8 26.4 11.0 1.4  
— 
0.9 12.9 
1953 37.5 0.9 4.3 1.0 22.2 9.4 2.6 1.6 2.6 17.9 
1954 38.8 2.7 3.2 1.4 18.2 5.3 3.1 2.7 3.6 21.0 
1955 35.5 2.9 2.4 1.5 22.8 6.2 3.3 2.9 3.3 19.4 
1956 37.7 3.2 3.6 2.2 23.2 5.3 3.6 3.5 3.5 14.4 
1957 34.5 4.3 2.7 2.8 25.2 5.7 5.4 3.5 2.9 13.1 
1958 34.8 6.0 4.1 2.1 23.9 6.7 4.3 4.2 1.7 12.3 
1959 26.0 6.9 3.0 3.4 25.6 6.4 4.9 3.7 3.7 16.4 
1960 22.1 7.9 1.3 3.4 26.7 8.6 4.9 3.7 3.3 18.1 
Source: Michaely (1975, 197) 
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Peddling Macroeconometric Modeling  
and Quantitative Policy Analysis:  
The Early Years of the SSRC’s Committee  
on Economic Stability, 1959-1963 
Juan Acosta* and Erich Pinzón-Fuchs** 
 
Using the Social Science Research Council’s records, we discuss the two 
projects that the Committee on Economic Stability carried out during its 
first three years of existence: (i) the construction of a macroeconometric 
model (1960-1963) and (ii) the organization of a conference on quantitative 
policy analysis (1963). In line with the central theme of this special issue, 
we focus on the effect of the Committee’s activities on public economic 
discourse and argue that, while the Committee did not participate directly 
in the policy debate, it did purposefully contribute to the growing im-
portance of macroeconometric models in policy analysis. Thus, with its ac-
tivities, the Committee helped usher in an age of quantified and model- 
based economic discourse that was not, however, exclusively technical but 
that recognized both the importance of the political character of the poli-
cy-making process and the limits of the economists’ toolkit. 
Keywords: modeling, Social Science Research Council (SSRC), quantifica-
tion, macroeconometrics 
La modélisation macroéconométrique et l’analyse quantitative,  
de nouveaux outils de prise de décision de politique économique :  
les premières années du Comité pour la Stabilité Économique  
du SSRC, 1959-1963 
En utilisant les archives du Social Science Research Council, nous 
discutons les deux projets que le Comité pour la Stabilité Économique 
réalisa durant les trois premières années de son existence : (i) la 
construction d’un modèle macroéconométrique (1960-1963) et (ii) 
l’organisation d’une conférence sur l’analyse quantitative de politique 
économique (1963). Ce papier s’inscrit dans la thématique centrale de ce 
numéro spécial dans la mesure où nous nous concentrons sur l’effet que 
les activités du Comité ont eu sur le discours public économique. Nous 
soutenons que le Comité a contribué délibérément à établir l’importance 
des modèles macroéconométriques dans le débat politique, malgré le fait 
                                                            
*Universidad de los Andes, jc.acosta130@uniandes.edu.co 
**Universidad Nacional de Colombia, erapinzonfu@unal.edu.co 
We want to thank the organizers of the conference “Economics and public Rea-
son” (University of Lausanne, May 2018) for providing financial support for us to 
present a previous version of this paper, as well as the participants of this confer-
ence for their comments and suggestions.  We would also like to thank Roger E. 
Backhouse, Béatrice Cherrier, Emilie Lefèvre, Aurélien Goutsmedt, and two 
anonymous referees for their fruitful feedback. 
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qu’il n’ait pas participé directement au débat public. Ainsi, à partir de ces 
activités, le Comité a joué un rôle décisif dans l’instauration d’une ère 
caractérisée par un discours économique basé sur la modélisation et la 
quantification. Toutefois, cette période ne fut pas exclusivement basée sur 
la technique puisque les économistes reconnurent le caractère politique du 
processus de prise de décisions politiques et les limitations 
méthodologiques de leur boîte à outils. 
Mots-clés : modélisation, Social Science Research Council (SSRC), 
quantification, macroéconométrie 
JEL: B22, B23 
 
 
The Committee on Economic Stability of the Social Science Research 
Council (SSRC) was established in 1959 and played a key role in the 
construction of large-scale macroeconometric models during the 
1960s and early 1970s. Using archival material from the SSRC, we dis-
cuss the two projects that the Committee carried out during its first 
three years of existence:1 (i) the construction of a macroeconometric 
model (1960-1963) and (ii) the organization of a conference on quanti-
tative policy analysis (1963). In line with the central theme of this spe-
cial issue, we focus on the effect of the Committee’s activities on pub-
lic economic discourse and argue that, while the Committee did not 
participate directly in the policy debate, it did purposefully contribute 
to the growing importance of macroeconometric models in policy 
analysis. Thus, with its activities, the Committee helped usher in an 
age of quantified and model-based economic discourse that was not, 
however, exclusively technical but that recognized both the im-
portance of the political character of the policy-making process and 
the limits of the economists’ toolkit.  
The Committee was created as a joint venture of economists in ac-
ademia, think tanks, and government institutions that were interested 
in better understanding economic instability in postwar United 
States. Although the available evidence suggests that advising gov-
ernment agencies on economic policy was not a clear priority when 
the creation of the Committee was initially discussed, a much strong-
er interest in influencing economic policymaking is clear in the two 
projects that the Committee carried out during its first years and that 
                                                            
1 The SSRC’s records include mainly minutes and correspondence related to the 
functioning of the Committee and its activities. Several of the papers presented at 
the different meetings and conferences organized by the Committee are also 
included. They thus offer a window into the everyday planning and discussions 
of the Committee members, which we hope will be complemented as archives 
from individual participants become available. References to the records of the 
SSRC—located at the Rockefeller Archive Center—are identified by SSRC1 
(Record group 1, Accession 1, series 1.) and SSRC2 (Record group 2, Accession 2, 
Series 1). 
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we discuss here. First, the Committee’s model was designed to be 
useful for policy analysis and not just for forecasting: it was consider-
ably more disaggregated than the models built by Lawrence R. Klein 
at the Cowles Commission (Klein, 1950) and the Klein-Goldberger 
model built at the University of Michigan (Klein and Goldberger, 
1955), and it included parameters that represented actual policy in-
struments to accommodate the needs of policy makers. In addition, 
the project successfully engaged important government agencies that 
provided data series and whose officials also contributed with their 
expertise in the construction of individual sectors of the model. Se-
cond, the 1963 conference deliberately reinforced the Committee’s 
role as a promoter of quantitative methods for policy analysis in the 
United States by showcasing the experiences of Japan, France, and the 
Netherlands—which relied in these methods to a much greater de-
gree than the United States. The Committee, however, did not offer 
ready-made solutions. Instead, they promoted the more modest view 
that quantitative policy analysis had the potential to make economic 
policy better and that it was worth investing resources in its devel-
opment. 
The activities of the Committee also offer a useful contrast with 
some of the institutions and people considered elsewhere in this spe-
cial issue. The Committee’s active and purposeful engagement with 
government institutions and officials contrasts with Robert Lucas’s 
careful distancing from the world of policymaking described in 
Goutsmedt et al. (2019, this issue). At the same time, contrary to the 
privileged place of Walter Heller at the Council of Economic Advisers 
and the direct policy advice he provided to President Kennedy (Cher-
rier, 2019, this issue), the Committee’s activities involved the technical 
staff and mid-ranking officials, and they were related to the creation 
of tools and to the promise of providing better ways of thinking about 
economic policy instead of giving concrete policy advice. Finally, the 
Committee’s outsider position and its efforts in peddling the potential 
uses of the methods it promoted are in stark contrast to the authority 
and legitimacy that the Central Planning Bureau and its model exert-
ed, from the start, in Dutch policy making, given that the Bureau oc-
cupied a central position at the heart of the Dutch government (Kayz-
el, 2019, this issue). 
1. The Establishment of the  
Committee on Economic Stability 
The establishment of the Committee was the result of an SSRC “Con-
ference on Economic Instability” held on June 17-19, 1959 at the Uni-
versity of Michigan. According to Robert A. Gordon (Berkeley), he 
and other economists associated with the SSRC who were interested 
in creating a committee on business cycle research proposed the con-
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ference to explore this possibility further (Gordon, 1975, 31; 1959, 38). 
As the first column of Table 1 shows, participants came from academ-
ia, government agencies, and private institutions like the Brookings 
Institution and the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). 
Gordon opened the discussion by briefly introducing the topics that 
would be discussed at the conference, centered on understanding 
what was known about the instability of the US economy and wheth-
er there were fundamental differences between pre and postwar 
business cycles. He stressed three characteristics of the postwar expe-
rience: “(1) the absence of a serious depression associated with a fair-
ly rapid rate of growth, (2) the persistence of inflationary pressures, 
and (3) the continued recurrence of what have come to be called ’mi-
nor cycles.”2 These phenomena needed an explanation, and Gordon 
noted in particular the lack of interest that theoreticians working on 
models based on the multiplier-accelerator mechanism seemed to 
have on explaining these minor cycles and even the extraordinary 
ones like the 1930 depression. Not surprisingly, Gordon considered 
that “this theoretical model-building ha[d] been largely divorced 
from the empirical and policy literature of the postwar period.”3 
Table 1: Participants in Committee activities.4 
 
Michigan 
(1959) 
Dart-
mouth 1 
(1961) 
Dart-
mouth 2 
(1962) 
1965 
Vol-
ume 
Conf. 
QPA 
(1963) 
Number of participants 19  29  30 25 32 
Participants with PhDs 16  21  20 21 - 
Participants from  
academia 11  18 21 21 11 
Participants from gov.  
agencies5 5  8 7 4 13 
Participants from private 
institutions 3  3 3 1 9 
Source: Records of the SSRC. 
                                                            
2 “Notes for the SSRC Conference on Economic Stability,” SSRC1, box 145, folder 
801. Gordon (1957) had previously discussed these characteristics of the US 
economy in the postwar. 
3 Ibid. 
4 A couple of the participants had double affiliations and were thus counted 
twice. The information about the education of participants is not complete, so the 
number of PhDs presented is a lower bound. Given the amount of international 
participants for which we do not have adequate information, we do not report 
the number of PhDs for the 1963 conference. 
5 This includes multilateral agencies and foreign government agencies. 
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Geoffrey Moore (NBER), Bert Hickman (Brookings Institution), 
and James Duesenberry (Harvard) also presented papers that looked 
in detail at the characteristics of the business cycle and at the chang-
ing role of specific elements in making the economy more or less sta-
ble (e.g., fiscal policy, financial distress, and the so-called automatic 
stabilizers that had been put in place in the postwar). The paper pre-
sented by Duesenberry—co-authored by Gary Fromm (Brookings In-
stitution) and Otto Eckstein (Joint Economic Committee)—had been 
specifically commissioned by the organizers of the conference and 
was the only paper that contained an econometric model.6 The core of 
the paper consisted of the various simulations, “policy experiments,” 
that Duesenberry, Eckstein, and Fromm carried out to consider the 
effects of different fiscal policies and of the automatic stabilizers on 
economic instability. The model had several intentional limitations 
that the authors willingly acknowledged—it only considered an 
economy in recession and it did not consider monetary policy or price 
changes—but it showcased effectively the type of questions that 
could be investigated with such a model. As Lawrence R. Klein 
(Pennsylvania) later put it, the model played an important role in 
“the whetting of the appetites” for a large-scale macroeconometric 
model (Klein, 1975, 13). 
The summary of the discussion shows that there was an active de-
bate around each of the papers presented, not only on the specific el-
ements that were considered to contribute to the stability or instabil-
ity of the postwar economy of the US but also on the methodological 
and organizational aspects of carrying out research on this subject.7 
The conference concluded with a vote in favor of the establishment of 
a committee at the SSRC that would fulfill several functions. As re-
ported in Gordon’s summary of the conference (1959, 39) for 
ITEMS—the SSRC’s magazine—these functions were to (i) “facilitate 
the coordination of research,” (ii) “help integrate current research 
methodologies,”8 (iii) “facilitate the collection and publication of 
                                                            
6 “Stability and Instability in the American Economy,” SSRC1, box 145, folder 801. 
A revised version of the paper appeared later in Econometrica with a different 
title: “A Simulation of the United States Economy in Recession” (Duesenberry et 
al., 1960). Note that during our period of interest Eckstein was part of the CEA’s 
staff, not a member. He did serve as a member later, during 1964-1966. 
7 Discussion summary, SSRC1, box 145, folder 801. These notes were taken by 
someone with the last name Barlow, perhaps Robin Barlow, who is unfortunately 
not included in the conference’s list of participants. Inter-office correspondence 
mentions he did a good job considering the difficulty of the task, but that some 
individual views might not have been captured completely faithfully. We thus 
stress the contents of the discussion more than the individual views presented in 
the discussion. See inter-office correspondence, September 22, 1959, SSRC2, box 
151, folder 1721. 
8 While econometric modeling clearly occupied a central role, the “historical” 
approach of the NBER was seen as a potentially useful complement. The 
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needed data, particularly by the Federal Government,” and (iv) 
“serve as a channel of communication and a facilitating agency in the 
field of research on problems of economic instability.” The first func-
tion was specifically geared towards helping researchers working on 
econometric models come together. Gordon highlighted the need to 
take stock of the research available in order to avoid duplication of 
work and to channel efforts into disaggregation. He hoped that “[i]n 
this way econometric business-cycle research could have much more 
of a cumulative effect than has been true in the past, when each inves-
tigator has started largely from scratch” (ibid.). Judging from the 
summary of the discussion at the conference it would seem that the 
idea to build a larger, more disaggregated model was explicitly con-
sidered, but this is not completely clear. Gordon (1959) is equally un-
clear in this respect. 
It should also be noted that a fifth function of the committee, not 
reported in Gordon (1959) but discussed at the Michigan conference, 
was that of “providing information to policy-making agencies of the 
government.” Specifically, the conference’s discussion summary re-
ports that Henry Wallich (CEA staff) emphasized “the value that the 
model-building project could have in providing government agencies 
with policy recommendations” and that Duesenberry “said that simu-
lation experiments with a model could easily be made to provide pol-
icy implications.”9 
However, and this might explain why this function did not appear 
in Gordon (1959), the discussion summary of the Michigan conference 
also reports that “[t]here was some debate on the question of whether 
the task of providing recommendations for current policy would con-
flict with the basic research objectives of the project.”10 Unfortunately, 
there is no further record of the specific points that were advanced 
against this function during the conference. On the contrary, the atti-
tude towards policy analysis of the group of researchers that built the 
Committee’s model would be clearly positive. 
The proposal to establish the Committee on Economic Stability 
was accepted in September of 1959 and the initial members of the 
Committee were recruited in the following months (Gordon, 1959, 
39).11 Table 2 lists the Committee members during the early 1960s—
the exclamation sign (!) denotes the chairman—and it can be seen 
                                                                                                                                     
discussion summary of the conference explicitly shows these approaches were 
seen as complementary rather than substitutes. As we mention in Acosta and 
Pinzón-Fuchs (2018), however, the NBER’s approach ended up playing only a 
minor role in the activities of the Committee. 
9 Discussion summary, SSRC1, box 145, folder 801. See footnote 7 above. 
10 Ibid. Our emphasis. 
11 See the “Proposal for committee on economic instability,” Sept 12, 1959, SSRC2 
Box 151, folder 1721. In the end, though, the last word of the committee’s name 
was replaced by “Stability,” SSRC inter-office correspondence, September 22, 
1959, SSRC2, box 151, folder 1721. 
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from their affiliations that most of them were academics. However, as 
Table 1 shows, the Committee’s activities had a broader reach and 
engaged more government officials in an effort to develop macroe-
conometric models and promote the use of quantitative policy analy-
sis. 
Table 2: Members of the Committee on Economic Stability, 1959-1964 
Members CES Affiliation 1959-1960 
1960-
1961 
1961-
1962 
1962-
1963 
1963-
1964 
Klein,  
Lawrence R. U. Pennsylvania X X X X X 
Duesenberry, 
James 
Harvard  
University X X X X X 
Hickman, Bert Brookings  Institution X X X X! X! 
Gordon, R. A. UC Berkeley X! X! X! X X 
Moore, Geoffrey NBER X X X X X 
Lusher, David CEA X X X X X 
Abramovitz,  
Moses Stanford  X X X X 
Bronfenbrenner, 
Martin U. Minnesota   X X X 
Modigliani,  
Franco MIT    X X 
Fox, Karl Iowa State University    X X 
Source: Records of the SSRC 
2. The Macroeconometric Model of the CES 
Planning for the construction of a large-scale macroeconometric mod-
el started in early 1960. The team of experts that would be in charge 
of each of the individual sectors of the model was almost complete by 
October 1960 and funding was sought from the National Science 
Foundation (NSF).12 Preliminary work on the model began in Febru-
ary 1961, although the NSF’s grant seems to have been awarded in 
June of that year.13 From 1961 to 1963 a team of more than 20 re-
searchers led by Klein and Duesenberry worked on the model.14 Re-
                                                            
12 Herring to Riecken, October 4, 1960. SSRC2, box 151, folder 1721. 
13 Fouraker to Klein, June 16, 1961. SSRC2, box 151, folder 1721. 
14 It is noteworthy to point out that Klein did not attend the 1959 Michigan 
conference, but was invited to participate in the Committee soon afterwards. We 
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searchers worked mostly individually, meeting only a couple of times 
a year, most notably during two multi-week conferences at Dart-
mouth during the summers of 1961 and 1962 (Klein, 1961; 1962). The 
model was handed over to the Brookings Institution for management 
and further development in September 1963, thus becoming the 
Brookings model. Several volumes appeared afterwards describing its 
structure and simulation results—starting with Duesenberry et al. 
(1965), which reports mostly the work carried out during the Com-
mittee phase of the model. The model was a milestone in the practice 
of large-scale macroeconometric modeling due to its size, its technical 
innovations, and the way it was built. These aspects have been dis-
cussed elsewhere, but two important elements stand out in connec-
tion with the relationship that the model helped build between aca-
demic economists, private institutions, and government agencies.15 
First, the model was conceived from the beginning to be useful for 
economic policy analysis, and second, the model drew extensively on 
both data and expertise from government agencies. Although it took 
a few more years of work on the model beyond its Committee phase 
to obtain the type of quantitative policy analysis that the project 
promised (Fromm and Taubman, 1968), the project was successful in 
gaining the attention of government agencies and in building im-
portant connections between academia and government that paid out 
in the following years. 
As we mentioned in the past section, at the Michigan conference 
there was some discussion around the potential role that the Commit-
tee could have in advising government agencies. And although we 
have not located the proposal presented to the NSF, the cover letter 
sent by the SSRC’s president did not mention anything related to 
economic policy either.16 It is possible that emphasizing the scientific 
aspect of the project was a strategic choice to appeal to the NSF, but it 
is in any case clear that, on the contrary, the team behind the model 
project had a clearly positive attitude towards the potential uses of 
the model for policy analysis. The intention to “produce a system that 
[would] be jointly useful in forecasting and policy formation” was 
explicitly stated in February 1960 meeting where the construction of 
the model was decided, and it was confirmed a year later in the first 
preliminary meeting between the team of researchers in charge of the 
                                                                                                                                     
ignore the reasons for his not having attended the conference given his stature as 
one of the main proponents of macroeconometric modeling, but we conjecture it 
might be related to his previous experience at the University of Michigan, where 
he had been accused of sympathizing with communism and driven out into exile. 
Pinzón-Fuchs (2017, ch. 2) describes this episode in detail. 
15 See in particular Bodkin et al. (1991). Acosta and Pinzón-Fuchs (2018) describe 
in detail the approach followed in the construction of the model and its 
importance for the consolidation of the practice of macroeconometric modeling 
during the 1960s. 
16 Herring to Riecken, October 4, 1960. SSRC2, box 151, folder 1721. 
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individual sectors of the model.17 In terms of the structure of the 
model, this concern for policy usefulness meant an overall higher de-
gree of disaggregation in the production sectors and other segments 
of the model, and the explicit inclusion of parameters representing 
actual policy instruments. These parameters would allow the model 
to produce quantitative estimates of the effectiveness of any specific 
policy instrument considered.18  
The relationship with government agencies was crucial due to the 
amount and variety of data series that were used to build the model, 
some of which were specially put together for the project. Officials 
from the Department of Commerce’s Office of Business Economics 
(OBE) seem to have been particularly helpful in getting the needed 
data series.19 The detailed specification of each of the individual sec-
tors was left to experts whose models would then be combined into a 
full model of the whole economy. As shown in columns 2-4 of Table 
1, some of the experts involved in the discussion and construction of 
the model also came from government agencies. Columns 2 and 3 
refer to the participants of the two Dartmouth conferences where the 
team of researchers involved in the project, as well as occasional 
guests, met to discuss their progress and worked on turning the vari-
ous parts of the model into a consistent whole; column 4 refers to the 
researchers that authored the individual sector models included in 
Duesenberry et al. (1965). Although our data still has some gaps, we 
found that at least four (out of eight) of the government-affiliated par-
ticipants at Dartmouth 1, at least three (out of seven) of the partici-
pants at Dartmouth 2, and three (out of four) of the government-
affiliated contributors to Duesenberry et al. (1965) held Ph.D. degrees. 
This information is not a perfect indicator, but it does suggest that the 
connections established during the model project involved the techni-
cally oriented government officials, that is, staff members who could 
understand the technical discussions or, that at the very least, were 
interested in hearing about them.  
Even if the connections between the model building project and 
government agencies were not built directly with people high up in 
the decision-making ladder, they did have a long lasting effect by 
helping some of these agencies establish macroeconometric modeling 
                                                            
17 Meeting minutes, Feb 24, 1960, SSRC1, box 147, folder 810; meeting minutes, 
Feb 3, 1961, SSRC1, box 147, folder 810. 
18 For comparison, a model focused exclusively on forecasting the GDP or the 
price level need not worry with a disaggregated, detailed specification of the 
model as long as it produces good estimates. Thus, explicit variables for the 
different types of taxes on personal income or corporate revenues, which 
represent actual fiscal policy instruments, need not be used if a general “tax” 
variable produces good enough forecasts.  
19 “The Dartmouth Conference on an Econometric Model of the United States,” 
August 7-25, 1961, SSRC1, box 147, folder 810. Our emphasis. A slightly reduced 
version of this summary appeared in ITEMS as Klein (1961). 
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research agendas. This is particularly clear in the case of the Board of 
Governors. The Committee initially contacted the Board looking for 
funding, but the Board’s response was lukewarm. They would let 
Daniel Brill—who was initially in charge of building the model of the 
financial sector—and other members of the staff participate in the 
project but were hesitant to fund it.20 Paul Webbink, who handled the 
administrative affairs of the Committee at the SSRC, reported that: 
[f]urther discussion with Jack Noyes [Director of the Board’s Division of 
Research and Statistics] has made it clear that getting financing from the 
Federal Reserve would require a more specific statement of plans and an-
ticipated results. It would probably be better to err on the modest side of 
this rather than on the expansive side, but it might also be necessary to 
make some contention that what will be accomplished is something that the 
Federal Reserve otherwise, sooner or later, would have to do, or at least ought to 
do, with its own staff. 21  
The request for Board funds was eventually dropped. The Committee 
was confident that they would get the funding from the NSF and con-
sidered that following up on the request for funds from the Board 
would take up too much valuable time from Klein.22 Even so, the 
proposed strategy is noteworthy and proved to be prescient. The idea 
that the model project was in the Board’s best interest and, even more 
so, unavoidable, fits in well with the attention given to the policy use-
fulness of the model and with the agenda pursued in the 1963 confer-
ence. And the Board did in fact develop a macroeconometric model 
afterwards, in collaboration with the Committee’s Subcommittee on 
Monetary Research. The Board’s model was another joint project led 
by Frank de Leeuw (Board’s Division of Research and Statistics, DRS), 
Franco Modigliani (MIT), and Albert Ando (Pennsylvania). Brill, who 
became the director of the DRS in 1963, established a modeling pro-
ject led by De Leeuw—who had replaced him as the final responsible 
for the financial sector in the Committee’s project (De Leeuw, 1965). 
The DRS’s project merged in 1966 with a project at MIT led by Modi-
gliani and Ando, and that became the Federal Reserve Board-MIT-
Pennsylvania model project (1966-1970). The project was fully funded 
by the Board via the Committee’s Subcommittee on Monetary Re-
search, an initiative that had brought the DRS staff and academic 
monetary economists together since 1964.23 
                                                            
20 Minutes of the Board meeting of September 23, 1960, 4ff. The minutes of the 
Board meetings are available at https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/821. 
21 Webbink to Gordon, Oct 05, 1960, SSRC2, box 151, folder 1721. Our emphasis. 
22 Op. Cit. See also Gordon to Webbink, Oct 10, 1960, SSRC2, box 151, folder 1721. 
23 For details on the Fed-MIT-Pen model see Acosta and Rubin (2019), Backhouse 
and Cherrier (2019), and Rancan (2019). For a discussion of what the model 
meant for the Board’s relationship with economists see Acosta and Cherrier 
(2019). 
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A less well documented, though equally interesting relationship, 
emerged between the Committee and the Department of Commerce’s 
Office of Business Economics. The Department was a major source of 
data as it produced the national accounts, but a group of their officials 
was also interested in obtaining help from the Committee in kick-
starting its own econometric research group at the OBE.24 The OBE 
had taken up and updated Klein’s quarterly model (Klein, 1964), and 
they had the intention of doing further work on econometric policy 
analysis. Researchers at the Department wanted the Committee to 
help them guide their research agenda and find adequate personnel.25 
There is some evidence in the SSRC’s records that suggests that the 
Committee advised the OBE at least until 1965, but the details are un-
clear.26 In any case, the first version of the OBE’s model was ready by 
1966, which later became the BEA model, when the OBE changed its 
name to the Bureau of Economic Analysis (Bodkin et al., 1991, 120). 
Finally, it is worth noting that the CEA also showed some interest 
in the model project and got involved in the initial phase of its con-
struction. Both Henry Wallich (CEA member) and David Lusher 
(CEA staff) attended the 1959 Michigan conference, and Lusher be-
came the expert in charge of the Government revenues and expendi-
tures sector together with Louis Weiner (DRS).27 The Committee ap-
proached Council members James Tobin and Walter W. Heller, its 
chair, early on with an open invitation to discuss and see if the Coun-
cil would be interested in the Committee’s work, apparently getting 
an enthusiastic response from both of them.28 It would seem that a 
meeting took place on May 17 of 1961 but we have not found any fur-
ther evidence of collaboration.  Lusher dropped out of the model pro-
ject—but not the Committee—due to an illness and his work was tak-
en up by Albert Ando, Cary Brown, and Earl Adams (1965).29 
                                                            
24 Gordon to Webbink, August 28, 1961; Gordon to Webbink, October 16, 1961, 
SSRC2, box 151, folder 1721. 
25 See the minutes of the meeting between the OBE team and the Committee, 
November 5, 1963, SSRC1, box 147, folder 811. 
26 See for example Klein to CES members, March 29, 1965. SSRC1, box 147, folder 
812. 
27 Lusher also received help from the Treasury and Klein was glad they were 
showing interest in their work. Klein to Webbink, July 1962, SSRC2, box 151, 
folder 1721. 
28 See Gordon’s memos of April 7 and April 19, 1961, as well as the minutes of the 
Committee’s meeting of December 28, 1960, SSRC1, box 147, folder 810. Tobin 
had been initially considered as a candidate to take over the work on 
consumption for the model. It would seem that he was officially invited, and 
declined, but there is no further evidence on this in the Committee’s records. See 
Klein’s letter of invitation to collaborate on the model project, July 13, 1960, 
SSRC1, box 147, folder 810. 
29 It is also worth noting that, as Bodkin et al. (1991, 93) point out, the OBE’s 
model’s forecasts were used by many government agencies, including the CEA. 
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It would be impossible to say for sure whether the Board of Gov-
ernors or the OBE would have carried out their model projects if the 
Committee’s own project had not existed. But the Committee’s project 
certainly helped move things along, particularly because it showed 
officials from these and other agencies how a large-scale model could 
be built and what was needed to do so. Thus, the Committee’s model 
project helped diffuse macroeconometric modeling by example. The 
conference on quantitative policy analysis organized by the Commit-
tee in 1963 reinforced the message, but it did so in a much more direct 
and open way. 
3. Promoting Quantitative Policy Analysis  
in the United States 
The Committee organized an international conference in August 1963 
that supplemented the interest that the macroeconometric model pro-
ject had provoked in some government agencies. The conference was 
explicitly aimed at giving quantitative policy analysis more visibility 
among economists in the United States, including government offi-
cials. Bert Hickman (Brookings Institution), Charles Holt (Wisconsin), 
Karl Fox (Iowa State), and Erik Thorbecke (Iowa State) were in charge 
of the planning of the conference. Concrete plans started taking shape 
in late 1962 and Hickman suggested that it might be a good idea to 
contact the organizers of an NBER conference on the same topic (i.e., 
planning).30 It is unclear whether the organizers actually contacted 
the NBER but the evidence suggests that, if they did, nothing came 
out of this. The NBER did carry out a conference on “National Eco-
nomic Planning” in November 1964 (Milikan, 1967), but none of the 
Committee members seem to have participated in it and, similarly, 
nobody from the NBER participated in the Committee’s conference. 
As we point out in Acosta and Pinzón-Fuchs (2018), this shows that 
despite the presence of George Moore (NBER) in the Committee, 
there doesn’t seem to have been much collaboration between the 
Committee and the NBER. 
The conference had a clear goal from the start: to promote quanti-
tative policy analysis in the United States by showcasing the experi-
ence of other countries. Indeed, early in 1963 Hickman emphasized 
this objective:  
I believe that we should be careful not to lose sight of the educational 
function of the conference, both for the participants and profession at 
large. There should be heavy emphasis on milking the experience of the 
foreign economists who have been working with the tools and the associ-
ated political and administrative problems. A volume of collected papers 
on country experience[s] with “Quantitative Planning of Economic Policy” 
                                                            
30 Hickman to Fox. December 4, 1962. SSRC2, box 151, folder 1722. 
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on the national level, rounded out with a general report on the proceed-
ings of the conference and possibly supplemented by other papers, should 
attract wide attention among US economists.31 
The initial version of the conference proposal, sent later to the Ford 
Foundation, emphasized this educational purpose. The proposal not-
ed the experience accumulated in other countries “concerning the 
quantitative formulation and planning of economic policy on a na-
tional and regional level” and explicitly stated that the purpose was 
to “acquaint American economists with this body of foreign experi-
ence and to stimulate research on the application of quantitative tools 
to policy problems in the United States.” Papers would be commis-
sioned from “persons actively at work in the field and [would] not be 
burdensome to prepare” so that the conference volume could be pub-
lished soon afterwards.32  
The conference would last five days and bring together up to 40 
economists to discuss the techniques of quantitative policy analysis 
and the experience of countries that had led the path in their use. In 
the proposed agenda mornings would be occupied with technical pa-
pers dealing with the theory of economic policy, and estimation and 
specification issues. The Friday session also included two papers 
about “the political-economic process, dealing with problems of 
communications between economic advisers and policy makers, in-
terpretation of results by economists to policy makers, administration 
and implementation of the policy process, etc.” Technical discussions 
would be supplemented with afternoon discussions based on the rel-
evant parts of papers that presented the experiences of the Nether-
lands, Norway, France, Italy, and Japan with “quantitative planning 
and [the] implementation of economic policy.” The structure of these 
papers would follow the proposed agenda of the conference so as to 
facilitate comparisons and would be “solicited from the chiefs of the 
relevant government bureaus or close associates. These papers would 
not be delivered at the conference but would be prepared as back-
ground papers and circulated in advance of the conference.”33  
The proposal was also explicit on the pedagogical objective in re-
gards to the selection of US participants who were “selected in con-
formity with the basic purpose of fostering interest in research on 
quantitative analysis of economic problems.” The organizers not only 
invited young and senior scholars, but they also sought to have “a 
wide coverage of institutions.” In addition, “[e]conomists with basic 
policy interest but comparatively little econometric training [were] 
                                                            
31 Hickman to Fox. January 2, 1963. SSRC2, box 151, folder 1722. 
32 “Proposal for a conference on ‘Quantitative Planning of Economic Policy’ 
under the sponsorship of the SSRC Committee on Economic Stability.” January 
18, 1963. SSRC1, box 147, folder 811. 
33 Ibid. 
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asked to participate, and conversely, econometricians who had not 
previously done research on policy matters [were] also ... invited.”34 
The Ford Foundation’s initial response to the grant application 
was negative. Despite the apparently balanced agenda of the confer-
ence, which included both technical and real-world implementation 
discussions, the Foundation considered that there was too much em-
phasis on the technical side. As Hickman reported to the rest of the 
planning committee: 
The Ford Foundation is cool to the conference as we planned it—cool to 
the point of refusing to finance it. Their principal objection is that too 
much emphasis is planned on techniques and too little on the actual con-
tribution of quantitative methods to economic policy. Does the advice of 
the technicians get accepted? Is the advice straight from the models or 
does the judgment of the planning chief and his staff enter heavily into the 
final recommendations? What role do political factors play in setting con-
straints on admissible goals? On crucial variables like the money wages? 
What means are used to implement the policies?35 
The proposal was modified to increase the emphasis on the pragmatic 
problems and was finally approved by the Ford Foundation.36 The 
new proposal had similar language, insisting on the fact that “Ameri-
can economists and policymakers are largely uninformed about these 
important developments” made in France, the Netherlands, Norway, 
and Japan, and that “[a] critical appraisal of the contribution of quan-
titative techniques to the planning and implementation of economic 
policy in these countries could significantly affect the future direction 
of economic research and economic policy in the United States.”37 The 
new proposal also explicitly emphasized the effort made to com-
municate these techniques to a wider public, insisting that technical 
papers should be “expository in nature and [confine] any difficult 
mathematical material to appendixes.”38 In addition, the new agenda 
explicitly incorporated the questions suggested by the Ford Founda-
tion, which would be treated in the papers prepared on the experi-
ences of the above mentioned countries. Policy papers now appeared 
explicitly in the agenda and occupied the last three full days of the 
conference, with the technical papers confined to the first two days. 
The country experiences to be discussed were cut to three: France, the 
Netherlands, and Norway instead of Japan. A couple of months later, 
                                                            
34 Ibid. 
35 Hickman to Fox, Holt, Thorbecke. March 4, 1963. SSRC2, box 151, folder 1722. 
36 Hickman to Fox, Holt, Thorbecke. April 12, 1963. SSRC2, box 151, folder 1722. 
37 “Agenda for a Conference on ‘Quantitative planning of economic policy’ under 
the sponsorship of the SSRC Committee on Economic Stability.” March 15, 1963. 
SSRC2, box 151, folder 1722. 
38 Ibid. 
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however, this last choice was reversed, and Japan was included 
again.39 
It is unclear how the final choice of the authors of the policy pa-
pers was made, but Hickman does point out that he got some sugges-
tions from Jan Tinbergen—who could not personally attend the con-
ference but was reportedly very enthusiastic about it.40 In any case, 
the educational purpose of the conference was also made explicit to 
the authors of the policy papers,41 and the questions included in the 
conference’s instructions clearly echoed those proposed by the Ford 
Foundation:  
How is the economic policy problem identified and defined? How or to 
what extent is the policy decision problem formulated in quantitative 
terms? How are the specific objectives or targets of economic policy de-
termined? How are the relationships between proposed policy actions and 
desired economic outcomes estimated and how successful are the models 
in forecasting economic activity and the influence of policy actions on 
economic activity? If a formal quantitative model is used, how is the 
mathematical solution of the decision problem obtained? How do the re-
sults of the quantitative economic analysis contribute to the political deci-
sion process?42  
The conference took place in August 19-24, 1963 at the Brookings In-
stitution in Washington. As shown in Table 1, in the end there were 
32 participants and those associated with government agencies out-
numbered academic economists: 13 participants were affiliated to 
government agencies, 11 to academic institutions, and 9 to private 
organizations; 10 out of 23 US participants were associated with gov-
ernment agencies. In particular, there were officials from the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Council of Economic 
Advisers (CEA), the Department of Commerce’s Office of Business 
Economics (OBE), the Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics, the Treasury’s Office of Financial Analysis, and the Agency for 
International Development. With the exception of the Joint Economic 
Committee and the Bureau of the Budget, the organizers were suc-
                                                            
39 See the May 1, 1963 version of the conference agenda. SSRC1, box 147, folder 
811. Unfortunately, it’s unclear from the records why exactly this choice was 
made and then reversed. 
40 Hickman to Fox, Holt, Thorbecke. January 29, 1963. SSRC2, box 151, folder 
1722. 
41 See for example Hickman to Bauchet. June 18, 1963. SSRC2, box 151, folder 
1722. 
42 19630501 “Note to authors of country papers.” May 1, 1963. SSRC1, box 147, 
folder 811. These questions seem to follow Charles Holt’s steps for quantitative 
policy formulation. As reported by Hickman these are: “identification of the 
problem; discovering the relevant relationships; specifying the objectives; 
quantitative formulation; mathematical solution; interpretation of the results for 
policy makers; and administration and control of either the research process or 
the policy process or both — this was not clear to me.” See Hickman to Fox, 
January 2, 1963, SSRC2, box 151, folder 1722. 
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cessful in getting officials from the agencies they originally wanted, 
although they did not get some of the high-profile officials they had 
considered, such as Gardner Ackley (CEA) and George Jaszi (OBE). It 
is also noteworthy that none of the Harvard and MIT economists as-
sociated with the Committee such as Franco Modigliani, Edwin Kuh, 
Duesenberry, and Eckstein attended the meeting. Other major names 
like James Tobin, Arthur Okun, and Kenneth Arrow were considered 
initially but did not participate in the conference.43 
The presentations of the conference and the published volume 
(Hickman, 1965a) provided a broad introduction to the technical as-
pects of quantitative policy analysis as well as a presentation of the 
experiences of the Netherlands, France, and Japan. The conference 
showed even more clearly why proponents of the use of quantitative 
tools in economic policy considered these tools valuable. A short note 
published as a Brookings Research Report summarized their view: 
The techniques of policy planning provide a rigorous and systematic meth-
od of exploring the impact on the economy of specific governmental ac-
tions. Their purpose is to supply the policy maker with a more scientific 
basis for choosing among alternative economic policies than is given by 
the rough estimates or intuition frequently underlying policy decisions.44 
The conference volume conveyed a general support for the use of 
quantitative tools and also showed that there were different ap-
proaches available. The chosen countries illustrated this well: Japan 
and France focused on long-term planning and the Netherlands fo-
cused on short-term planning. The Committee’s macroeconometric 
model was closest in type to the work done in the Netherlands, but 
there too, it was possible to choose between using previously speci-
fied values for the target variables (Tinbergen’s approach) or deriving 
the optimal values from a maximization program using a decision-
maker’s preference function (Theil’s approach) (Hickman, 1965b; 
Theil, 1965). It was clear that in order to apply either of these ap-
proaches in a rigorous way, “a complete econometric model must be 
built in which all relevant target and instrument variables are includ-
ed and all coefficients are numerically estimated” (Hickman, 1965b, 
6). The kind of econometric model used in the Dutch case was studied 
in van den Beld’s (1965) and Fox and Thorbecke’s (1965) papers in the 
volume. And yet, an important message that the book wanted to con-
vey was that, even if it was still under construction and preliminary, a 
project already existed in the United States that tried to build such an 
econometric model with the purpose of doing quantitative policy 
                                                            
43 See the initial list of potential candidates: Hickman to Fox et al., April 12, 1963. 
SSRC2, box 151, folder 1722. 
44 “The uses of quantitative economic planning.” SSRC2, box 151, folder 1722. Our 
emphasis. The note was not signed, but it could well have been authored by 
Hickman—who wrote the introduction to the conference volume (Hickman, 
1965b)—or any of the other members of the planning team. 
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analysis in a rigorous way. This project was, of course, the Commit-
tee’s macroeconometric model that had now been passed on to the 
Brookings Institution.  
Another important point emphasized both during the conference 
and in the book, was the political character of quantitative economic 
policy analysis. More specifically, Hickman (1965b, 9) reminded the 
readers that the “determination of desired values of targets and in-
struments ... and the weights attached to them” was conditioned to 
higher order political aims. Indeed, Etienne S. Kirschen and Lucien 
Morissens (1965) described how higher order political aims such as 
full employment, price stability, improvement in the balance of pay-
ments, expansion of production, or improvement in the allocation of 
factors of production, had affected the formulation of different targets 
in nine Western countries in the postwar era. Kirschen and Morissens 
(1965, 133) insisted that the choice of these political aims depended on 
the preferences of the political parties, administrators, and interest 
groups. As Hickman (1965b, 9) put it, “these last findings serve[d] as 
a healthy reminder to the economist that quantitative policy analysis 
was not only a technical endeavor, but that it was essentially a politi-
cal problem.” 
In this sense, the message that the Committee was trying to pass 
on was not that quantitative tools were the ultimate and infallible 
way to make policy analysis. Rather, they conceived these tools as a 
way to help policymakers make decisions, but they understood pretty 
well that the decision-making process could not be mechanistic, and 
that the political dimension was, in the end, the most important di-
mension in this process. In addition, the conference participants rec-
ognized that the contributions of quantitative policy analysis, while 
promising, were still modest and should be further developed.45 In 
particular, Holt (1965) called attention to the important difference be-
tween simply using quantitative tools as a way to make policy deci-
sions and the quantitative decision analysis approach. The use of 
quantitative methods for policy analysis, on the one hand, helped pol-
icy makers achieve a “coherent and timely set of economic policies” at 
all the levels of the decision process using economists’ “unconditional 
and conditional forecasts ... of the outcomes of alternative courses of 
action” (Holt, 1965, 254). Yet, however important economists’ contri-
butions were, these were scattered within a complex process that was 
sometimes “reduced to the art of finding legislation that stands a 
chance of passage in Congress” (ibid., 253) and that was dispersed 
among the political power of “various agencies, committees, and 
chairmen, as well as the Senate, the House, and the President” (ibid., 
254). The quantitative decision analysis approach, on the other hand, 
consisted in posing the decision making problem in terms of the max-
                                                            
45 “The uses of quantitative economic planning.” SSRC2, box 151, folder 1722. 
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imization of the “accomplishment of a welfare function subject to the 
constraint of economic relationships” (ibid., 255). This provided the 
economists with a “framework for thinking about the decision pro-
cess that is less simplified,” and that “implies, not a change in the 
process itself, but a different way of relating the work of economists 
to it” (ibid., 254). 
Yet Holt was careful in his formulation of the advantages of this 
approach as well as of the “limited knowledge [of economists] and 
the genuine differences between objectives of various groups, the 
conclusions of the formal analysis will be, not a single ‘best’ action 
alternative, but rather several ‘good’ alternatives depending upon the 
assumptions that are made,” which clearly left the door open for the 
importance of the political aspects in the decision making process 
(Holt, 1965, 255). Holt also made clear that they were not “visualizing 
a benevolent dictatorial technocracy run by professional economists” 
but a way to make economists “better able to offer sound advice on a 
professional level to politically responsible decision-makers” (ibid., 
255). The Brookings Research Report quoted above summarized well 
not only Holt’s idea on the limits of an exclusively technical ap-
proach, but also reinforced the SSRC’s pluridisciplinary approach to 
the process of policy decision making:  
Of equal or perhaps greater importance is the less technical problem of re-
lating the professional advice of the economist to the political decision 
process so that quantitative analysis can be of maximum effectiveness and 
use to the responsible decision makers. Fundamental to this aim is a 
greater understanding of how economic policy decisions are actually 
made. These are problems which cannot be solved with the economist’s 
toolkit alone. The skills, techniques, and theories of other social science 
disciplines must be utilized more fully before the promise implicit in 
quantitative decision analysis can be realized.46 
In summary, the conference did not propose a program for making 
policy decisions that was blindly based on quantitative methods. Ra-
ther, the organizers of the conference were willing to recognize that 
this process was conditioned by higher order political aims, that it 
was complex, and that the economists’ toolkit alone was not sufficient 
to provide sound evaluation of alternative policies.  
4. Conclusions 
The two activities we have discussed, the construction of a large-scale 
macroeconometric model and the organization of the 1963 conference 
on quantitative policy analysis, were certainly important in furthering 
the Committee’s guiding objective of channeling efforts into the un-
derstanding of instability in the United States. The model project, in 
                                                            
46 “The uses of quantitative economic planning.” SSRC2, box 151, folder 1722. 
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particular, was at the forefront of macroeconomics and played an im-
portant role in the consolidation of macroeconometric modeling. But 
besides the scientific contributions of the Committee in these years, its 
activities helped promote quantitative policy analysis in the United 
States. The model did so by establishing and promoting direct collab-
oration with government officials, who provided much needed data 
and expertise. The type of highly disaggregated model that was con-
ceived and the concern for its policy usefulness made collaboration 
with government officials unavoidable, but the project also built im-
portant communication bridges between the Committee and gov-
ernment agencies that helped other model projects come into being at 
the Board of Governors and the Office of Business Economics. 
The 1963 conference further emphasized the usefulness of quanti-
tative policy analysis. Having a macroeconometric model was the 
first step—and the Committee’s model was certainly going to be big-
ger and “better” than anything available until then—but it was also 
necessary to rethink the approach to economic policy. The conference 
sought to show economists in the United States how a deeper in-
volvement of quantitative analysis could help make economic policy 
better, more rigorous. Although countries that had taken the lead in 
the use of quantitative policy analysis had obtained only modest re-
sults so far, the conference showcased these various experiences and 
approaches to try to convince economists in the United States that this 
was a path worth following. It was also clear that the politics of eco-
nomic policy were a fundamental part of the policy process that was 
not going to go away. However, once a policy was formulated, quan-
titative analysis could help policymakers carry it out more effectively.  
The Committee and its activities thus provide a rich historical ex-
ample of how economists and economics progressively gained influ-
ence in the policy making process. Following Hirschman and Ber-
man’s (2014) classification of the modes in which economists can in-
fluence policy, the Committee clearly contributed to the creation of a 
“cognitive infrastructure” favorable to economists. They did so by 
constructing a model, a “policy device,” but also by pushing for a 
greater role for quantitative policy analysis and thus contributing to 
the change in the style of reasoning in economic policymaking.47 At 
the same time, the model projects related to the Committee’s own 
model that emerged at key government agencies became important 
parts of the policymaking process and helped open up spaces for a 
specific type of economists, thus increasing their “institutional posi-
tion.” Further research into the history and internal dynamics of the 
agencies where econometric modeling gained these spaces should 
help us better understand the Committee’s role in the consolidation 
                                                            
47 Such a change, of course, followed the change that the economics discipline 
itself had gone through since the end of World War 2 (Morgan and Rutherford, 
1998). 
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of the practice of macroeconometric modeling. Finally, this research 
should also illuminate the effect that macroeconometric modeling had 
on the “professional authority” of economists, in particular regarding 
the contribution (or lack thereof) of policy results and of ideas about 
rigor and scientificity in economics.  
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Early Interest, Lasting Scepticism: The Views 
about Education at the OECD (1960s-1980s)  
Pedro N. Teixeira* 
 
 
In this article we reflect about the dissemination of economic ideas among 
international organizations by looking at the case of the OECD and its 
views on education from the early sixties to the mid-eighties. Although 
previous studies have tended to present the OECD as an early supporter 
of human capital ideas, our analysis will highlight the strong and persis-
tent resistances of this organization throughout the 1960s and 1970s to 
human capital theory. The analysis of major institutional events, projects, 
and reports of that period point out to an institutional context dominated 
by other views about education that reflected in its policy recommenda-
tions. This text will provide an interesting example about the dissemina-
tion of economic ideas within a certain type of political institutions and 
the role of economists in influencing the agenda of international organiza-
tions, which are important (yet understudied) aspects in the relation be-
tween economists and economic ideas and power in the second half of the 
twentieth century. 
Keywords: human capital, education, OECD, manpower planning, screen-
ing 
Intérêt précoce, scepticisme durable : l’éducation à l’OCDE (1960-1980) 
Cet article s’intéresse à la diffusion des idées économiques parmi les orga-
nisations internationales en examinant le cas de l’OCDE et son point de 
vue sur l’éducation du début des années 1960 au milieu des années 1980. 
Bien que des études précédentes aient eu tendance à présenter l’OCDE 
comme l’un des premiers partisans de l’idée de capital humain, notre ana-
lyse met en évidence les résistances fortes et persistantes de cette organisa-
tion tout au long des années 1960 et 1970 à la théorie du capital humain. 
L’analyse des principaux évènements institutionnels, projets et rapports 
de cette période fait ressortir un contexte institutionnel dominé par 
d’autres points de vue sur l’éducation reflétés dans ses recommandations 
politiques. Cet article fournit un exemple intéressant de la diffusion des 
idées économiques au sein d’un certain type d’institutions politiques et du 
rôle des économistes dans l’influence du programme des organisations in-
ternationales, qui constituent des aspects importants (mais peu étudiés) de 
la relation entre économistes, idées économiques et pouvoir dans la se-
conde moitié du 20ème siècle. 
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One of the major developments in policy-making in the post-World 
War II period was the rise of international agencies, which became 
significant actors in intergovernmental and transnational relations 
(Pechman, 1989). Organizations such as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (IBRD), and the Organisation for European Economic Co-
operation (OECE) that later became the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), became significant actors 
and influential regarding the definition of priorities for economic pol-
icy-making.1 These international agencies gained increasing visibility 
with the rise of professionalism in modern society and the expansion 
of governments’ role in the economic arena, nationally and also inter-
nationally.2 Their impact was enhanced due to the spread of the activ-
ities of those organizations to a wider range of topics covering almost 
every relevant issue for national policy and economists becoming a 
distinctive professional group with a strong presence within these 
agencies.3 However, there have been very few studies of these organ-
izations’ role, activity, and influence on the design of public policy, 
namely in what concerns the role of economists (for a few exceptions, 
see Furner and Supple, 2002; Schmelzer, 2016; Teixeira, 2018). 
One of the areas that became very important to the activity of 
those international agencies was education, especially due to the de-
velopment of human capital theory and the growing interest of econ-
omists in exploring the role of education (Teixeira, 2005). These de-
bates about the economic role of education (and the role of govern-
ments in this sector) became very important to the work of those in-
ternational organizations, including the OECD, especially regarding 
international trends in educational policy-making. It is therefore in-
teresting to see how this institution reacted to this insistence on a link 
between education and growth/development and what kind of con-
                                                            
1 This is certainly the case of the OECD whose activities depend upon convincing 
national policy makers of the organisation’s recommendations, calling for a 
persuasive capacity in promoting the organisation’s point of view (Marris, 1986; 
Schmelzer, 2016). 
2 On the evolution of the economics profession and the role of economic expertise 
in policy-making see Furner and Supple (2002), Lacey and Furner (1993), and 
Fourcade (2009). 
3 Economists seemed to play a significant role in almost every international 
agency due to their generalist training which neatly suited the multifarious needs 
of those organisations (see Coats, 1986). 
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ceptual, methodological, political, and organisational difficulties were 
faced by those attempting to win over the organization for the cause 
of the economic role of education and to human capital in particular. 
This article analyses the views about education at the OECD from 
the late fifties to the early eighties. The analysis will focus in particu-
lar on main institutional activities linked to education such as the 
Economics of Education Study Group, key policy conferences, and 
the main educational planning projects developed by the OECD on 
education during that period.4 Although previous studies have tend-
ed to present the OECD as an early supporter of human capital ideas 
(see Papadopoulos, 1994; Schmelzer, 2016), our analysis will highlight 
the strong and persistent resistances faced throughout the 1960s and 
1970s by the proponents of the human capital theory in presenting 
their ideas and in influencing the views of the organization about ed-
ucation, due to an institutional context dominated by other conceptu-
al and policy views about education. We will start by analysing the 
views of the OECD in the early 1960s, after the transformation from 
OECE into OECD and how education came to play a relevant role in 
this new phase of the organization. Then, we will analyse the activi-
ties of the Economics of Education Study Group. This will be fol-
lowed by an analysis of the involvement of the OECD in educational 
planning projects in the sixties and early seventies and the waning of 
that interest in the late seventies. The later sections will analyse the 
shift of the OECD in the early eighties away from educational plan-
ning, which would eventually lead to a hesitant and slow endorse-
ment of a more favourable position regarding human capital theory. 
1. Economists’ Growing Interest on Education  
at the Turn of the 1960s 
Until the late fifties the contribution of education for economic 
growth and for the labour market did not receive much attention in 
either academic circles or in public debates (Schultz, 1961; 1963; 
Teixeira, 2005; 2007). However, the revival of interest in economic 
growth and development that characterized the post WWII period 
was one of the major factors that promoted the exploration of the 
economic role of education. Alongside more theoretical develop-
ments, there was a long tradition of empirical work devoted to the 
organization, development, and analysis of data on past growth (see 
Abramowitz, 1956; Jorgenson, 1990). By the early sixties there was an 
increasing amount of empirical research emphasizing education as a 
potential major source of economic growth. Although attention 
                                                            
4 The material supporting the analysis has been collected through major reports 
and proceedings of the conferences organized by the OECD on education during 
that period. 
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turned initially to the quantity of inputs (especially to physical capi-
tal), subsequent debates and the empirical difficulties of growth-
accounting stimulated the quest for other sources of growth. 
As time went by, education and training became a prime candi-
date for that quest and, despite many limitations, the first empirical 
exercises contributed to strengthen their case placing them firmly on 
the research agenda and more importantly in the public and political 
arena. This was also strengthened by the emerging development from 
what became known as human capital, which was being spearheaded 
by Theodore W. Schultz (1902-1998) and a group of younger re-
searchers among which were quickly attaining prominence Jacob 
Mincer (1922-2006), and Gary Becker (1930-2014). This group of econ-
omists aimed to explore the metaphor of human capital as an analyti-
cal tool to explain a variety of economic behavior (Teixeira, 2000). 
These three economists were particularly interested in exploring the 
factors that made education and training relevant in economics and to 
understand to what extent a human capital theory could provide an 
explanatory principle to issues of income inequality, economic 
growth and development, and labour markets. The role of these three 
economists would also be very important at an early stage of the de-
velopment of this field because they played a critical role to attract 
and support a growing community of young researchers willing to 
extend and develop this field of research (Teixeira, 2005; 2007). 
The early developments of human capital research reflected this 
diverse array of topics, combining more macro (growth and devel-
opment) approaches with more micro (especially in the labour mar-
ket) ones. T. W. Schultz, in his presidential address to the AEA in 
1960 (Schultz, 1961) stressed the role of human capital as a major con-
tribution to the past performance of Western economies. Moreover, 
he regarded human capital as something that made people more pro-
ductive, especially in terms of an activity that made people aware of 
new and better opportunities and their ability to seize them (Schultz, 
1963). For Mincer human capital was mostly pursued in terms of 
schooling and especially on-the-job training and their effects on the 
labour market (see Mincer, 1958; 1962), and a large part of his work 
was on the returns to these two sources of human capital (Teixeira, 
2007). For Becker, human capital started as an analysis of lifetime pat-
terns of income and decisions concerning investment on these activi-
ties (schooling and on-the-job training) (Becker, 1964), though it 
would eventually become a framework for understanding several 
aspects of human behaviour, including individual decisions in non-
market contexts (Becker, 1975). 
The work of these pioneers in human capital research contributed 
to stimulate economists’ interest in education and led to the devel-
opment of multiple studies exploring the potential contribution of 
education to national and individual betterment (Rostow, 1990). From 
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generally superficial remarks, the debate evolved to more significant 
theoretical and empirical controversies about the extent of which ed-
ucation was an important factor in promoting economic growth and 
development (Bowman, 1966; Blaug, 1985). Subsequent to these de-
bates, it became increasingly important to discuss to what extent gov-
ernment policies could (or could not) enhance that contribution, no-
tably by promoting a faster expansion of access to education. It was in 
this context that the OECD would become increasingly interested on 
the topic of education. 
2. Early Interest at the OECD and the Washington  
Conference of 1961 
By the early sixties, when the human capital research program was 
taking off, the visibility of education and training among economists 
and policymakers was growing and rapidly becoming a hot topic on 
the agenda. The OECD had been transformed from OECE, with an 
enhanced focus on to issues of economic growth and development, as 
the Europe’s reconstruction efforts were finally on its back (Papado-
poulos, 1994; Schmelzer, 2016). 
The signs of an increasing attention of the OECD to the economic 
role of education came with the Washington Conference (16th-20th 
October, 1961), entitled “Economic Growth Policies and Educational 
Investment” (OECD, 1962). This represented a landmark in the activi-
ties of the organisation, being for instance the first OECD conference 
to take place in the US. The conference was attended by several high-
rank officials from member countries, both from the ministries of ed-
ucation and finance, as well as by several of the leading economists at 
that time with interest in issues of education and development.5 The 
main document of the conference was the text “Targets for Education 
in Europe in 1970,” by Swedish economist Ingvar Svennilson, devel-
oped with the support of German educationalist Friedrich Edding 
and the British educationalist Lionel Elvin. The first two would be 
active members of the study group on the economics of education 
that was about to be launched and the latter was Director of the Insti-
tute of Education of the University of London and a regular partici-
pant in the activities of the aforementioned study group. The im-
portance of the report was also enhanced by the fact that it was ini-
tially planned to be co-ordinated by Thorkil Kristensen, who mean-
                                                            
5 The conference benefited from a previous meeting in July 1960, that took place 
in Bellagio (Italy), organized by the International Association of Universities 
(with financial support of the Ford and Rockfeller Foundations) and focused on 
the “Economic Aspects of Educational Development in Europe” (Schmelzer, 
2016). 
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while became Secretary-General of the OECD, and hence passed it to 
Svennilson. 
In a context of increasing focus by governments on economic 
growth, and of progressively greater attention to the role of education 
in promoting it, the conference, and particularly this report, attempt-
ed to define objectives of educational expansion for OECD countries 
that met foreseeable demographic, social and economic needs. The 
report exhibited a visible confidence on the capacity of education to 
promote growth, integrated in a broad optimistic perspective towards 
society’s growth potential. Education was regarded not only as a con-
sumption good to which more resources were allocated with the in-
creasing prosperity of society, but also as a powerful force in promot-
ing society’s progress. Hence it was important to adjust education, in 
terms of the quantity and the quality of its provision, notably due to 
its effect on the distribution of income, level of employment, and eco-
nomic progress in general. The prevailing view among the partici-
pants indicated that its expansion had to be planned and led by gov-
ernments due to the shortcomings of market mechanisms as far as 
education was concerned. Hence, significant attention was devoted in 
the debates and in the official documents of the conference to explore 
the potential of educational planning techniques.6 
If the Washington Conference indicated that the views of econo-
mists interested in exploring the economic relevance of education 
were present, the structure and content of the debate indicated that 
there were already emerging some differences vis-à-vis the positions 
of the pioneers in human capital theory. The main one was the view 
that the expansion of education should be led and planned by gov-
ernments, which contrasted with the assumptions underlying human 
capital theory (and Chicago economists), that privileged an expansion 
of education supported by market supply and demand forces and 
based on individual decisions and rationality. Moreover, whereas the 
debates at the Washington Conference emphasised the consumption 
and social motivations of education, the human capital pioneers 
tended to underline the investment and economic motivations under-
lying educational decisions. These emerging differences would con-
solidate in the following years, especially with the establishment of 
the Study Group on the Economics of Education. 
                                                            
6 The importance of planning was also present in Tinbergen and Bos’ paper 
(1964), who presented a pioneering model of educational planning, and in the 
fourth volume of proceedings devoted to the analysis of three countries 
attempting to develop experiences of manpower planning (France, Sweden, and 
Yugoslavia). 
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3. The Study Group on the Economics of  
Education (1960-1965) 
The Washington Conference was followed by the creation of the 
Study Group in Economics of Education in 1960, which operated mainly 
between 1962 and 1965 and was responsible for organising some very 
important work in the field, namely some high-profile international 
conferences that congregated academics and policy-makers interested 
in the discussion about the economic relevance of education. The 
group started with the Danish Social Scientist Henning Friis, Frie-
drich Edding, the North-American economist Seymour Harris, the 
French top bureaucrat Raymond Poignant, Ingvar Svennilson, and 
the British educational economist John Vaizey. They were later joined 
by the French Educationalist Michel Debeauvais, the North-American 
economist Selma Mushkin, and the Dutch economist Jan Tinbergen. 
This group included several pioneers in the Economics of Educa-
tion who had become interested in the topic either through the analy-
sis of its costs and funding (Edding for Germany, Harris for the U.S., 
Vaizey for the U.K., and Poignant for French-speaking African coun-
tries), or via the analysis of economic growth (Svennilson and Friis). 
This group was largely pro-Keynesian, in favour of some degree of 
planning, and somewhat sceptical about the perfect working of the 
market. Most of the members of the Study Group believed that mar-
kets had far more failures than neoclassic models assumed, and edu-
cation was clearly one of the areas in which markets underperformed. 
This helps to understand why altogether the tone of the group was 
significantly critical towards human capital economists (see Vaizey, 
1962). They saw the role of education on economic development as a 
matter of long-term planning that should not be left to the working of 
market forces as most of the human capital pioneers believed (see, for 
instance, Harris, 1962). 
The core of the activities of the Group was the organisation of a se-
ries of important international conferences that took place between 
1962 and 1965 and that gathered some well-known economists and 
high-rank governmental officials and policy-makers. The dominant 
topics of the conferences were the issues of funding and planning, 
which were becoming increasingly relevant to several of the member 
countries, especially due to the increasing expansion of their educa-
tional systems (namely at the secondary and higher levels). Thus first 
conference was devoted to “Economic Aspects of Higher Education” 
(Paris, June 1962) and focused on the aforementioned issues of fund-
ing and planning in higher education. From the proceedings it is clear 
that there were disagreements within the group on the topic, namely 
regarding human capital and cost-benefit as useful guidances for ed-
ucational planning. Whereas Fein, Friis, Harris, and Mushkin ex-
pressed the view that calculations of the return to education based on 
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income differentials made a valuable contribution, Vaizey was very 
critical of the assumption that those differentials reflected educational 
achievement (see their remarks in OECD, 1963). 
This scepticism towards human capital research, notably on the 
assumption of correspondence between remuneration of factors and 
productivity levels, continued in the following conference, which was 
focused on “The Residual Factor and Economic Growth” (May, 1963) 
and centred on Edward Denison’s presentation (OECD, 1964). The 
members of the study group showed again their scepticism and, once 
again, Vaizey (1964) summed up the criticisms by talking about the 
“the economics of human resources” (OECD, 1964, 201) and stating 
that he found it “difficult to visualize the computing of private rates 
of return on ‘investment in human capital,’” since it rested in a fallacy 
of comparing it to physical capital and pressing the analogy with it 
too far. Several of the members considered that educational planning 
was preferable to allowing expansion to be guided by market forces. 
Hence, in the following conference, centred upon the “Organisational 
Implications of the Link between Education and Economic Growth” 
(November 1963), they advocated the need to integrate education into 
economic planning, in order to adapt it to the needs of the economy 
(OECD, 1965). This was linked to the growing involvement of the 
OECD at large with educational planning, especially after launching 
the Mediterranean Regional project (see below). 
This Conference was followed by two others on the implications 
and challenges of educational expansion. The first one was devoted to 
the “Financing of Education for Economic Growth” (21-24 April 1964) 
and analysed the role of education in economic growth in a context of 
increasing competition of funding for education with other essential 
branches of the public sector (OECD, 1966a).7 The financial issues 
were becoming a pressing topic due to the rapid expansion of educa-
tional enrolments in many member countries, fostered by high politi-
cal and social expectations about the benefits of education, and the 
general tone was again critical about a cost-benefit approach to edu-
cational funding. The second conference, which was one of the last 
activities of the Study Group and focused on “Social Objectives in 
Educational Planning” (March 1965), underlined the interest of the 
group and of the OECD on the topic of educational planning. In his 
contribution, John Vaizey argued that the educational gap between 
different social groups remained stable and that education had a mild 
effect on inequality (OECD, 1966b).8 This sceptical view about the ac-
tual effect of education on inequality would become more prominent 
                                                            
7 The financial dimension of education was very relevant to several members of 
the Study Group such as John Vaizey (1958), Seymour Harris (1962), and 
Friedrich Edding. 
8 This was a topic already covered in an earlier report on “Ability and 
Educational Opportunity” (OECD, 1961). 
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in subsequent years, especially when the organization would start 
questioning the effects of the previous decades’ educational expan-
sion. 
The activities of this Study Group were very important in shaping 
the initial views of the OECD about the economic role of education. 
Through their activities, especially the conferences and its proceed-
ings, they contributed to raise the interest of the organization in edu-
cation and to its awareness about major research about human capital 
and the economics of education. Nonetheless, the members of the 
study group had a more sceptical view about markets and their effec-
tiveness in guiding the educational system and contributed to consol-
idate the view in the OECD favouring planning of education instead 
of a more market-oriented approach. The influence of the members of 
the Study Group would be visible in subsequent activities, not the 
least since several of them would continue to be regular participants 
in subsequent activities of the OECD related to education. 
The position of the Study Group also illustrates one aspect that 
hindered the acceptance of human capital research within the OECD 
in particular and Europe in general (Teixeira, 2018). Human capital 
research remained for a long time centred in North America and there 
were fewer contacts with European economists. Moreover, the Euro-
pean pioneers in the economics of education (several of whom partic-
ipated in the activities of the OECD) were critical of the assumptions 
of human capital theory in terms of the working of the labour market. 
Although some American economists would participate in activities 
of the Study Group, voicing support for a cost-benefit approach to 
educational expansion, they were a small group and their influence 
was clearly more limited. 
4. Educational Planning and the  
Mediterranean Regional Program 
Alongside the promotion of fora for the interaction between research-
ers and policy-makers, the OECD developed during the sixties a sig-
nificant activity in educational planning. In the early sixties it 
launched the Mediterranean Regional Project (MRP), which became the 
first major international experience of educational planning, attempt-
ing to relate educational needs to economic growth and social ad-
vancement. The project had its origins in a request from Portugal, in 
1960, for technical support from the organisation in the creation of a 
plan of development of technical manpower (Teixeira et al, 2003; 
Stoer, 1986). This was enlarged to cover all types of manpower re-
quirements, and to include Spain, Italy, Portugal, Turkey, Yugoslavia, 
and Greece. The group of countries covered in the study presented 
several interesting common features. They included some of the less 
developed countries of the OECD, with very low educational qualifi-
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cations (the lowest in the organization) and significant shortage of 
educational facilities. The main objective of the project, at least in its 
initial stages, was to gather the needs for education over the period 
1961-1975 for the countries participating in the exercise. Each country 
was supposed to provide a complete survey of its educational system 
and of future needs for education (by looking at major demographic, 
social, and economic trends). In a second phase, the project aimed at 
translating the long-term educational plans into shorter operational 
programs. 
National teams, formed by economists, statisticians, and educa-
tionists, were established with the task of defining educational needs 
for the period 1961-1975 and suggesting proposals to achieve it, and 
to the OECD was ascribed the task of co-ordination and technical as-
sistance, notably in the training of human resources planners. The 
first training course for experts on human resources planning and 
development, under the framework of the MRP, took place in 1962, 
and it focused mostly on the link between education and economic 
growth. Also in 1962, Herbert Parnes published a handbook about 
educational planning, which was the first report of the project and 
would become the main guide to the MRP’s national teams in their 
forecasts and the national reports (Parnes, 1962a). In his report, he 
explored some of the main conceptual and methodological problems 
involved in assessing educational needs and discussed alternative 
approaches to achieve that goal. According to Parnes, the main issue 
was how to estimate future manpower requirements, given the dy-
namic nature of the educational system and the need to define certain 
assumptions about the educational content of occupations and the 
links between productivity, education and occupations. These were 
fundamental issues about planning exercises in education and educa-
tional policy and would loom persistently over manpower planning 
debates. 
In 1962 would also be established the Educational Investment 
Planning Program (EIP), which would later absorb and broaden most 
of the Study Group’s activities by focusing on the social and economic 
complexities of education. The EIP aimed at promoting educational 
planning and had a significant activity in promoting country reviews 
of educational planning practices.9 An important role was also in de-
veloping activities with the Scientific Directorate such as seminars 
and training courses, especially in the framework of the MRP. One of 
the most significant in this respect took place at Frascati (Italy) in late 
1962 and focused on “Planning Education for Economic and Social 
                                                            
9 A similar but far more active and lasting body was established in 1963 by 
UNESCO—the International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP), which 
would play a major role in training, research and technical assistance in matters 
related to educational planning in addition to an extensive activity of reports and 
pamphlets about the specificities of educational planning. 
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Development” (Parnes, 1962b). Among the lecturers participating in 
this training seminar we would find the usual names associated with 
OECD activities related to education (and with the Study Group) 
such as Herbert Parnes (editor of the volume), John Vaizey, Michel 
Debeauvais, Raymond Poignant, Friedrich Edding, Lionel Elvin, 
Gareth Williams and Jan Tinbergen. 
The activities related to the MRP attained significant international 
visibility and created opportunities to expand the OECD’s role on ed-
ucational planning (OECD, 1967). This experience was extended to 
Latin America in 1965, in order to compare experiences in MRP and 
Latin American countries on long-term forecasting of manpower 
needs by level of training, and its consequences for educational plan-
ning. It aimed also to promote the inclusion of the development of 
human resources in development policy, namely through two pilot 
schemes of educational planning in Argentina and Peru. The exten-
sion of the MRP experience to the Latin America included a seminar 
of experts from seven Latin American countries and several OECD 
member states that was held in Lima in 1965, just before the two pilot 
schemes were launched (Hollister, 1966). Alongside this interest in 
planning the OECD developed an activity of promoting statistical 
methods and data on education, that ultimately supported the plan-
ning efforts. In particular, it attempted to provide a comparative clas-
sification of the systems (cf. classification of educational systems, 
OECD, 1972). An attempt was also made to expand this initiative to 
Arab countries, though with more limited results. 
Despite the international visibility, several problems remained to 
be tackled with the current exercises of planning. First, there was a 
lasting dispute about the alternative approaches to educational plan-
ning, which undermined the political support for any of the solutions 
to be adopted. Moreover, different countries tended to prefer differ-
ent approaches and the OECD could not do much more than try to 
systematize, assess, and compare those choices. Second, a major gen-
eral difficulty referred to the degree of uncertainty surrounding those 
planning exercises, especially due to the time-span involved (15 years 
in the case of the MRP). Third, there were significant qualitative dif-
ferences between the various educational systems that were hard to 
reconcile in a quantitative analysis of educational expansion, which 
would be amplified by possible differences in the economic and la-
bour structures of each of the countries involved in the MRP (and de-
spite the apparent similarities). Finally, the claim that educational 
planning should be integrated with economic and social planning 
reinforced the national embeddedness of those exercises and the lim-
ited relevance of international comparisons. Hence, after a few years 
of significant political visibility, the project would lose its appeal. 
Moreover, with the Review of Operational Activities (1964) several 
activities were discontinued (Papadopoulos, 1994, 60), which affected 
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the MRP and eventually led to its end (for a critical analysis, see Hol-
lister, 1966). 
Notwithstanding the phasing out of the MRP, this experience 
would have importance lasting effects in the activities of the OECD in 
education. In the mid-sixties the organization decided to launch coun-
try reviews of education, which benefited from the experience of edu-
cational planning and also that acquired in the country reviews of 
economic policy (Papadopoulos, 1994).10 The first country reviewed 
was Ireland (1966), then followed by Italy and Austria. In the reports, 
as in those of the MRP, the emphasis was on the role of education in 
economic growth, manpower planning, and issues of educational eq-
uity. These early reviews were permeated by optimism about the 
economic and social role of education, though the economic role of 
education was taken for granted in most of the reviews of this period 
and was hardly analysed beyond a few superficial references. 
5. The Decline of Manpower Planning 
By the end of the sixties the activities of the OECD began to reflect 
fading optimism about the link between education and the economy, 
and to be dominated by fears of oversupply of graduates and mis-
match between skills and economic needs. Propelled by poor results 
in terms of social mobility and economic growth, many started to 
question the real economic effect of education in explaining income 
distribution and in raising individual prospects (Griliches and Mason, 
1972; Arrow, 1973). Many challenged the view that education had a 
major cognitive role and that earnings were rewarding these en-
hanced cognitive capacities, arguing instead that the educational sys-
tem was embedded in the social and political system (Bowles and 
Gintis, 1975). This view of the role of education also contributed to 
emphasize the importance of the socioeconomic background for stu-
dents’ educational achievement, and their economic position (Taub-
man and Wales, 1973). 
This growing scepticism about the economic contribution of edu-
cation was notable in the Paris Conference of 1970 (OECD, 1971), 
where the attainments in terms of growth, in member-states, were 
regarded as insufficient and many voices echoed a concern that 
growth should be regarded as an instrument rather than an aim in 
itself (as it was somehow in the Washington conference). The increas-
ing crisis of confidence in the economic role of education affected 
negatively human capital theory, regarded as too optimistic about the 
                                                            
10 These reviews were preceded, during the mid-sixties, by some Reviews of 
National Policies for Science and Education, which tended to be more specific 
than the subsequent country reviews. For an analysis of the OECD country 
reviews on education see Kogan (1979). 
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economic potential of education to promote growth and especially 
social mobility. The conference was also embedded in a context of 
increasing awareness of the social issues on education, focusing on 
issues such as the equality of educational opportunity, and on the so-
cialisation and individualisation dimensions of education as policy 
goals. However, and although the conference called for a renewed 
educational planning “less technocratic and more speculative” (Pa-
padopoulos, 1990, 124), reflecting a more sceptical context among re-
search and policy circles on the economic achievements of education 
and in educational planning, it did not lead to a better acceptance of 
human capital theory.11 
The reflections about the effectiveness of manpower planning 
came at a time when educational planning was becoming increasingly 
institutionalized among member countries. This was supported by a 
series of meetings organized by the OECD that started by 1966 and 
that would take place roughly twice a year. In the summer of 1969, 18 
reports on educational planning submitted by member countries 
were presented and discussed at a meeting. One of the major issues 
emerging from the discussion was the perception that educational 
planning was being developed within governmental units and with 
very limited interaction with higher education institutions and public 
opinion. The technical difficulties of these efforts also seemed to over-
shadow the dynamic nature of education as an object of planning (es-
pecially in view of the huge expansion of the education system). The 
outcomes of that discussion would be published in 1973 and high-
lighted a growing concern about the adequacy and effectiveness of 
educational planning (OECD, 1973a). 
These policy challenges would continue to be discussed through-
out the seventies as in meetings of the OECD Education Committee at 
the Ministerial level. One example of that was the one that took place 
in October 1978 and whose summary was presented in the report 
“Future Educational Policies in the Changing Social and Economic 
Context” (OECD, 1979a). The report highlighted the widespread 
recognition that the conditions that had promoted the massive expan-
sion of the previous two decades had changed, due to the economic 
crisis and the limitations in public expenditure that characterized 
much of the 1970s, which conditioned further expansion. Moreover, 
the development of mass systems of higher education in the 1960s 
and 1970s created significant organizational and systemic challenges 
that needed to be addressed by policy-makers. There was a broad 
perception that the economic crisis had undermined the confidence of 
governments and societies in the economic and social roles of educa-
tion. Hence, the need to shift the focus towards qualitative improve-
ments, rather than quantitative ones, and to the efficiency and effec-
                                                            
11 See also OECD (1973b). 
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tiveness of the educational system and educational expenditures (see 
also OECD, 1973b). This also reflected the evolution of the field, 
which was increasingly concerned with issues of quality and efficien-
cy (Teixeira, 2000). Interestingly, the report used the expression “hu-
man capital” a few times, especially in the context of accumulation of 
skills and its return in the labour market. This was mainly done in the 
technical report prepared the Secretariat, suggesting that the internal 
institutional context was becoming more congenial to that kind of 
language and rationales. 
Around that time the Education Committee commissioned a re-
port to reassess educational planning in view of the developments of 
the previous 20 years and the degree of uncertainty faced by educa-
tional systems and educational policies in the turn to the eighties—
“Educational Planning: A reappraisal” (OECD, 1983). This exercise 
took into consideration both the unprecedented expansion of the pre-
vious two decades of the education system of most member-states 
and the economic and social crisis of the 1970s that had affected the 
demand for qualified labour, eroding the beliefs that underpinned 
most of the aforementioned expansion. In the background report pre-
pared by the Scientific Secretariat it was attempted to identify the ma-
jor factors that had affected the evolution of educational planning and 
what role could be played by educational planning in the future, 
bearing in mind the changes in the socio-economic context. This 
overview report was followed by a series of contributions reflecting 
about national experiences with educational planning in several 
OECD countries and a couple of contributions reflecting about the 
policy issues, the technical challenges and the future of educational 
planning.12 
The predominant tone reflected a defence of the usefulness of 
planning, but the need to rethink the approach that had prevailed 
over the previous decades. First, a softer approach to planning that 
focussed on qualitative changes and improvements in the educational 
system. Second, a greater account of the uncertainty and dynamic na-
ture of the object and context faced by educational planning. Finally, 
a plea for a greater interaction between the results of educational re-
search and the practice of educational planning, namely by taking 
into account the bottlenecks and the complexities presented by mas-
sified education systems. Although the organization remained inter-
ested in educational planning, the tone was more detached and the 
topic had lost interest in the agenda of the OECD.	13 
                                                            
12 The latter chapters were prepared by prominent economists of education, 
several of which had been long-time collaborators of the organization in this field 
such as Jan Tinbergen and Gareth Williams. 
13 On the change of tide against manpower planning in educational policy see 
Ahamad and Blaug (1973). 
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6. From Manpower Planning to Credentialism 
The waning of support for manpower planning did not benefit im-
mediately the human capital approach to educational policy, favour-
ing instead a more critical view about the economic contribution of 
education to social and individual welfare. The economic context of 
the 1970s, affected by sluggish productivity, economic crisis, and dis-
appointing improvements in social mobility, had clearly affected the 
confidence that investments in education could contribute to en-
hanced productivity, faster growth, and more dynamic labour mar-
kets. This would provide another barrier to the dissemination of hu-
man capital views within the OECD. 
One of the critical points referred to the debates about the role of 
education in economic growth. The sluggish performance of most 
western economies during the late sixties and most of the seventies, 
especially at the productivity level, contributed to cool down the ex-
pectations from training and technological progress (cf. Jorgenson, 
1990). The question that was raised by some was that if education was 
supposed to enhance productivity, hence growth, how come that in a 
period of great educational expansion the levels of productivity were 
showing such a poor performance (Thurow, 1982). Moreover, at the 
same time that growth and development issues were losing much of 
their disciplinary momentum, some questioned the way the link be-
tween schooling and growth and development had been portrayed 
and deemed it simplistic and/or naïve (cf. Carnoy, 1977). Although 
schooling could have a positive contribution to growth and develop-
ment, this was neither automatic nor independent of the way these 
resources were allocated. 
Furthermore, whereas the early sixties were characterised by great 
hopes in terms of the potential role of education in promoting social 
mobility, notably in improving the lot of traditionally disadvantaged 
groups such as women or ethnical minorities, by the end of the dec-
ade these hopes had given way to serious scepticism. Moreover, alt-
hough there were significant expectations that the expansion of edu-
cation would bring an increasing equality of economic opportunities 
and of income, some authors implied that the empirical evidence 
suggested otherwise, based on an increasing disparity of income 
(Thurow, 1975). The contribution of education to greater equality and 
social mobility, already a matter of concern in the 1960s, would re-
ceive further attention in the 1970s. Several documents of the organi-
zation would question the effective role of the educational system in 
broadening opportunities at the entry, let alone in the labour market. 
To make things worse, the situation in the labour market as a 
whole was not very favourable, since with the arrival of the first 
groups of baby-boomers on the labour market the private returns to 
education were falling rapidly (see Freeman, 1976). It was argued 
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that, because earlier estimates of returns to education had been based 
in cross-section data, they had overestimated the returns to educa-
tion, and with the progressive expansion of educated labour the re-
turns would diminish steadily. The rising unemployment, especially 
affecting younger cohorts, would become a matter of concern for the 
OECD and that would pervade several of the organizations’ reports 
from the 1970s onwards. Hence, the organization placed a growing 
emphasis on issued of effectiveness and the performance of the edu-
cational system, especially at the higher levels, and its articulation 
with the labour market.14 The tone was less on quantitative expan-
sion, and more on the effectiveness and efficiency of the social in-
vestments allocated to education. 
The environment in the turn to the seventies became infused with 
a growing scepticism with the employment and wage effects of edu-
cation in the labour market, in what was often labelled as credential-
ism (Berg, 1970), and that undermined a view that saw education and 
enhancing productivity and growth (as in the human capital theory). 
These claims would have a strong impact in economics through the 
work of Michael Spence on market signalling (Spence, 1973) or the 
criticisms of Kenneth Arrow (1973), who also wanted to challenge 
‘the current human capital orthodoxy’ and intended to ‘formalize 
views expressed by some sociologists,’ which had suggested that ed-
ucation had mainly a credentialist effect. 
This challenge to human capital raised by screening had signifi-
cant implications for policymaking in general and development poli-
cy in particular. On a general basis it questioned the existence of sig-
nificant productivity effects of education, let alone the externalities 
normally associated with education. If the productive behaviour was 
hardly influenced by education, it was even less obvious that other 
secondary effects were significant. Thus, the main reason advanced 
for public funding of education was severely weakened. 
7. The Growing Dissemination of Human Capital Research 
Initially, the doubts on the role of educational planning gave place to 
a general scepticism on the role of education altogether rather than to 
a change in methodologies or perspectives that would be more fa-
vourable to human capital research (see Papadopoulos, 1994, 67). This 
meant that human capital would still face a hard task within the 
OECD corners, even after the waning of the manpower approach on 
educational debates and policy-making. Nonetheless, and despite 
those resistances, there were some isolated signs of the increasing use 
of human capital research in OECD reports and documents, which 
                                                            
14 See, for instance, the Reports “Development of Higher Education, 1950-1967” 
(1971) and “Indicators of Performance of Educational Systems” (1973). 
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started already in the early 1970s, but would become more visible in 
the late 1970s and, especially, in the 1980s. 
The presence of human capital research in the debates about edu-
cational systems was already significant in a report published in 
1973—“Indicators of Performance of Educational Systems” (OECD, 
1973). This was the most extensive use to date of several works relat-
ed to human capital theory, with references to the work of, among 
others, Gary Becker, Jacob Mincer, T. W. Schultz, Mary Jean Bowman, 
Mark Blaug, Finis Welch, and Zvi Griliches. The report is also inter-
esting for the extensive use of academic research in footnotes sup-
porting the arguments presented regarding the relationship between 
education and the economic system, much more detailed than in pre-
vious reports. This covered the contribution of education to economic 
growth, the indicators assessing the quality of the labour force, and 
the efficient allocation of educated labour. 
A few years later, the OECD, through the Education Committee, 
commissioned a study coordinated by Kjell Härnqvist about the Indi-
vidual Demand for Education (1978). The study included an analyti-
cal report and several national case studies from France, Germany, 
Greece and the United Kingdom. The first volume presented the the-
oretical framework used for the study and an analysis of empirical 
findings observed on that issue, with particular attention to the Swe-
dish case (from where the coordinator of the study originated). In a 
second volume were presented the four case studies and a general 
report summarizing the main findings. The study presented several 
interesting features, not the least the focus on individual demand, 
rather than on social decision-making. Thus, the study gave a much 
greater attention to individual motivations and the social factors in-
fluencing the former, and in doing this provided a much greater visi-
bility to issues of cost-benefit analysis and rates of return analysis and 
their relevance to the individual demand for education, especially at 
the higher education levels. Although the study was not restricted to 
economic factors, and gave significant attention to social, cultural, 
and psychological factors, it emphasised the relevance of economic 
and financial motivations, especially in the context of higher educa-
tion. 
Hence, it would take a good few years until it became popular 
within the OECD to revisit the link between education and the econ-
omy, which would happen only well into the eighties. This trend re-
flected the renewed vitality of human capital research from the mid-
eighties onwards, which garnered increasing attention among policy-
makers. As it happened before, in the early sixties, the renewed inter-
est of international organizations like the OECD was largely associat-
ed with developments in growth theory that gave enhanced visibility 
to human capital, notably due to the development of the so-called 
endogenous growth literature (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988). This more 
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recent work challenged a certain mechanistic view that to a certain 
extent had proliferated in the early years of human capital research 
(Nelson and Phelps, 1966). Moreover, this new wave of research on 
growth and development emphasised the externalities associated 
with education and training, giving additional strength for govern-
ment support to these activities. The strengthening of the relevance of 
human capital for economic growth had also to do with the develop-
ments regarding the role of technology and its impact in enhancing 
the demand for more and better qualified workers (Goldin and Katz, 
2004). Moreover, research about returns to education confirmed that 
the role of education was significant and common to all groups, 
though far more complex than initially suggested and with unequal 
effects among different groups (Card, 2001). 
In several of the contributions to the aforementioned report of 
1983, the term human capital was being more frequently used and not 
anymore to be criticised or qualified as a misguided metaphor or fal-
lacy (as it was frequent in the debates of the 1960s). The expression 
‘investment in human capital’ (by employers and by individuals) was 
used three times in the chapter by Tinbergen and Psacharopoulos.15 
Several of the contributors conceded that there could exist a small 
screening effect but they asserted it was neither lasting nor as relevant 
as sometimes supposed. However, many economists and policy-
makers consider that though the correlation between schooling and 
earnings was well documented empirically, doubts remained about 
the factors explaining it and that the empirical evidence available at 
that time was insufficient to clarify this issue in a definitive way 
(Blaug, 1985; Rosen, 1977). 
The attention at the OECD to human capital topics would grow 
significantly in the late 1980s and would become a central issue in 
several reports published henceforth. Relevant examples of that pat-
tern would be the following ones: “New Technologies in 1990s: A So-
cio-economic strategy” (1988); “Education and the Economy in a 
Changing Society” (1989); “Measuring What People Know: Human 
Capital Accounting for the Knowledge Economy” (1996); “Human 
Capital Investment: An International Comparison” (CERI, OECD, 
1998). 
                                                            
15 Psacharopoulos was a strong supporter of a human capital explanation of 
earnings differences and had participated actively in those debates throughout 
the 1970s in academic circles (see, for instance Psacharopoulos, 1973a; 1973b). 
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8. Concluding Remarks 
In this article we have followed the evolution of OECD’s views about 
the economic role of education from the sixties to the eighties and 
have shown how it became rapidly interested in the emerging eco-
nomic analysis of education and assembled a study group on the sub-
ject by the early sixties. This early interest has tended to be identified 
as an early adoption of the views of human capital theory, increasing-
ly popular at that time. However, our analysis has revealed that the 
process has been far more complex and that this early interest in the 
economic role of education has evolved to consolidated views that 
were at odds with human capital theory. 
If at a superficial level human capital research had some impact on 
the (educational) activities and the discourse of the OECD, our analy-
sis indicated that the organisation was less permeable that it seemed 
at first to the analysis of human capital economists. The idea of in-
vestment in education had clearly become part of the jargon, the in-
vestment approach seemed to pay off, and human capital/education 
became established as an engine of growth. However, the OECD did 
not take on board the approach of human capital theorists to educa-
tional expansion. Whereas the latter privileged a demand-based ex-
pansion in which individuals would feedback to the government 
their expectations of return to education by demanding more educa-
tion, the OECD tended to assume that educational expansion was too 
important to be left to private decisions. 
Instead, the OECD embarked on a series of activities that promot-
ed educational planning and manpower forecasting. In this respect 
the critical stance of most members of the study group played an im-
portant role in undermining the investment perspective and the rate 
of return approach. Most of the members of the Study Group consid-
ered that the specificities of education and the imperfections of the 
labour market prevented a straightforward application of microeco-
nomic neoclassical theory, rather choosing an approach that called 
governments to play a much more active role in the development of 
educational provision. Their influence promoted therefore a focus on 
educational planning at odds with human capital pioneers. 
Although short-lived, the activities of this Study Group were very 
important in shaping the initial views of the OECD about the eco-
nomic role of education. Although the initial development of human 
capital theory played a major role in stimulating the organization’s 
interest in the economic role of education, the composition of the 
group influenced the OECD towards greater emphasis in educational 
planning. Moreover, their enduring influence in the activities of the 
organization on education have consolidated that initial scepticism 
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about the adequacy of human capital theory as a guidance for educa-
tional policy. 
This case also suggests the relevance of the views of those econo-
mists influential in an international organization and how those 
shape the dissemination of ideas in certain public and political con-
texts. In the case of the OECD, its main forums of discussion were 
persistently dominated by voices critical of a human capital theory 
strongly anchored on a neoclassical framework. To this dominance of 
critical views of human capital theory also contributed the general 
absence of the pioneers on human capital research from the main fo-
rums of debate promoted by this organisation. If the OECD did not 
have too much difficulty in embracing the idea of an economic value 
of education, it clearly diverged with human capital researchers on 
the methods to operationalize this policy target by privileging a man-
power planning approach that limited for many years the influence of 
human capital research in its policy advice and positions. 
The analysis of these debates indicates that nuances of economic 
debates in the public sphere and how often they are superficially un-
derstood. In this case, the absorption of human capital was very su-
perficial and mostly rhetorical, being restricted to a sort of truisms on 
the beneficial properties of an educated labour force, or the promo-
tion of technological progress. Furthermore, and although economists 
working on human capital topics managed to put education and 
training in the policy agenda of the OECD, the process was influ-
enced by peculiarities related to the staff’s economic views and inter-
nal dynamics. In particular, the crisis of educational planning of the 
seventies corresponded to a general crisis of the optimism that linked 
education and economic growth in the early sixties. The dissemina-
tion of human capital theory within international organisations sug-
gests that a group of economists can influence the policy-view of the-
se institutions and that some individuals can make a difference, 
though they need to find an environment that has to be congenial (or 
at least not too sceptical) to a certain theory and its underlying eco-
nomic assumptions. 
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The state is a difficult realm to conceptualise for economists. It used 
to be the main object of early treatises of political economy in the sev-
enteenth and eighteenth centuries. As the classical and neoclassical 
approaches, with their focus on commodity production and market 
interactions, established themselves as the core of economic matters, 
the public economy has been relegated to a derivative subfield. In this 
Springer Brief, Sekera is motivated by the question of “how to restore 
the role of the state as a strategic agent that creates and implements 
collectively binding solutions on behalf of all citizens” (23). She 
blames market-centric economics for the government’s failure to 
achieve what should be its goals, that is to satisfy social needs.  Her 
objective is twofold: To identify the limitations of mainstream eco-
nomic and managerial visions of the government and to suggest a 
way to conceptualise the reality of the public sector. Ultimately she 
hopes that adopting positive representations of the state might 
change the way public policy is conducted and participate in a con-
structive democratic dynamic. 
Sekera is a public policy practitioner who brings three decades of 
experience at the Federal, State and Local levels of government in the 
United States to her reflection. She observed on the ground how the 
neoliberal vision gradually transformed public administration prac-
tises without any explicit and public discussion on how it affected the 
capacity of the state to realise its purpose. She did not find in the ex-
isting literature in public economics and public management a con-
vincing alternative to market-centric theories of the state. This van-
tage point explains the interesting range of references on which 
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Sekera relies, especially from outside the academic literature in public 
economics. 
The neoliberal vision presents itself as the only rational approach 
to government, imposing blinders on alternative perspectives. One of 
Sekera’s target is New Public Management which she characterises as 
a “real-world manifestation of neoclassical economic theory” (17). She 
provides a few examples of failed administrative reforms in the US 
(prisons, jobseekers support, the “Obamacare” website) that were 
motivated by narrowly conceptualised goals of efficiency improve-
ment. In each case, the importation of private sector management 
techniques disregarded the particular nature of the public sector. 
Sekera shows how outsourcing at every step of the production and 
delivery of public services has often resulted in significant cost in-
creases. Paradoxically, financial scandals involving many contractors 
fuelled resentment toward the government which, in turn, helped the 
advocates of privatisation in their ideological quest for shrinking the 
scope of the public sector. More generally, so the argument goes, by 
seeing citizens as consumers, “market mimicry” would pose a threat 
to democratic governance. 
Sekera’s main argumentative strategy is to identify the differences 
between the market economy and the public economy in order to 
show why the “transplant” does not work. For instance, the logic of 
competition does not apply to the public sector because the govern-
ment acts as a monopsonist and because free entry and free exit in 
governmental services are often not possible. Information asymme-
tries and principle agent problems are also widespread. Prices do not 
restrict supply. Rather, administrative rationing follows from the leg-
islative appropriation of a determined quantity of financial resources. 
Most goods are provided for free, or sold at prices that are not eco-
nomically significant. Moreover, the state is less risk-averse than cor-
porations and private individuals, and can therefore invest in very 
long-term projects. Its indefinite horizon also explains why it can pro-
tect natural resources from overexploitation, with a duty of care for 
future generations. Some goods and services provided by the gov-
ernment have been conceptualised by Richard A. Musgrave as non-
rival and non-excludable. This definition assumed that citizens-
consumers are able to assess the benefits of public services, which is 
not the case for merit goods like healthcare, education, and many 
cultural goods. What is more, a substantial share of public expendi-
tures funds useful, but partly invisible, programmes for the preven-
tion of catastrophes, for the maintenance and repair of infrastructure, 
etc. To be fair, Sekera should have acknowledged that many of these 
features are not differences of nature between the market economy 
and the non-market public sector, but more differences of degree. The 
causes of market failure, such as asymmetry of information, principal 
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agent problems, increasing marginal returns and non-rivalry are also 
present, to some extent, in the market economy. 
For Sekera, contrary to the bilateral exchange of markets, the pub-
lic economy can be represented as a “three-node production flow” 
between the government as a producer, the public beneficiaries and 
the elected representatives (62). The government must work with 
often ambiguous demands from the population and conflicting goals 
from its elected representatives. As Musgrave remarked a long time 
ago, political processes are central to the public economy. Unfortu-
nately, economists have taken narrow paths to conceptualise them, 
either in public choice or in social choice theory. Sekera’s suggestion 
for a realistic institutional theorisation of the public non-market is 
interesting, but it is only a call for a new theory, as the subtitle of the 
book states. Contrary to what the publisher insinuates on its website, 
the short book does not propose a fully fledged alternative theory of 
public economics or public management. 
The main flaw of the argument is the amalgamation between neo-
classical economics, the neoliberal vision and public choice theory. A 
more nuanced presentation of the different economic approaches to 
the state would have prevented some sweeping generalisations about 
the “mainstream”. A sympathetic reader might be convinced by the 
author’s rejection of any catallactic approach to government and 
might support the idea that public action should be driven by “socie-
tal needs”. This reader might have been interested to know that this 
way of conceptualising the public sector was common among Ger-
man economists in the nineteenth century and it was also Musgrave’s 
starting point in public finance. This reader might not be convinced 
by Musgrave’s efforts to bring this vision of a distinct public sphere in 
line with the market failure approach in the 1950s. Yet, the broad 
spectrum of conceptualisations within the neoclassical family calls for 
a more qualified judgement on their fruitfulness for any theorisation 
effort on the functioning of the state (see Marciano and Medema, 
2015).  
The book is part of a new series of short Briefs published as ebooks 
and printed on demand by Springer (similar to the Palgrave Pivots). 
The price tag of €44 for a softcover is more reasonable than many 
other academic books, but for 128 pages it still comes up to a hefty 
price per page. What is more disappointing is the lack of editorial 
work by the publisher. Sekera writes in a clear and easily accessible 
language, but the argumentation is often sketchy with many very 
small paragraphs and numerous lists of elements. Furthermore, there 
are some repetitions over the chapters that could have been avoided 
by a thorough editorial job. The layout also leaves something to be 
desired, especially coming from a renowned academic publisher.  
All things considered, this thought-provoking book should inspire 
future conceptual work on the public economy. One unaddressed 
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question is the extent to which the unsatisfactory nature of main-
stream economic visions of the state is due to a defective theoretical 
framework, as the author argues, or rather to the values promoted by 
these visions. With hindsight, the new public management that guid-
ed policy reforms in the 1990s focused on making efficiency gains 
(perhaps at the cost of promoting equality of opportunity), which is 
one of the values at the heart of the welfare state. Another question is 
whether it is possible to develop a theory of the public economy cen-
tred around the production of goods and services. Against those who 
argued that the nature of public goods laid in their joint supply, Mus-
grave and Samuelson showed that some goods were public because 
of the particular way in which they are consumed (Desmarais-
Tremblay, 2017). Goods are public because their consumption is non-
rival and because it is difficult to exclude consumers from their en-
joyment even if they do not pay for it. These features stand irrespec-
tive of who actually produces these goods. Beyond this neoclassical 
framework, Mariana Mazzucato (2013) has recently shown how the 
government plays a crucial role in growth-fuelling technological in-
novation. This is perhaps a good starting point for a more systematic 
understanding of the productive role of the state in economics.   
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Science studies contain a wealth of stories about discoveries and the 
emergence of an idea at a certain point in time, which was to bear 
significant changes in a field. In economics, those stories are often 
initiated by economists themselves and tend to be repeated through 
review articles, textbooks or interviews. Macroeconomics appears as a 
fertile ground for such stories—think of the Keynesian multiplier, the 
rational expectations hypothesis, the birth of endogenous growth 
theories. Among those edifying stories, the one about the discovery of 
the Phillips Curve and its critics, laying the ground for the expecta-
tions “revolution” in macroeconomics, is probably the most famous. 
James Forder valiantly speaks against this well-anchored narrative 
which has been told for years among economists. The story could be 
summed up like this:  
In what quickly became a classic paper, Phillips (1958) discovered a nega-
tive relation between inflation and unemployment; then, either under the 
influence of Samuelson and Solow (1960) or otherwise, policymakers 
treated it as offering a selection of inflation-unemployment combinations 
from which they could choose, depending on their … aversion to the two 
evils; much work was done investigating this tradeoff and, because of it, 
inflationist policy was pursued until Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968a) 
revolutionized thinking by pointing out that continuous inflation would 
change expectations and thereby shift the Phillips curve so that there was 
no long-run tradeoff; and although this was initially disputed, in due 
course it was accepted. (1)  
As the title of the book suggests, Forder’s goal is to demonstrate step 
by step that “each component of that story is false” (ibid.). To that 
end, he provides detailed proofs documenting how the reality of the 
study of the relationship between inflation and unemployment was 
far more different and complicated than—and sometimes quite the 
opposite of—what the “myth” tells us.  
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Forder directs the first blow against the supposed centrality of the 
“curve of Phillips”: neither did Phillips (1958) discover a relationship 
between wage change and unemployment, nor was his article “in-
strumental in promoting the idea” (11). Forder first shows that sever-
al economists investigated the correlation between the two variables 
before—among them, Tinbergen or Klein and Goldberger—and that 
Phillips’ work was weaker than the ones of his predecessors. Besides, 
in the following years, the literature did not rely on the work of Phil-
lips. When he was quoted, most of the time the author was rejecting 
Phillips’ idea that market forces (i.e. tight labour market), rather than 
non-economic institutional factors, constituted the primary determi-
nant of wages variations. It is not before the end of the 1960s that the 
“Phillips curve” expression spread and that more acknowledgement 
was granted to Phillips.  
Then, Forder discredits the common beliefs about Paul Samuelson 
and Robert Solow’s (1960) article which Milton Friedman contributed 
to diffuse: the two MIT economists never used the Phillips curve to 
advocate inflationary policy in order to reduce unemployment. In-
stead, they focused on the instability of the curve and the way to im-
prove the trade-off, to reach full employment and price stability at the 
same time. Forder analyses Solow’s and Samuelson’s retrospective 
view on their own article, as well as the way economists talked about 
the article in the 1960s. He concludes that in the 1960s, economists did 
not interpret their article as a defence of inflationary policies. Howev-
er, Forder shows that this false interpretation emerged progressively 
in the 1970s and became common thought even if not substantiated.  
However, the most crucial point of contention of the book con-
cerns the assumed “revolution” in the story of the Phillips curve: 
Friedman and Phelps discovering the role of expectations in inflation 
mechanisms. Forder offers here a considerable survey of the literature 
on inflation at the time of Friedman’s 1968 AEA presidential address. 
This literature focuses mainly on wage determination, and many 
works took into account the role of inflation in it. In other words, this 
literature did not confuse nominal wages with real wages, contrary to 
what Friedman later argued; neither did it calculate any optimal 
trade-off and advocate inflationary policies. Forder also convincingly 
details how the importance of expectations was acknowledged before 
Phelps and Friedman, and how even the latter did not seem to con-
sider, in the 1960s, that his presidential address brought revolution-
ary insights. Nevertheless, it has to be noted here that Forder did not 
deal with the success of Friedman’s (1968) article. Contrary to Phillips 
(1958) or Samuelson and Solow (1960), Friedman (1968) quickly en-
countered tremendous success as well as many economists opposed 
to it. By dismissing the idea that the article was innovative, Forder 
tends to suggest that it was not really important and that it did not 
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profoundly change macroeconomics. However, Forder has dealt with 
this issue in a later article (Forder and Sømme, 2019).  
Finally, the last part of Forder’s demonstration concerns how poli-
cymakers would have used the Phillips curve in the 1960s to promote 
inflationary policies. Here again, it is a mere myth. By analysing offi-
cial documents and how economists related the policy issues of the 
time, Forder proves that the Phillips curve was not central in the poli-
cy decisions of the 1960s. Interestingly, the Phillips curve more regu-
larly appeared in reports after 1975, notably to criticise the policies of 
the 1960s. It is at the same moment that the myth developed and that 
economists began to interpret the policies of the last decade through 
the Phillips curve framework. The best examples are authors who, 
like Haberler or Brittan, did not describe 1960s policies in terms of the 
Phillips curve in the late 1960s, but began to do so after 1972. Forder 
dated the appearance of the whole myth in the mid-1970s, within the 
writings of several economists (Friedman, of course, but also Robert 
Lucas, James Buchanan, Karl Brunner and Allan Meltzer). With the 
next decade came the routinization: the story of the Phillips curve 
was narrated again and again without any factual proofs.  
The reading of the first six chapters (over eight) leaves a feeling of 
accomplishment: thanks to a careful analysis of a large sample of arti-
cles and books, we observe every piece of the well-known Phillips 
curve story collapsing. Forder brilliantly proves why contextualiza-
tion is an essential weapon for any intellectual history. Understand-
ing how a discipline evolved and how some ideas diffused needs 
putting the “classics” of the discipline in the context of the time. By 
confronting many contemporaneous works, by understanding how 
grand ideas (from today’s perspective) were received, by studying the 
economic context of the time, the historian offers a broader and more 
vibrant picture of the problems at stake in the discipline at the time. It 
then enables to dismiss the imagined pasts that circulate, rebuilt a 
posteriori by the scientists.  
Thanks to this great effort of contextualization, Forder shows that 
the Phillips curve was not central in the 1960s and early 1970s for 
thinking about inflation and employment. By dismissing every piece 
of this tale, he sketches an alternative history of the treatment of the 
relationship between inflation and unemployment, rich, complex and 
displaying useful insights for today’s debates.  
Nevertheless, the book does not go without limits. First, it has the 
weaknesses of its qualities: Forder’s demonstration goes through the 
analysis of a large sample of articles, books, reports, etc. Often, refer-
ences add on references to make the case, to the point where the 
reader would be tempted to jump to the conclusion. It sometimes 
seems like a never-ending enumeration, which makes it hard to fol-
low the argument at stake. The aridity of the numerous lists and 
enumerations leaves the reader with the impression that this story 
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lacks an institutional and network background. Most of the time, 
Forder does not connect economists with one another, does not pro-
vide us with biographical information, institutional details, research 
programs, to go beyond the mere fact of enumerations. There is one 
telling exception in the book, when Forder details the influence of 
Popper’s falsificationism at the London School of Economics and how 
it pushed Richard Lipsey to work on the Phillips curve and to popu-
larise it. He thus gives a lively colour to the alternative story he is 
sketching. 
In the seventh chapter, Forder tentatively proposes some leads on 
how the myth could spread or persist. First, he reminds us that the 
famous founding papers of the myth (Phillips, 1958; Samuelson and 
Solow, 1960; or Friedman, 1968) were not representative of the whole 
literature of the time on the topic. Retrospectively, today’s economists 
are more prone to (even if still wrong in) believing the myth if they 
only read these papers rather than more representative works of the 
time. Another argument hinges upon the semantic confusion sur-
rounding the “Phillips curve” term. Through the 1960s and 1970s, the 
“Phillips curve” was used in turn to designate cost-push or demand-
pull mechanisms, a relationship between unemployment and either 
wage inflation or price inflation, short-run and long-run relation-
ships, complex representations of wage and price inflation determina-
tion or a basic correlation between only two variables (inflation and 
unemployment). This considerable semantic floating contributed to 
misleading economists after the 1980s and thus to the passive diffu-
sion of the myth. Forder also gives importance to some initial “mis-
datings” (181)—like Friedman and Phelps being the first to talk about 
expectations—which persisted and strengthened over time. Forder 
finally underlines that opponents to Friedman poorly answered 
him—and so gave some credence to the story he developed—and that 
the inflation of the 1970s favoured the story which Friedman, Lucas 
or Buchanan were developing. 
All these elements surely have a grain of truth, but Forder lacks a 
systematic analysis of the diffusion of the myth, as a general lesson to 
learn for the history of economics. He enables us to understand how 
the myth circulated and strengthened, but not how it imposed itself 
to start with. One could legitimately aspire to broader and more deci-
sive conclusions. 
There is a fantastic topic for the sociology of science here. “Imag-
ined pasts” remain understudied (Wilson, 2017) and Forder’s book 
offers a wonderful field of investigation. It raises questions on the 
consequences of scientific practices, like naming concepts or imposing 
literature survey section in published articles. Schools of thought and 
concept labels offer a more organised view of the discipline, but they 
oversimplify its complexities and lead to misreading its history. The 
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diffusion of the Phillips curve myth is good focus for seeing these 
mechanisms at work. 
In the concluding chapter, Forder defends the quality and rele-
vance of the work done by economists in the 1960s on inflation and 
unemployment against the common picture of naivety drawn in the 
Phillips curve myth. He sharply criticises the Phillips curve and the 
fact that its existence was never established empirically, whereas it is 
central in today’s macroeconomics. This quick discussion actually 
raises essential questions. The transformation of macroeconomics in 
the 1970s through the impulsion of New Classical economists (Lucas, 
Sargent, or Edward Prescott) but also of disequilibrium economics 
(see Backhouse and Boianovsky, 2012) represented a return of “high 
theory” to the foreground.  To what extent did the history of the Phil-
lips curve parallel this process? The rise of the Phillips curve, its con-
ceptualisation and formalisation could be seen as a rationalisation of 
the research in the field. It offered a platform for discussing inflation 
in a unified framework, but at the risk of losing the diversity of infla-
tion explanations that could not easily fit the Phillips curve frame-
work. Then, Forder’s conclusion would have deserved a more in-
depth discussion of this process and its consequences for macroeco-
nomics. 
The last issue that would deserve more investigation concerns the 
concrete consequences of the diffusion of the myth. In the introduc-
tion, Forder argues that discrediting the myth represents an essential 
task because the story constitutes a crucial part of the post-1980 con-
sensus and of “the story of the origins of early twenty-first century 
policymaking presumptions” (4). Nevertheless, Forder does not much 
pursue this line of investigation in the rest of the book (although he 
worked on related topics; Forder, 2001). How did the emergence of 
the myth influence the change in economic policy in the late 1970s? 
Was the myth instrumental for economists or policymakers to impose 
some changes of practices? The Phillips curve standard narrative also 
has some importance for the explanation of the 1970s stagflation. To-
day, the “ideas hypothesis” (Romer, 2005) constitutes the dominant 
explanation: the inflation of the 1970s was the result of bad economic 
policies inspired by false economic ideas (namely the belief in a long 
term trade-off between inflation and unemployment). The story of the 
Phillips curve myth debunked, what is left of this explanation? How 
should the debunking of the myth transform our vision of the 1970s? 
However, if all these critical issues appear during the reading of 
Forder’s book, it is a proof of how stimulating it is to read and how it 
opens new paths of inquiry for the future. Undoubtedly, it constitutes 
an important step in the field of macroeconomics history, and it will 
inspire innovative future works. 
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This book is a critical investigation of universal natural laws in eco-
nomic science—the idea that laws in economics are like scientific laws 
in natural science, such as the laws of Newtonian mechanics. It is both 
a history addressing whether economists have historically employed 
the idea of such laws, as well as a philosophical assessment of wheth-
er such a natural law-based approach is appropriate for economic 
science. Although the book is both an interpretative history and a 
philosophical assessment of universal law-based thinking in econom-
ics, the majority of the chapters focus on the latter in light of relatively 
recent developments in philosophy of science. Hardt’s discussion of 
recent philosophy of science focuses on philosophers’ general move 
away from “law-centrism” (6), increased emphasis on models rather 
than theory, and investigation of the relationship between idealized 
models and scientific explanation. The author’s extended philosophi-
cal discussion draws on a wide range of resources including Cart-
wright (1983; 1989; 1995; 1999; 2007), Mäki (2009a; 2009b; 2011; 2013), 
Reiss (2012; 2013), and others.  
In both the historical part and the more extensive philosophical 
discussion, Hardt’s central claim is clear from the book’s title: eco-
nomics without laws. The argument is that “economics without laws 
is not only possible but it is desirable if we really want to better un-
derstand the way in which the economic world works” (3). The laws 
that economists should do without are universal laws of nature “op-
erating in all possible contexts” (85). The argument against universal 
laws is pursued both descriptively (through the history of economic 
thought) and prescriptively (through contemporary philosophy of sci-
ence). The historical argument is that most of the major figures in the 
history of economic thought doubted “the existence of universal laws 
in economics” (47). The philosophical argument is much more com-
                                                        
*University of Puget Sound. hands@pugetsound.edu 
596 Revue des livres/Book Review | 
Œconomia – Histoire | Épistémologie | Philosophie, 9(3) : 595-605 
plex, but the main point is that contemporary philosophy of science is 
characterized by “the demise of law-centrism” (66). 
I will discuss Hardt’s main arguments proceeding as they appear 
in the book: first his history of universal laws in economics, second 
his discussion of laws and models in contemporary philosophy of 
science, and finally, how he characterizes the overall moral of his sto-
ry. I will close with some critical remarks, but also some praise for the 
author’s attention to certain ideas. 
Chapter 2 contains the majority of the historical discussion. It 
starts with the classical economics of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, 
and John Stuart Mill, and closes with early neoclassicism, particularly 
Alfred Marshall. Although it is clear that the author has done exten-
sive research, the historical material is very targeted and selective—
the goal clearly seems to be to find arguments and quotes to support 
the view that these economists were not committed to universal laws 
in economics—rather than the thicker, often archival and more con-
textual, style of history that characterizes much of contemporary his-
tory of economic thought. This said, the targeting uncovers consider-
able evidence to support the author’s position that “Smith as well as 
Ricardo, Mill, and Marshall simply do not believe in fundamental 
universal laws of economics” (63). Even though I would disagree 
with several specific claims in the chapter—for example: that Ricardo 
was reluctant to draw “inferences from models to the world” (91) 
even though every chapter of his Principles implied that the corn laws 
should be repealed, and that Walras emphasized “directly applying 
model’s conclusions to the real world problems” (11) when his Ele-
ments offered a purely abstract mathematical model that some experts 
have argued was primarily normative (Jaffé, 1977)—overall it does 
seem that Hardt weaves together a reasonably plausible defense of 
his main historical thesis.  
His extended philosophical discussion is contained in chapters 3-6, 
although chapter 6 is somewhat of a special case (discussed in the 
final section below). There are many crosscrossing and interrelated 
arguments within these philosophical chapters, so I will focus on 
what seems to be a few main themes. The first major theme is that not 
only have philosophers moved away from the Humean, event-
regularity, view of scientific laws that dominated the literature of the 
nineteenth century, they have also steadily moved away from the 
syntactic view of scientific theories associated with logical empiri-
cism: theories as axiomatized systems of sentences linking theoretical 
terms and observational terms, generally through some version of 
correspondence rules. There are many aspects to the recent philo-
sophical developments Hardt discusses, but three of the most im-
portant are (i) an increased concern with the actual practice of science 
(I would call this the naturalistic turn), (ii) an increased emphasis on 
scientific models and a decreased emphasis on scientific theories, and 
| Revue des livres/Book Review 597 
Œconomia – History | Methodology | Philosophy, 9(3) : 595-605 
(iii) the development of various versions of the semantic (or model-
based, or non-statement, or predicate) view of scientific theories in 
which scientific theories are simply families of models. 
A second major theme, associated with Cartwright (1989; 1999; 
2007) and others, is the idea that what philosophers have traditionally 
thought of as scientific laws are not found directly in nature; they are 
manifestations of nature’s capacities, but capacities seldom reveal 
themselves directly because of complex countervailing forces and 
disturbances (this is similar to J. S. Mill’s discussion of tendency laws 
in economics). Scientific laws only manifest themselves through spe-
cifically constructed nomological machines, and models serve as blue-
prints for such nomological machines. As Hardt explains: 
the practical problem with such an approach is that capacities can be pre-
sent, while at the same time they need not manifest themselves … There-
fore, how to identify them? Cartwright’s answer is the following: build 
models, the blueprints of nomological machines … Laws are not discov-
ered, but they are created in models, since only models (ideal circum-
stances) offer arrangements in which nature is reliable. In other words, on-
ly in models, without the presence of disturbing factors, is it possible to 
analyze manifestations of capacities. (82) 
Perhaps the most important thing that Hardt takes from Cartwright is 
“that models come first and laws only later, since models are what 
produce laws” (93). 
The third main theme concerns one of the most controversial ques-
tions within contemporary philosophy of economics: How can highly 
idealized (fictional) models explain, or provide other epistemic value 
regarding, real world phenomena. As Petri Ylikoski and Emrah Ay-
dinonat recently put it: 
Highly abstract and simplified theoretical models have an important role 
in many sciences, for example, in evolutionary biology and economics. 
Although both scientists and philosophers have expressed doubts about 
the epistemic import of these idealized models, many scientists believe 
that they provide explanatory insight into real-world phenomena. Under-
standing the epistemic value of these abstract representations is one of the 
key challenges for philosophers of science who attempt to make sense of 
scientific modeling (Ylikoski and Aydinonat, 2014, 19) 
Hardt subsumes many of the different philosophical accounts of 
highly idealized scientific models into two categories—isolationist 
and constructivist (133)—but in the end argues for a position that he 
calls the believable worlds account which is “neither pure isolations, 
nor pure constructions, but believable worlds depicting structures … 
that enable the workings of mechanisms that refer to the ones operat-
ing in the real world” (134-135). Under the believable world concep-
tion “a model is an entity containing mechanisms that are believed to 
be similar to the ones operating in the real world” and they “are simi-
lar because a model of a mechanism demonstrates the reality of a 
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mechanism by isolating it” (148). Hardt’s believable world conception 
draws heavily (with proper recognition) on both Cartwright’s nomo-
logical machines and Robert Sugden’s notion of a credible world or 
model (Sugden, 2000; 2009; 2011), but is not identical to either. Hardt 
summarizes his account of the relationship between idealized eco-
nomic models and scientific explanation toward the end of the book: 
models explain by depicting structures which enable the workings of 
mechanisms, or models are just mechanisms’ descriptions. And such 
models of mechanisms produce beliefs about the real world and thus 
those beliefs are always true in models producing them. Here my answer 
to the question of how models explain refers closely to Cartwright’s idea 
of models as blueprints for nomological machines that produce ‘insights’ 
about regularities in the actual world. (150-151) 
All in all I think the main points the book are well-taken. Most classi-
cal and early neoclassical economists were not committed to universal 
context-independent natural laws and such laws play little role in 
contemporary philosophy of science. I agree. The problem is that 
while I agree, I cannot really say I was persuaded by the arguments in 
the book. Since I never thought that universal natural laws had a seri-
ous role to play in economic science—either descriptively or in terms 
of normative methodology—I was already persuaded. But my re-
sponse to the book was more than simply not needing to be persuad-
ed; I also wondered about the book’s motivation and audience. After 
reading just the first few pages of the introduction, my thought was 
“The point seems correct, but why do we need a two hundred page 
book on it”? The book is an effort to eliminate law-centrism in eco-
nomics, but I do not see evidence that most economists think that way 
about economics—either now or in the past—and it is certainly clear 
that philosophers of science have moved away from such views. Giv-
en this, who is the book for? Who is it that needs to be persuaded? 
Hardt drops some hints about a possible answer—“A nice example 
comes from my home country, Poland, where even after 25 years 
since the end of communism many economists still think that a transi-
tion towards a full market economy can be based on a context-
independent set of laws taken from neoclassical economics text-
books” (4)—but I will stay away from such speculative issues. On the 
other hand, I do have some critical remarks about the book of a less 
speculative sort. I have many specific concerns, but will try to roll 
them up into one general complaint about the book’s organization 
and the way various philosophical topics are discussed.  
My concerns are motivated by the question of how a person who 
did initially think that economics was, had been, and should be, com-
mitted to universal natural laws would react to the book. Would such 
a person change their mind after reading it and abandon law cen-
trism? I think not. I believe the book represents a significant amount 
of research and introduces a considerable amount of interesting and 
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important ideas—ideas that are some of the most discussed in the 
current philosophy of economics literature—but they are not neces-
sarily presented in a very clear and systematic way and would thus 
be unlikely to persuade those who were not already disposed toward 
the author’s bottom line. Moreover, Hardt is not only trying to per-
suade readers that economics has not been, and should not be, guided 
by the idea of universal natural laws, he is also trying to defend his 
own account of various philosophical concerns like the problem of 
explanation with idealized models, the role of mechanisms in eco-
nomic explanation, the way ceteris paribus laws work and should 
work, scientific explanation versus scientific understanding, and a 
host of other issues. Although he offers some interesting ideas on 
these philosophical topics, they are often presented in insufficient 
detail or coherence to be persuasive or, perhaps more importantly, to 
compete effectively with the many other competing accounts of these 
topics within the recent philosophy of economics. I will discuss only 
one general category of concerns, but give several specific examples.  
My concern is that the entire argument, particularly chapters 3-5, 
could have been delivered more effectively. The main problem I see, 
and it percolates throughout the philosophical discussion, is that 
while all of these various accounts of models, theories, explanation, 
understanding, and such, are important, none is given a sufficiently 
detailed discussion for the reader to understand exactly how they all 
fit into a coherent story line. Ideas from various philosophical authors 
seem to pop in and out of the narrative, often in ways that make in-
dependently interesting points, but are almost never given the sus-
tained attention or discussion that they deserve, or that the reader 
needs to understand how the author sees the various parts of his nar-
rative hanging together. I will give a few examples that come from 
various parts of the book and pertain to different topics, but the gen-
eral point is the same. There are too many ideas presented too quickly 
for the reader to get a coherent picture of the author’s philosophical 
position. 
Early on in chapter three Hardt discusses the change from philos-
ophers of science thinking primarily in terms of theories, to thinking 
primarily in terms of models, and the associated conception of scien-
tific theories as clusters of models. He says this “is called the semantic 
view of theories,” but this view “is not itself opposed to laws, since 
the models are specified by laws” (73). This makes models the “cen-
tral units in theorizing” which is significant because “if a model is not 
something linguistic but is rather an abstract object, then one cannot 
assess it as being true or false but rather the focus of attention con-
verges towards asking questions on the relation between the model 
and the modelled, thus the issue of isomorphism” (73). Later in chap-
ter five (152) Hardt also endorses Hausman’s (1992) version of the 
semantic view, in which a model just defines a predicate (“is a New-
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tonian system,” “is a Keynesian economy,” etc.) and that “we do not 
test the model as such vis-à-vis the real world” (152), but rather we 
test only theoretical hypotheses like “X is a Newtonian system,” or “Y 
is a Keynesian economy,” etc. (see Hausman, 1992, 73-76). 
Although what Hardt says about the semantic view of theories is 
often clear within any particular sentence in which it appears, con-
sistency problems emerge across different sentences and larger blocks 
of text. The problem is that there are many different versions of the 
semantic view of theories and while sentences may seem fine stand-
ing alone, as one moves on various inconsistencies develop because 
“semantic view” is being used in different ways in different places. 
Only certain interpretations of the semantic view consider models as 
isomorphisms, and some are opposed to laws. Hardt notes Giere 
(1999) and Suppes (2002) as semantic views, which broadly they are, 
but they are quite different. Giere’s version is fundamentally pragma-
tist which seems inconsistent with Hardt’s emphasis on mechanisms, 
and Suppes version, while also informed by pragmatism, emphasizes 
set-theoretic axiomatization which also seems to be at odds with the 
kind of economic science Hardt is arguing for. There are also struc-
turalist variants of the semantic view—for example Sneed (1971) and 
Stegmüller (1979)—which require set-theoretic characterizations of 
scientific theories that are related to, but different from Suppes’ char-
acterization. This form of structuralism is problematic because there 
is an extensive literature applying it to abstract economic theory (e.g. 
Stegmüller, Balzer and Sophn, 1982) that is in many ways at odds 
with most of what Hardt is saying (particularly in his remarks about 
Walrasian general equilibrium theory, 3; 11; 186-189). Hausman has a 
semantic view of the model-theory relationship but uses the terms 
“model” and “theory” in ways more guided by the practice of econ-
omists rather than by that of philosophers and thus ends up being 
different from other semantic views. It is of course extremely difficult, 
if not impossible, to sort all this out in a 220 page book with other 
goals, but if that is the case, it seems to me that it would have been 
better for the author to simply pick a particular semantic conception 
that is particularly consistent with his point of view and use it to 
make the relevant points, thus avoiding the potential confusion of 
mixing bits and pieces of various philosophical accounts and leaving 
the reader to try to sort them all out and find coherence.  
Of course the discussion of the semantic view of theories is just 
one small part of the philosophical discussion, but similar concerns 
also surface in other parts of these chapters. Another example is the 
brief discussion of the relationship between learning from scientific 
models, obtaining understanding from scientific models, and explain-
ing with scientific models (146-156). Learning and understanding 
have received a lot of attention as philosophers try to figure out ways 
in which highly idealized models may be able to provide some useful 
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epistemic value without actually providing (even approximately) 
accurate representations or adequate scientific explanations. There is 
a massive philosophical literature on these topics—far too much to be 
discussed in a book on natural laws in economics—but rather than 
simply bypassing it because there is not sufficient room to treat it in 
depth, or picking one or two consistent accounts and adopting those, 
Hardt approaches the material much like the semantic view of theo-
ries: introducing quite a few different ideas, but none in much detail, 
and then trying to isolate useful parts for his story, without being 
certain, or making it clear to the reader, that the relevant parts can 
possibly work together.  
I have similar concerns over many other philosophical topics, but I 
will only mention one more since it is so fundamental to his entire 
story: universal natural laws. Hardt starts the discussion of natural 
laws, as one should, with the Humean event regularities (there is an 
excellent statement of the Humean view, 66), but then moves on to a 
number of different non-Humean views, followed by a very brief 
discussion of the syntactic view, and ultimately his discussion of the 
semantic view, while introducing various relatively recent philosoph-
ical ideas that he wants to employ in his own account along the way. 
As a result the reader may lose track of exactly how Hardt character-
izes universal laws of nature, which is of course the main topic of the 
book. It might have been much better to follow a relatively standard 
textbook discussion of the evolution of the philosophical conception 
of scientific laws—as in say Nagel (1961) or Suppe (1977)—and then 
move from their relatively simple summary of the topic, directly to a 
particular version of the semantic view that best serves the author’s 
purposes. 
I have discussed three specific examples but I think they are repre-
sentative of systematic concerns I have about the way the author 
handles the philosophical portion of the book. As I noted above, I 
think the main points the author is trying to make are correct, and the 
philosophical literature discussed is interesting and important. But it 
seems that his believable worlds account of how we should think 
about economic theory with respect to idealization, explanation, un-
derstanding, mechanism, and a host of other issues, is simply not 
detailed enough to persuade someone to give up the notion of uni-
versal laws in economics or to compete with many of the other philo-
sophical accounts in the literature. 
Even given these concerns, I want to be clear that Hardt deserves a 
great amount of credit for introducing these philosophical ideas to his 
readers. While most of the ideas he discusses are in the recent litera-
ture in philosophy of science and philosophy of economics, it is a vast 
amount of literature to assimilate, and perhaps more importantly, this 
literature is almost exclusively produced by philosophers. Hardt is 
not only an economics professor, he is also a member of the Monetary 
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Policy Council at the National Bank of Poland, and thus an active 
economics practitioner, and deserves substantial praise for his philo-
sophical commitment.  
One specific part of the book where I think Hardt deserves par-
ticular credit is chapter 6. I think chapter 6 makes an extremely im-
portant and original contribution to the philosophy of economics lit-
erature; it discusses the philosophical literature on what Lange (2013) 
termed distinctively mathematical explanations (DME) in the context of 
economics. Style-wise it has some of the same issues that I have com-
plained about in previous chapters, but in this case, since the point is 
simply to introduce the reader to some potentially interesting new 
ideas rather than trying to develop a coherent non-natural-law-based 
account of economic models, I think it works just fine. Hardt draws 
primarily on Baker (2009), Lange (2013), and Steiner (1978a, 1978b), 
which are key contributions to the literature, but I would also add 
Anderson (2018), Batterman (2010), Knuuttila and Loettgers (2017), 
Morrison (2015), Potochnik (2009), and Rice (2019), and others. Alt-
hough many of these authors note in passing that DME explanations 
may be relevant to idealized economic models, there has been little or 
no serious research on the relevance of DME to mathematical eco-
nomic theory. Hardt says that “To my knowledge there are no papers 
dealing with this issue in social sciences, including economics” (171) 
and that still seems to be the case. Although some of the discussion of 
DME and the related literature is primarily concerned with the ontol-
ogy of mathematical objects and thus not relevant here, the argu-
ments that are relevant to economics are those asking the question 
whether mathematical objects and relations can play a distinct ex-
planatory role in empirical science. Of course the traditional answer 
has been “no,” but some of this recent research on mathematical ex-
planation suggests it may be “yes.” The literature is relatively new 
and very controversial, but since so many highly idealized mathemat-
ical models in economics have ineliminable mathematical parts to 
them—say optimization or the stability of a system of differential 
equations—the mathematics is a necessary part of the explanation. If 
we had an acceptable account of exactly how such explanations work 
epistemically it could usher in a significant change in the way econo-
mists and philosophers think about highly mathematical models. 
Perhaps it could even be combined with some of the recent work on 
how-possibly explanations in mathematical economics (e.g. Vereault-
Julien, 2017; 2019). Hardt’s own investigation of the topic concludes 
that “the norm in economics is not to use distinctively mathematical 
explanations” (186) and perhaps he is right, but even if that ends up 
being the case, dedicating a chapter to such an interesting, and per-
haps potentially fertile, topic is an important contribution to the liter-
ature. Although I would note in closing that Hardt argues (186-189) 
that Thomas Schelling’s checkerboard model of housing discrimina-
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tion (Schelling, 1971; 1978) is actually an example of DME—perhaps a 
distinctively checkerboard explanation—while the Arrow-Debreu 
general equilibrium model is not an example of DME. I will leave it to 
the reader to ponder that assessment. 
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With an astute analogy Hanley compares this collection of essays 
with a travel guide: travellers are offered invaluable guidance 
throughout the universe of Adam Smith which, as Buchan notes in 
taking up the analogy, “is one of the sights of philosophy and, as the 
old Michelin tourist guides used to say, merits the detour” (15). 
Smith’s universe is indeed that of a philosopher and in presenting 
him overall as a moral philosopher the book gives Smith his due. Yet 
the proclaimed purpose of the book is not only to further the appreci-
ation of the richness and breadth of Smith’s thought beyond econom-
ics, but also to “rediscover his relevance for our time” (ix) by propos-
ing intellectual voyages through which Smith can be shown to “in-
form and contribute to current live debates in the contemporary 
academy as well as the contemporary public sphere” (x). In this re-
gard too, the volume is to a great extent successful and the editor 
should be credited for having brought together outstanding scholars 
from a wide range of disciplines, many of whom have written illumi-
nating books on Smith’s life, thought and legacy or have engaged 
with Smith in their works as important contemporary philosophers or 
as a businessman (i.e. John C. Bogle who passed away earlier this 
year).  
The book is comprised of thirty-two chapters, divided into five 
sections. After an introductory section presenting Smith’s published 
and unpublished works along with his life and the Scottish context, 
the remainder of the chapters seems to be somewhat arbitrarily orga-
nized into four sections treating “Smith’s social vision”, his econom-
ics, “Smith beyond economics” and “Smith beyond the academy”.    
Part 1 begins with “The Biography of Adam Smith” by James 
Buchan who thoroughly covers the subject in approaching it from a 
historiographical perspective: besides providing a succinct biography, 
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Buchan summarizes the history of Smith’s biographies (including his 
own) while at the same time assessing the different Smiths presented 
by his various biographers. Thereafter, a series of chapters on Smith’s 
works alternates chronologically starting with Vivienne Brown’s 
piece on his very first lectures on rhetoric and belles lettres. After 
noting that “Smith would be horrified to think that scholars would 
read the student notes of his lectures as if they were a finished state-
ment of his mature views” (18), she gives a critical examination of his 
rhetorical theory. Eric Schliesser presents the key concepts of The The-
ory of Moral Sentiments, highlighting that the latter should be read in 
relation to Smith’s “more theoretical science of man” (34). Knud Haa-
konssen explores the intertwining of Smith’s theory of justice, law 
and government in his lectures on jurisprudence with a careful atten-
tion to the evolution of his teaching. In this regard, Haakonssen re-
states his previous concern for the change Smith effectuated in the 
order of presentation of his lectures (treating government first rather 
than property) at his final year at the University of Glasgow. Whereas 
the possible reasons for this change had previously been studied 
(Haakonssen, 1996; Metzger, 2010), neither of these studies nor the 
present piece discuss the change Smith made in relation to the obvi-
ously less fundamental but interesting fact (though mentioned by 
Haakonssen himself (49)) that Smith knew beforehand that he was to 
leave Glasgow and arranged the remainder of his course to be taught 
by his former student Thomas Young. In the following chapter, Jerry 
Evensky turns to the Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations and provides a proper guide to the economic dimension of 
Smith’s system. Reminiscent of his most recent book Adam Smith’s 
Wealth of Nations: A Reader’s Guide (2015), the emphasis is laid upon 
the Smithian take-off theory of growth and the dynamic of the circuits 
of capital flow. There follows Craig Smith’s chapter on the Essays on 
Philosophical Subjects published posthumously according to Smith’s 
will. Alongside a plea for their wider consideration by scholars, the 
chapter mostly focuses on the Scot’s historical essays on astronomy, 
ancient physics, ancient logics and metaphysics which combined to-
gether outline “a theory of growth of human knowledge” (92). In the 
closing chapter to this introductory section, Nicholas Phillipson, 
Smith’s most recent biographer, recapitulates the Scottish intellectual 
and historical context in which Smith’s science of man is embedded 
and upon which he had powerful influence (remarkably chiefly by 
his theory of rhetoric). According to Phillipson, a sophisticated theory 
of needs forms the basis of Smith’s attempt to propound a secular 
science of man, “a project of Aristotelian proportions”. (105) 
In the second part, Ryan Patrick Hanley, the editor of the present 
volume, reminds us that an often neglected yet significant purpose of 
Smith’s project was that of offering a guide to a good way of life. 
Hanley shows that the Smithian way of becoming virtuous requires 
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transcending our self-concern. Leonidas Montes’ contribution consti-
tutes an appropriate follow-up to this issue. Analysing the interplay 
between sympathy, self-interest and the four main Smithian virtues 
(prudence, justice, beneficence and self-command), Montes argues 
that Smith is more than a mere virtue ethicist. Elizabeth Anderson 
then reflects on Smith’s stance on moral, social and political equality 
(in comparison with Rousseau’s) and deduces that “Smith’s work is a 
milestone in the history of egalitarianism” (169). In the following 
chapter, Nicholas Wolterstorff provides an illuminating analysis of 
Smith’s theory of justice while underlining its originality on the one 
hand and its failure to integrate “the idea of the worth and dignity of 
a person” (188) on the other. According to Wolterstorff, an account of 
justice that lacks such an idea fails. Remy Debes revisits in chapter 12 
Smith’s theory of sympathy as the groundwork for his account of 
human sociability. He also contrasts Hume’s “contagion” theory with 
Smith’s “simulation” theory of sympathy by stressing the role imagi-
nation plays in the latter (193). Next, David Schmidtz, in a somewhat 
discursive final chapter, undertakes the reconstruction of a Smithian 
theory of freedom. Drawing much on Hanley’s previous work, 
Schmidtz first considers the liberating effects of markets in Smith’s 
thought and then explores the reasons why for Smith the realization 
of these effects might be hindered.  
Agnar Sandmo’s appraisal of the Wealth of Nations from the per-
spective of modern economic theory makes up the first contribution 
of the third part devoted to Smith’s economics. Sandmo takes heed 
not to succumb to anachronism by distinguishing the Smithian eco-
nomic concepts from the contemporary ones. Still, he conflates 
Smith’s price theory with the neoclassical one by identifying the 
Smithian distinction between the natural and market price with “the 
modern distinction between the long-run and short-run equilibrium 
price under perfect competition” (233). In the next chapter which 
aims at revising the literature by vindicating the consistency of 
Smith’s considerations on banking, Maria Pia Paganelli shows how 
Smith’s particular treatment of the Scottish banking system reflects 
his general view of society as “a complex web of entangled relation-
ships among the economy, the polity, laws, and morals” (248). 
Vernon L. Smith’s piece “Adam Smith and Experimental Economics: 
Sentiments to Wealth” stands out among the other contributions by its 
difference in approaching the subject matter: rather conversational in 
style, Vernon Smith traces the evolution of his own thinking about 
experimental economics through his further engagement with the 
Scot’s works. Notwithstanding his idiosyncratic approach, he manag-
es not to leave the main character in the background. The shortest 
part of the volume concludes with Amartya Sen’s chapter where a 
case is made for the relevance of appreciating Smith as a development 
economist. It appears odd that Sen presents such an approach as new 
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insofar as there is a vast literature associated with Smith’s awareness 
about the developmental issues of his day (e.g. “the rich-poor country 
debate” or the developmental gap between the Scottish Lowlands 
and Highlands; Hont, 1983; Robertson, 2005). Still, it is evident that 
Sen’s interest lies in new perspectives Smith can offer to the contem-
porary development economics illustrated by his call for a broader 
scope for the field. 
In Part 4, Gordon Graham dissects all the possible aspects pertain-
ing to the topic of “Adam Smith and Religion”: his personal faith, the 
theological dimension of his thought, and his philosophy of religion, 
namely his inquiry into “the source of religion in human nature” 
(312) (which has great affinity with what Hume does in the Natural 
History of Religion (1757)—surprisingly unmentioned by the author 
despite many references to Hume and his Dialogues). Through a cri-
tique of Lisa Hill’s much-debated article on “The Hidden Theology of 
Adam Smith” (2001), Graham cogently argues that the extent of 
Smith’s natural theology should not be overvalued, all the more so 
that there is no evident logical connection between the theological 
components and the moral and economic dimension of his thought. 
Lisa Hill, in the next chapter, reiterates the central role Smith’s provi-
dentialism plays in his spontaneous order theory, which, as she sug-
gests, is the cornerstone of his political theory. Understanding the 
balance between liberty and gradualism, i.e. the “two key tenets of 
the spontaneous order theory” (332) is, according to Hill, a requisite 
for acknowledging the coherence of Smith’s political project. Lisa 
Herzog then sorts out how Smith’s moral theory can contribute to an 
ongoing debate of modern ethics about the stability of identity by 
providing an account of moral self, which is more or less malleable by 
the social context. In a similar vein, Jacqueline Taylor uses Sandra Lee 
Bartky’s work on sympathy and solidarity to illustrate what feminist 
ethics can gain from Smith’s moral theorizing. Chad Flanders, in turn, 
exploits the Theory of Moral Sentiments in an engaging analysis of re-
sentment, punishment and justice in Smith’s thought. Lurking in the 
background is his critique of modern analytical jurisprudence which 
goes hand in hand with his endorsement of the rationale of Smith’s 
unfinished project of natural jurisprudence. In the following chapter, 
Stephen McKenna forges a link between Smith’s rhetorical theory and 
rhetoric as an academic discipline, thereby underscoring the modern 
twist Smith gave to the classical question of the role of the study and 
practice of rhetoric in the formation of moral character. He also urges 
for further studies in rhetoric “most particularly at a moment when 
the humanities are thought to be in crisis, due at least in part, it is 
often said, to utilitarian pressures of capitalism driven by neoliberal-
ist politics” (400). Right afterwards, Karen Valihora aptly discusses 
the narrative structure of the Theory of Moral Sentiments and how it 
prompts the reader to adopt different point of views which in turn 
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enables the formation and the maintenance of social standards. 
Michaël Biziou in “Adam Smith and the History of Philosophy” takes 
quite a different track from the previous contributions, by providing a 
guide to historians of philosophy who want to do research on Smith. 
He considers the methodological issues to be encountered and traces 
out some research plans regarding the philosophical context of 
Smith’s thought. The section ends with Fredrik Albritton Jonsson’s 
interesting contribution on Enlightenment studies, which is quite 
extensive in scope. Jonnson starts off with a survey of some different 
interpretations attempting to make sense of the Enlightenment and to 
gauge the extent of Smith’s understanding of the newly emerging 
industrial society. He then passes, through a discussion of Smith’s 
view on empire, to a rather neglected yet relevant topic, namely the 
impact of ecology, environment and natural history on Smith’s politi-
cal economy. 
The final part of the book starts off with Gavin Kennedy’s refuta-
tion of common misreadings of Smith’s ideas by generations of aca-
demics and politicians. The bulk of the chapter tackles the use and 
abuse of Smith’s metaphor of the invisible hand in relation to the reg-
ulation of markets and thus sets the scene for the two following chap-
ters on whether Smith’s politics should be considered left- or right-
wing. This never-to-be-resolved debate is epitomized by Samuel 
Fleischacker’s and James R. Otteson’s contributions (respectively, on 
the left and right) in which they seem, with hindsight, to be talking 
past each other because, as both of them are cautiously aware, all 
depends on how one construes the term “left” and “right”. Whereas 
Fleischacker deems them cluster terms, “defined by general aims and 
orientation rather than specific policies and strategies” (489), Otteson 
concentrates on the specific strategies as their defining feature: 
(de)centralization of political-economic decision making. Meanwhile, 
Luo Wei-Dong provides a survey of Smith scholarship in China 
throughout the twentieth century by pointing out the role of ideology 
(first Marxist, then neoliberal) in academia. Note that he presents the 
sea change towards Smith as a result of the search for new theoretical 
support required by the economic, political and social transfor-
mations of the Chinese society. John C. Bogle then draws a compel-
ling parallel between the nascent capitalism of Smith’s day and to-
day’s shareholder capitalism in the USA. He detects in the latter a 
kind of pervasive agency problem which is similar to what Smith was 
apprehensive regarding the joint stock companies of his day: the con-
flict of interest arising between capital owners and managers stem-
ming from the fact that investors do not manage their own capital. 
Deploring this “malfeasance in our system of modern capitalism” 
(532), Bogle proposes concrete solutions in order to prevent further 
financial market failures. Finally, Douglas A. Irwin gives a lucid ex-
position of Smith’s arguments for free trade (carefully demarcated 
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from laissez faire) and against protectionism. He also reminds us of the 
novelty of Smith’s idea according to which economic policies should 
be evaluated by their overall impact “on the real value of a country’s 
national income, or what he called the real annual revenue (or pro-
duce) of society” (548)—which sounds trite to our contemporary ears. 
Just as Hanley thinks good traveller guides should do (xi), the col-
lection offers something more than a survey of Smith’s universe. This 
bonus partly comes from what may be considered to be the very 
weakness of the guide: the considerable overlaps and repetitions con-
stitute the basis for many different and sometimes controversial in-
terpretations which cause the readers to ponder over the subject, 
thereby pushing them toward an independent point of view. The 
book as a whole is imbued with the same thought-provoking tenden-
cy, especially when promoting multidisciplinary research. The one 
qualification to note is the lesser attention paid to the Essays on Philo-
sophical Subjects—thus comforting Craig Smith’s observation (91, 
102)—which is exemplified by the manner in which Smith’s treatment 
of religion, one of the recurring themes of the book, is handled with-
out any discussion of arguably Smith’s most irreligious views in the 
History of Astronomy (Section III). This is not to say that the guide at-
tracts the readers only to the more touristic or popular sights. Indeed 
many pristine locations are hinted to as well, and at any rate, as any 
good guide, it appeals both to first-time and frequent visitors of 
Smith’s universe. 
References 
Evensky, Jerry. 2015. Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations: A Reader’s Guide. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Haakonssen, Knud. 1996. Natural Law and Moral Philosophy from Groti-
us to the Scottish Enlightenment. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Hill, Lisa. 2001. The Hidden Theology of Adam Smith. European  
Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 8(1): 1-29. 
Hont, Istvan. 1983. The ‘Rich Country-Poor Country’ Debate in  
Scottish Classical Political Economy. In Istvan Hont and Michael 
Ignatieff (eds), Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in 
the Scottish Enlightenment. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 271-315. 
Metzger, Ernest. 2010. Adam Smith’s Historical Jurisprudence and the 
‘Method of the Civilians’. Loyola Law Review, 56(1): 1-31. 
Robertson, John. 2005. The Case for The Enlightenment: Scotland and 
Naples 1680–1760. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
| Revue des livres/Book Review 613 
Œconomia – History | Methodology | Philosophy, 9(3) : 613-618 
Nicola Acocella, Rediscovering  
Economic Policy as a Discipline   ! 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  
2018, 424 pages, ISBN 978-110845491-9 
 
Malcolm Sawyer* 
 
 
The economic policy of the title of the book is that of macroeconomic 
policy rather than microeconomic or mesoeconomic (e.g. industrial) 
policy. The use of “rediscovering” in the title serves to indicate that 
the book covers the development of the targets and instruments per-
spective in the 1940s through 1960s. In Chapter 1, the “classical theory 
of economic policy with fixed and flexible targets” is formalised and 
set in a macroeconomic framework. The author presents the subse-
quent undermining of that perspective in the 1980s onwards by the 
rational expectations school, and then what the book views as a re-
vival of theory of economic policy in the past two decades. There is a 
consideration of some of the factors which brought the discipline into 
decline—“destructive critique of part of its core—and some theoreti-
cal advances that could or should contribute to its resurgence” (3). At 
a number of points in the book, the opportunity is taken to relate 
some general points being made to the experiences of the Economic 
and Monetary Union and the euro. 
The discipline of economic policy is here viewed as “to some ex-
tent autonomous from economic analysis” (3). It is viewed as emerg-
ing in the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands. The discipline 
is taken to build on two pillars. One pillar is the “logic” of economic 
policy justifying on democratic grounds the actions of the govern-
ment in a market economy, and the other a “theory” of economic pol-
icy, “to be applied to real situations of specific countries or regions 
according to their historical and institutional backgrounds” (3). There 
is an overview of how a discipline of economic policy developed 
which went well beyond “the nightwatchman view” of the State. 
There is an explanation of why the theory of economic policy flour-
ished in Continental Europe but not elsewhere. In particular, Acocella 
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seeks to explain (section 2.1) why the discipline did not pass to other 
countries that were different from those where it was born as well as 
why it did not survive there.  
Acocella argues that “The second step in the process of formulat-
ing economic policy as an autonomous discipline is associating the 
theory of economic policy with the existence of market failure.” (20) 
The focus of economic policy is then to be viewed in terms of the cor-
rection of market failures. The discussion illustrates the ways in 
which the formulation of economic policies is complicated by the 
difficulties of starting from individual values to define goal choices of 
the social welfare function.  
In effect, Chapter 2 covers the evolution of the debates on econom-
ic policy in the 1970s onwards, and the shifts away from the ideas on 
economic policy discussed in the previous chapter. Amongst the ma-
jor ideas promoting the shifts described are the general idea of “gov-
ernment failure” and the inability of government to evaluate and rec-
tify market failures.  In the realm of macroeconomics, the Lucas cri-
tique—that the prediction of effects of change in economic policy 
based on historical relationships would be unreliable when the policy 
adopted and expectations on policy outcomes change the parameters 
of the economic model—undermined the targets and instruments 
approach. The notion of rational expectations applied to a competi-
tive view of the world was seen to generate market clearing out-
comes, including in the labour market full employment. The scope of 
market failures which were to be addressed by economic policy be-
comes rather limited.  
In this chapter, there is extensive elaboration of the challenges 
posed by the policy ineffectiveness perspective. There is also much 
consideration of the development of rules and constraints to govern 
macroeconomic policies (for example, independent and conservative 
central banks) to limit discretionary policy actions. 
The major theme of Chapters 3 and 4 is the re-establishment of 
economic policy, undertaken in terms of the two pillars identified 
above. The difficulties of constructing a social ordering are fleshed 
out along the line of Arrow’s impossibility theorem. It is though ar-
gued that “political institutions … can be arranged in such a way as 
to reduce or even eliminate these difficulties by skirting the condi-
tions under which they arise” (67). The possibilities of a democratic 
social-welfare ordering and the need for a theory of justice are dis-
cussed at length. The various attempts to circumvent Arrow’s impos-
sibility result are evaluated, and Sen’s capability approach also 
brought into the picture. But for me there were no clear propositions 
on how to proceed in the analysis of economic policy. There is also a 
strong sense that a social ordering is determined by the technocratic 
experts rather than somehow through a democratic process and/or 
the formulation of a social ordering.  
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The purpose of Section 3.2 is to provide rebuttals of the proposi-
tions which supported the ineffectiveness of (macro-) economic poli-
cies. In each case there is a long and comprehensive discussion. Sev-
eral factors are identified as underpinning the policy ineffectiveness 
propositions which have been central to new classical macroeconom-
ics and the new consensus in macroeconomics. The factors involved 
include (i) the idea that it is only policy “surprises” which affect eco-
nomic outcomes; (ii) the idea that the long-run Phillips curve was 
vertical and thereby the economy was destined to operate at the 
“natural rate of unemployment”; (iii) that low rate of inflation should 
be the key target of policy; (iv) the promotion of the political inde-
pendence of central banks; and (v) the argument that “conservative” 
and inflation averse central banks should be drawn upon for counter-
inflation policy, and (vi) the arguments for low or zero values of fiscal 
multipliers and the diminished role of fiscal policy.  
Chapter 4 is entitled “Re-evaluation of the classical approach to 
economic policy”, with the sub-title “re-establishing the second pil-
lar”. In effect, the purpose is to address the Lucas critique through 
some formal analysis. For example, it is shown that “rational expecta-
tions do not impair policy controllability if certain conditions are met: 
even with rational expectations static controllability is guaranteed if 
the number of instruments equals that of targets” (261). This chapter 
reviews the ways in which macroeconomic policy has been formally 
modelled where that policy is used in some form to guide economic 
activity.  
Part 2 is entitled “Economic Policy in our Time” and includes three 
somewhat contrasting chapters. Chapter 5 is entitled “challenges of 
the financial crisis, rising inequality, secular stagnation and globalisa-
tion”, though no mention is made to environmental and ecological 
issues nor the threats of climate change. The crisis in question is the 
global financial crisis of 2007/2009 though there is no recognition of 
the many other financial crises of the past four decades. There is a 
focus on the limits imposed on fiscal and monetary policies and the 
development of new policy instruments in response to the global fi-
nancial crisis. Acocella then discusses the development of new rules 
for fiscal policy on deficit and debt limits, though how far they can be 
seen as new is debatable. Various sections then consider policies ad-
dressing rising inequality, stagnation and globalisation, though little 
by way of concrete proposals emerges. Indeed, many policies to ad-
dress inequality and secular stagnation would not fall under the 
heading of macroeconomic policies. There is rather little by way of 
discussion of the underlying causes of the global financial crisis, and 
how those causes relate to the theory of economic policy. The occur-
rence of financial crises, of which the global financial crisis can be 
seen as having more widespread effects than most crises, raises ques-
tions about the suitability of the equilibrium framework that under-
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lines the formal analysis in this book and elsewhere of the theory of 
economic policy. The roles of the financial liberalisation and de-
regulation as well as financialisation more generally in the generation 
of the global financial crisis are largely ignored. 
Chapter 6 is entitled “One step forward towards realism in theo-
ries relevant to effective and accountable policy making”. It seeks 
policy solutions which are “necessary to ensure proper working of a 
capitalist system” (253) and takes a closer look at issues to tackle for 
building a democratic society. The chapter states that it is concerned 
with two basic issues. The first is about how “information, in terms of 
signals [is] built into market institutions or as offered by the policy 
makers” (253) and moral hazard and adverse selection. The second is 
the “incentives for both private agents and policymakers to engage in 
opportunistic behaviour deriving from self-interest.” (253)  
Communication between policy makers and the public (or what 
could be termed the government and the governed) features heavily 
in this chapter. The difficulties of the private sector “in discerning 
signals” is acknowledged (256), though the implications of that are 
not explored, and there appears to be no consideration of how the 
private sector “signals” to the government. The discussion rather 
emphasises the government communicating “in a clear and effective 
manner, the intent and purpose of their policies and how exactly 
those policies can be expected to produce the desired result.” (268) 
In order to illustrate the arguments in this chapter a formal model 
is presented and described in the following terms. “In a game be-
tween the two sectors of the economy, where the reaction function of 
private agents is expressed in terms of Res [rational expectations] 
whereas that of government may be the object of forward guidance, 
the model of the economy can be as follows” (279). There are many 
features of the model (and the general approach) which, in my view, 
limit the insights gained from its application. The model is a linear 
one and hence is not examined for cyclical behaviour or instabilities. 
It is not path dependent, and hence does not examine the longer-term 
impacts of policy on the path of the economy. And, as with the dis-
cussion throughout the book, there is no considerations of fundamen-
tal uncertainty.  
In Section 6.4 three ingredients which are deemed essential to “en-
rich economic policy as a discipline along the lines indicated” (281) 
are discussed. There is first the reliability of analytical propositions. 
There is mention of “expansionary austerity” as a policy prescription 
derived from very “heroic” and specific theoretical assumptions and 
not backed by the data. However, this does raise the significant ques-
tion of who decides whether the theory being drawn upon for policy 
formulation has realistic assumptions and empirical support.  
Second, there is “welfare and social-choice theory, as well as the 
normative theory of economic policy, which can both be enriched by 
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incorporating political economic concepts”. In this respect, Acocella 
recognizes that political economy takes on different meanings. He 
states that a major issue explored by political economists is the expla-
nation of socio-political relations and interests, preferences of voters 
and the results of elections “as well as divergences between real poli-
cy actions and the social optimum deriving from specific incentive-
constraints of policymakers” (281). Although there is discussion of in 
effect “buying” votes, there is very little mention of the exercise of 
power by corporate and financial interests and others.  
The third ingredient relates to “realistic possibilities to devise 
democratic institutions” (289). This is then divided into the issue of 
“the logical (and procedural) possibility of finding a government’s 
maximand representing the citizen’s—usually conflicting—
preferences” (289). The other issue is “the possibility that in practice 
the various interests in the society and the government are composed 
in a non-conflicting way, enabling us to reach that maximand or to 
get close to it. Democracy should ensure this.” (289) 
The final Chapter 7 is entitled “Why economic policy can be a use-
ful discipline?” In seeking to address that question, it ranges over a 
number of issues. It starts with the stance claim that “Institutions as 
the ring connecting the three parts of economic policy” (295). It then 
moves on to the roles of social choice and institutions for building a 
fair society. Further, it assesses “whether democracy as an institution 
can implement social choice and ensure some kind of equality” (304). 
It puts out a call for the central role of education for democracy, and 
thinks about the institutions for building a well-functioning society. It 
concludes with “a restatement of the need for a unitary discipline of 
economic policy” for a “democratic, fair and efficient society” (324). 
Each of the subjects covered is dealt with a length which is not possi-
ble to summarise here. The concluding chapter is not closely related 
to the preceding chapters. It seems more like an exposition of the ap-
proaches to economic and social policy in a democratic society which 
the author would favour, than the continuation of the presentation of 
the theory of economic policy. 
To sum up, Acocella’s book provides a “theory of economic poli-
cy” à la Tinbergen in part 1. The applicability of such an approach 
appears to require a good knowledge of the “true” model of the 
economy, and to formulate the appropriate targets of policy. The 
struggles to formulate a social welfare function (or similar) are well 
illustrated. The general dependency on a “market failure” approach 
to underpin the theory of economic policy also becomes evident. The 
counterpoising of “government failure” to “market failure” was one 
of the forces pushing against the theory of economic policy. There 
were, as indicated, other sources of “push-back” including different 
perceptions of the “true” model of the economy. The decline of the 
theory of economic policy is treated in terms of the theoretical chal-
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lenges to it, and there is little consideration of the political and ideo-
logical forces which may lie behind those theoretical challenges. The 
strengths of Part 1 are the thorough exposition of the theory of eco-
nomic policy along with the detailed setting out of the challenges to 
that theory which developed in the 1980s onwards. Part 2 is rather 
wide ranging, which makes any form of summary difficult. It ranges 
over policies addressing inequality, secular stagnation and globalisa-
tion though without providing any concrete proposals or offering any 
analyses of the causes of inequality, secular stagnation and globalisa-
tion and the policy dilemmas which they present. The book strives to 
introduce democracy into economic policy-making, though with little 
discussion on participation in decision-making or on voting systems.  
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How should economists connect economic theories with observation 
and measurement? Amanar Akhabbar’s book Wassily Leontief et la 
science économique investigates one specific view about this fundamen-
tal issue. The narrative thread of the book is Leontief’s work and his 
views on the methodology and epistemology of economics: a 50-year 
long constant call for (and practice of) a closer articulation between 
measurement and theory. For Leontief, Akhabbar argues, economics 
should aim at building “empirical meaning” for theoretical concepts. 
In a nutshell, economics needs to establish unambiguous, direct rela-
tionships between measurement and theoretical concepts. The book 
permanently puts Leontief’s case in the context of the methodological 
debates of the time about theory and measurement and compares it 
with alternative views. This encompasses notably three key moments 
for the evolution of the discipline: the Vining-Koopmans (or “meas-
urement without theory”) controversy in the 1940s (the book is most-
ly focused on this episode); the critique and crisis of (mac-
ro)econometrics in the 1970s; and finally, the most recent debates 
about contemporary dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) 
macroeconomics. 
Given the ambition of the book, besides those readers interested 
specifically in Leontief’s thought, those who have a broader interest 
in the history of macroeconomics and in the methodology and epis-
temology of economics will find Akhabbar’s work highly stimulating 
and insightful. Similarly, although the book is published in French, its 
main findings will hopefully find an echo beyond the community of 
French-speaking economists and historians of economics. 
The main claim of the book is that Leontief held a distinctive view 
about the articulation between economic theory and empirical obser-
vation. Leontief’s “operationalist” view (as Akhabbar calls it) hinges 
on two ideas: (i) measurement and observation are providing eco-
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nomic concepts with meaning and purpose; (ii) all theoretical con-
cepts should be (re)shaped in such a way that their formulation al-
lows for direct measurement. 
Moreover, Leontief’s view was not just a “positive” methodology, 
but also a critical methodology. Indeed, Leontief’s distinctive articula-
tion of theory and measurement was rooted in his conscious quest for 
a “third way”, which should be an alternative to both the Cowles 
Commission “hypothetico-deductive” (macro)econometric approach 
(14) and what Leontief called “the radical inductivism” of NBER 
(ibid.). This vision was embodied in Leontief’s work, particularly in 
his “input-output analysis” framework, for which he gained wide 
recognition (ultimately, the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sci-
ences in Memory of Alfred Nobel in 1973). Indeed, the input-output 
analysis provides a distinctive way of combining and articulating 
statistics and data collection (the input-output tables) with mathemat-
ical modelling inspired from the general equilibrium theory (the Le-
ontief model). 
The book follows Leontief’s intellectual journey starting from the 
1920s, highlighting some crucial episodes: his early acquaintance, 
scepticism, and finally rejection of econometrics and macroeconomet-
ric modelling à la Cowles Commission (Chapter 1): the development 
of the “input-output” analysis (Chapter 2 and 3). Chapter 4 and 5 
constitute the actual core of Akhabbar’s book, where he provides his 
most general discussion of the methodology underlying Leontief’s 
input-output analysis. Furthermore, Akhabbar illustrates the distinc-
tive character of such a methodology through a discussion of the ap-
plication of the input-output method to international trade and the 
resulting “Leontief paradox” (Chapter 6). The last chapter goes back 
to Leontief’s use of the input-output framework to discuss economic 
dynamics. Finally, appended to the book is a re-edition and a com-
ment by Akhabbar of the French translation (by Marc Savona) of Le-
ontief’s “Mathematics in Economics” (1954). This Leontief’s talk, giv-
en in 1953 to the American Mathematical Society, constitutes a genu-
ine manifesto of his views about economic methodology.  
Chapter 1 begins by taking us back to 1927, when the young Leon-
tief started working at the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. As it 
has been abundantly pointed out by historians, these inter-war years 
were the early times of new methods for economics: traditional eco-
nomic analysis was combined with mathematics, models, national 
accounting, and probability theory, in what Alain Desrosières (to 
whom Akhabbar dedicated his book) called “a late encounter be-
tween statistics and economic theory” (2000). During this period (and 
actually for quite a long time after that), the study of the business 
cycle was the frontline for the struggles among different visions on 
the measurement-theory relation. Among other reasons, this relates to 
the fact that the collection and analysis of statistics was first orga-
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nized on a large scale through institutes devoted to business cycle 
analysis—such as the National Bureau for Economic Research in the 
United States, but also at Harvard (where Warren Pearson developed 
his “barometers”) or in Moscow (where Kondratiev developed his 
analysis of the business cycle), just to name a few. Leontief participat-
ed to this dramatic renewal of methods; his econometric estimation of 
demand and supply curves, undertaken at the Kiel Institute, was 
published between 1929 and 1932 as a series of articles in German. 
Nevertheless, Leontief abandoned this research path right after-
wards. This first chapter of Akhabbar’s book is entirely directed at 
explaining this turn, and the reasons and arguments for Leontief’s 
scepticism toward econometrics (51-53). In both his early writings (in 
particular his controversy with Ragnar Frisch, 45) and retrospective 
works (Appendix), Leontief’s main line of argument focused on the 
“tautological” character of structural econometrics à la Tinbergen. In 
his 1954 methodological manifesto, Leontief summarizes this concern 
as follow: 
As long as a theoretical assumption is logically embedded in statistical 
analysis, it is almost impossible to verify this same assumption via a com-
parison with the results obtained by this same investigation (Leontief, 
1954, 7) 
The structural forms of econometric models are one of the main tar-
gets of this criticism; according to Leontief, these are simply inferred 
from theory and not justified by any direct observation. A “vicious 
circle” is then prompted through the estimation of these forms (i.e. 
the quantification of coefficients that have no counterpart in any ob-
servable variable) and its use as a form of corroboration of the under-
lying theory. Henceforth, for Leontief, the pretence of econometrics to 
assess theories against observation is undermined by this logical flaw. 
He even characterizes the methodology of structural econometrics as 
“indirect statistical induction” or “indirect statistical inference”. 
These considerations, Akhabbar argues, motivated Leontief’s 
quest for his own alternative approach to economics and a different 
method for connecting measurement and theory. He notably pursued 
two main principles for economic investigation: first, economic analy-
sis should start (and not end) with undertaking the “painstaking” 
data collection work, which requires discipline and dedication in or-
der to collect more and “better” data (i.e. data that will “better”, 
“more directly”, correspond to theoretical concepts). However, this 
footwork should be disciplined by theoretical guidelines, which 
should provide the organizing principles for gathering information 
through observation and measurement. To secure this use of the theo-
ry, the economist should engage with reformulating economic theory 
in order to bring its basic concepts closer to a form that allows direct 
measurement (54). The input-output analysis developed by Leontief 
resulted from this twofold ambition. 
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Chapter 2 and 3 set the stage for understanding the methodologi-
cal foundations of Leontief’s work on input-output from 1932 on-
wards at Harvard. Chapter 2 carefully summarizes the logic of the 
input-output analysis. Those readers who are not entirely familiar 
with Leontief’s work are not left behind, since the exposition in this 
chapter is highly pedagogical. Incidentally, those who are interested 
in integrating input-out analysis to their teaching of macroeconomics 
will find here some great material. That being said, the bottom line of 
the chapter is to illustrate how Leontief’s input-output reflected his 
distinctive methodology, as outlined in the previous chapter. On the 
one hand, the analysis is structured along the fundamental lines of 
the general equilibrium theory (i.e., a set of equations defining equi-
librium prices and quantities for many interdependent branches and 
households in the economy); on the other hand, theory is disciplined 
and marshalled by the needs of data collection, which is actually the 
starting point of the analysis (and not its final stage). Finally, Leon-
tief’s model is a computable general equilibrium model, and the 
whole apparatus was developed in the perspective of being integrat-
ed to calculators and computers, with the help of relevant applied 
mathematics. (The book deals very quickly with computerization, 
although it seems quite essential to Leontief’s project; besides, recent 
developments and debates about disaggregation of macroeconomic 
models—and the rise of agent-based modelling—could be purpose-
fully nourished by a more in-depth investigation historical investiga-
tion of this aspect.) Chapter 3 develops the analysis of these three 
dimensions. It clarifies how Leontief’s re-elaboration of general equi-
librium theory is sourced both in the Ricardian and the Russian tradi-
tion; it outlines how the technical coefficients are directly measured 
through ratios between (directly observed) quantities of inputs, and 
how this is distinct from econometric “indirect statistical inference”. 
The combination of these three dimensions makes the unique charac-
ter of the input-output framework, which works both as a “measure-
ment device” (organizing empirical observations through tables) and 
as a “mediator” between measurement and theory. 
After having built a vivid and clear picture of Leontief’s approach, 
Akhabbar develops in Chapter 4 and 5 a more systematic discussion 
of the unique character of this approach when compared to alterna-
tive methodologies. Chapter 4 takes us back to the Vining-Koopmans 
controversy “measurement without theory”. After a brief presenta-
tion of the main lines of the debate and the surrounding context (99-
102), Akhabbar illustrates how Leontief’s position fits within this de-
bate. Let me add here a disclaimer for those historians that are famil-
iar with the Vining-Koopmans controversy: the author gives a very 
short and synthetic account of this debate, taking the risk of cutting 
short on some nuances in the arguments and positions. It is not un-
likely that this specific part of the book would raise some scepticism, 
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especially among those who know well the over-abundant historical 
literature on this episode. That being said, if one considers the over-
arching narrative of the book itself, the approximation seems reason-
able, to the extent that it illustrates Leontief’s views, notably, his reject 
of NBER’s “radical inductivism”. 
Leontief agrees with Koopmans, against Vining, about the corner-
stone role that economic theory should play in economics. Further-
more, both Leontief and Koopmans bear in mind similar conceptions 
of economic theory as mathematical modelling devices, in the style of 
neoclassical or general equilibrium approach (102-104). This agree-
ment is also clearly reflected in the great success, within the members 
of the Cowles Commission, of Leontief’s intersectoral models embed-
ded in the input-output analysis (104-109). Despite agreeing with 
Koopmans on the importance of mathematical modelling in clarifying 
theoretical debates and producing consistent analytical frameworks, 
Leontief expressed in several occasions his deep concerns about the 
path taken by Koopmans and the Cowles Commission. For Leontief, 
their views of economics had been drifting, indeed, towards a “theory 
without measurement”, an over-investment in mathematical rigour at 
the expense of empirical work. This is also an important point raised 
by Leontief (1954): economics suffered from a chronic lack of empiri-
cal foundations, which then failed to “suppor[t] the overachieving 
super-structure of economic theories” (112). These repeated criticisms 
by Leontief against the Cowles Commission led to harsh replies and 
attacks against some aspects of his work (109-112). 
Chapter 5 develops further on Leontief’s methodological vision, 
which is interpreted as a form of operationalism. In contrast with the 
Cowles Commission hypothetico-deductive method (where it is ad-
mitted that some concepts, axioms, and assumptions are not observa-
ble), Leontief championed an approach to theory constrained by a 
criterion of direct observability. In other words, no theoretical con-
cepts should be admitted into economic analysis before a “factual 
inquiry” could bring to its direct observation and/or measurement. 
For Leontief, the development of economics in the 20th century was 
unfortunately characterized by the opposite process, with theoretical 
concepts outnumbering observations and measures. This view, as 
mentioned by Akhabbar in the introduction of his book, echoes a fa-
mous metaphor of economics as a collection of “empty boxes” by 
John Harold Clapham (1922). For Leontief, this state of affairs is an 
obstacle to building a scientific method for economics. As he argues 
in his methodological manifesto: 
Economics, mathematical economics, in particular, acquired very early in 
its development the attitudes and manners of the exact empirical sciences 
without really having gone through the hard school of direct, detailed fac-
tual inquiry. Possibly it will do us good to be sent down in order that we 
may catch up with the experience we have missed. (Leontief, 1954, 222) 
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Leontief conceives his own input-output framework as such a “catch 
up with experience” (ibid.), “filling the boxes” of the general equilib-
rium theory.  
In chapter 6 we continue the chronological route, following Leon-
tief’s work in the after-war. Chapter 6 focuses in particular on the 
“internationalization” of the input-output analysis, which Leontief 
conducted relying on a growing volume of available international 
data. This brought him to formulate, in the late 1950s, the observation 
that came to be well-known as the “Leontief’s paradox”. This is based 
on Leontief’s input-output tables, where one can easily observe how 
the U.S. economy exports labour-intensive goods, despite being a 
capital-abundant country. This observation qualifies as a paradox 
since it contradicts the basic predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin theo-
ry. The discussion of the paradox by Akhabbar emphasizes two ideas. 
First, the paradox (or more precisely, its making) can be replaced in 
the perspective of Leontief’s critical methodological stance against the 
hypothetico-deductive method (as developed more in abstract in 
chapter 5). Second, the reactions to the paradox reveal the divide be-
tween Leontief and other economists. Indeed, as Akhabbar ironically 
notes, there is a paradox within the paradox: despite Leontief’s force-
ful demonstration, the Heckscher-Ohlin theory continued to consti-
tute a benchmark for international trade theories—though Leontief’s 
paradox stimulated countless departures, amendments and reap-
praisal. The discussion of these reactions to the paradox are particu-
larly interesting in that it highlights the limitations (or inconsisten-
cies) of an ideal vision of economic methodology as truly based on 
the sequence “theory, model, econometric corroboration” (145-150). 
These remarks introduce a few more general themes that are key to 
the conclusive remarks of the book (cf. infra). 
Finally, chapter 7 focuses on what is perhaps a less well-known 
aspect of Leontief work, namely his ambition to build an analysis of 
economic change, i.e. a framework able to analyze variations of prices 
and quantities of goods and, therefore, cycles and growth. In short, 
this could be broadly understood as an attempt as developing dy-
namic input-output models, where the change in technical coeffi-
cients triggers changes in prices and quantities. This final chapter of 
the book is quite short and descriptive, but it provides some interest-
ing insights about how this part of Leontief’s work could fit with oth-
er more well-known strains of the business cycle literature, including 
the real business cycle approach pioneered by Finn Kydland and Ed-
ward Prescott.  
The book features no less than three conclusive chapters (“Synthe-
sis”, “Epilogue”, and “Post Scriptum”). Besides the standard sum-
ming-up, the reader will find here some very stimulating insights, 
which open several interesting leads. 
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The “Post Scriptum” briefly develops the historiographical per-
spective of the author. As the book tries to highlight, the historical 
evolution of economics went hand in hand with the transformation of 
its methodological principles, notably the changing or opposing 
views about the articulation of statistics, observations, modelling and 
economic theory. Yet, historians of economic thought typically focus 
on the evolution of theories alone⎯though there are notable excep-
tions. Akhabbar calls for a shift towards a type of history of econom-
ics that builds a more comprehensive picture. Akhabbar’s view fits 
well with several other recent contributions that make similar claims 
(see for instance Boumans and Duarte, 2019, for the history of macro-
economics).  
Akhabbar’s “Epilogue” is a provocative take on the “What hap-
pened to macroeconomics?” (193) question, where Akhabbar tries to 
put in perspective the broader evolution of the field since the 1970s—
with respect to the rise of the new classical/DSGE macroeconomics. 
Indeed, no matter how celebrated or purposeful Leontief’s input-
output framework has been, it is hard to deny that macroeconomics 
has taken a different path. Expect a few exceptions (such as for in-
stance Anne Carter, to whom Œconomia devoted its first special issue 
in 2011), Leontief’s methodology has had few followers within aca-
demic ranks. Akhabbar points out two major differences to explain 
this fact. On the one hand, there is a sharp contrast between the use of 
disaggregated, multi-sector macroeconomic models (Leontief) and the 
macroeconomics of the “representative agent” characteristic of the 
DSGE approach (but also the neoclassical growth models à la Solow). 
On the other hand, there is an opposition between Leontief’s opera-
tionalism and the hypothetico-deductive method, which has been 
common to both the old and new neoclassical synthesis in macroeco-
nomics. There is, however, a subtler thread in this conclusive discus-
sion, raising doubts about how Leontief’s own view could be under-
stood as contributing to the rise of the neoclassical synthesis (old and 
new). 
The reader interested in more contemporary questions will find no 
definitive answers in Wassily Leontief et la science économique (since that 
is obviously not the purpose); nevertheless, he will certainly appreci-
ate the many stimulating insights that this well-documented book has 
to offer. 
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